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ABSTRACT
ECONOMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
Dilek, Ali Nihat
Ph.D., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Prof Dr. Siibidey Togan
February 2000, 156 pages
Since knowledge has “public good” characteristics, it is shown that the price system 
cannot determine the efficient allocation and production of knowledge. As a result, 
alternative allocative mechanisms are proposed as solutions to the public goods 
problem. But knowledge differs from classical public goods. Because of these 
differences, various arrangements have been proposed to deal with allocational 
problems in the production of knowledge. One of these arrangements refers to the 
patent system, where the society is granting private producers of new knowledge 
exclusive rights to the use of their creations, thereby forming conditions for the 
existence of markets in intellectual property and enabling the originators to collect 
fees for the use of their work by others. The thesis is about the economics of patent 
protection. After considering the economics of knowledge and discussing the history 
of the patent system and characteristics of the U.S. Patent Law, the thesis studies the 
international trade dimensions of intellectual property. Thereafter, partial and general 
equilibrium models of the patent system are developed for the study of the 
characteristics of the patent system and for the analysis of the Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement. It is shown that welfare cost of the 
patent system increases with increases in patent duration, degree of love of variety of 
the society, and the country size. The North -  South patent protection model 
developed in the thesis, deals with possible effects of patent duration on technological 
differences between these poles. The findings imply that, technological lag between 
developed and developing countries is non-decreasing in global patent duration.
Key Words: Patent System, Intellectual Property Rights, Knowledge, Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
Ill
ÖZET
PATENT SİSTEMİNİN EKONOMİSİ 
Dilek, Ali Nihat 
Doktora, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Sübidey Togan
Şubat 2000, 156 sayfa
Fiyat sisteminin, bilginin üretimini ve kaynak tahsisini verimli olarak belirleyemediği 
gösterilmiştir, çünkü bilgi kamu malı karakterine sahiptir. Sonuç olarak kamu malı 
problemine, alternatif kaynak dağılımı mekanizmaları önerilmiştir. Fakat bilgi klasik 
kamu mallarından farklıdır. Bu farklılıkları nedeniyle, bilgi üretimindeki kaynak 
tahsisi problemi ile ilgilenmek üzere çeşitli düzenlemeler önerilmektedir. Bu 
düzenlemelerden bir tanesi patent sistemini kapsamaktadır, toplum yeni bilgi 
üretenlere özel haklar vermekte ve bu yolla fikri haklar için bir piyasa yaratmakta, 
bilginin yaratıcısına, bilgisinin kullanılması karşılığında gelir elde etmesi olanağını 
sağlamaktadır. Bu tez patent korumasının ekonomisi hakkındadır. Bilginin 
ekonomisini, patent sisteminin tarihini ve Birleşik Devletler’in patent yasasını ele 
aldıktan sonra, fikri hakların uluslararası ticaret boyutunu incelemektedir. Daha sonra 
patent sisteminin karakteristiğini incelemek ve Ticaret ile Bağlantılı Fikri Haklar 
Anlaşması’m analiz etmek için kısmi ve genel denge çerçevesinde patent modelleri 
geliştirilmiştir. Patent sisteminin refah üzerindeki maliyetinin; artan patent süresi, 
toplumun çeşitliliğe olan sevgisi ve ülke büyüklüğü ile birlikte arttığı gösterilmiştir. 
Tezde patent süresinin teknolojik farklar üzerisindeki olası etkisini incelemek üzere 
bir Kuzey -  Güney modeli de geliştirmiştir. Sonuçlar, gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan 
ülkeler arasındaki teknolojik açıklığın, patent süresinin artması ile arttığını 
göstermektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Patent Sistemi, Fikri Mülkiyet Hakları, Bilgi, Ticaretle Bağlantılı 
Fikri Mülkiyet Hakları.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
According to the World Bank (1999), poor countries differ from rich ones not only 
because they have less capital but because they have less knowledge. Knowledge is 
critical for development and the degree of the success of the countries to acquire and 
use knowledge determines the time path of their well beings over time. But 
knowledge as a commodity has peculiar characteristics. It has no obvious natural units 
of measurement. Unlike ordinary tangible commodities, the use of a piece of 
knowledge by one agent does not exclude others from the simultaneous usage of the 
same knowledge. Furthermore, knowledge is indivisible and durable, and the 
production of it is subject to increasing returns to scale. Once a bit of knowledge has 
been obtained, the infomiation can be used again and again without exhausting it. The 
cost of transmitting knowledge in codified form is negligible compared with the cost 
of creating it. The marginal cost of reproduction and distribution is rather low. But the 
original production of knowledge requires substantial costs. These characteristics, 
which are the main characteristics of public goods, indicate that market forces cannot 
detemiine the efficient allocation and production of knowledge. Knowledge is also 
important in the economic growth of countries. Growing economies produce more 
quantity, better quality and more variety of goods and services. Growth arises from 
the accumulation of primary factors of production, capital and labor, and total factor 
productivity growth. Solow (1956) argues that 87.5 percent of per capita growth rate 
cannot be associated with factor accumulation. More recent studies estimate a lower 
figure for total factor productivity growth, but growth economists nonetheless agree
that, knowledge generation and, through it, the productivity gains are needed in order 
to achieve sustainable growth over the long run.
In the literature of public finance economics, alternative allocative mechanisms are 
proposed as solutions to the public goods problem. There are three principle 
alternatives. One is that society should give independent producers publicly financed 
subsidies and require that goods be made available to the public freely or at a nominal 
charge. A second mechanism would have the state levy general taxes to finance its 
direct participation in production and distribution of the good. Here, again, the 
objective is to supply the good without having to charge prices for it. The third 
solution is to create a publicly regulated monopoly authorized to charge consumers 
prices that will secure a normal rate of profit. These are the solutions proposed for 
classic public goods such as national defense, flood control systems, radar lending 
beams and lighthouses.
Although information qualifies as a public good, it differs from classical public goods 
in two respects. The first difference is that the contents of infomiation will not be 
known to interested parties beforehand. The second difference is the cumulative and 
interactive nature of knowledge. The stock of scientific knowledge grows by 
increments, with each advance building on and sometimes altering the significance of 
previous findings in complicated and often unpredictable ways. As a result, it is 
generally difficult even for creators to determine borders of their intellectual property. 
In general, it is difficult to enforce the property rights protection even though it may 
be legally possible.
Because of the differences of knowledge from pure public goods, three alternative 
arrangements have been proposed to deal with allocational problems in the production 
of knowledge. The first arrangement stands for the system of awarding publicly 
financed prices, research grants based on the submission of competitive proposals, 
and other subsidies to private individuals and organizations engaged in intellectual 
discovery and invention, in exchange for full public disclosure of their creative 
achievements. The second arrangement is associated with government’s contracting 
for intellectual work, the products of which it will control and devote to public 
purposes. The third arrangement refers to society’s granting private producers of new 
knowledge exclusive rights to the use of their creations, thereby forming conditions
for the existence of markets in intellectual property and enabling the originators to 
collect fees for the use of their work by others.
This thesis focuses on the economics of third arrangement proposed to deal with 
allocational problems in the production of knowledge, namely the patent system. 
Chapter 2 considers the economics of knowledge, general discussion of the the patent 
system including a discussion of its history and characteristics of the U.S. Patent Law, 
and survey of the literature on the economics of the patent system. Chapter 3 studies 
the international trade dimensions of intellectual property. Chapter 4 is on the 
economics of patent protection. The chapter considers, besides the partial and general 
equilibrium models developed, a North-South patent protection model developed for 
the analysis of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
Agreement. Chapter 5 constructs a North -  South patent protection model, which 
deals with possible effects of patent duration on technological differences between 
these poles. The thesis concludes with Chapter 6 summarizing the main results of the 
study.
CHAPTER 2
KNOWLEDGE IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In a path breaking study Nobel laureate Robert M. Solow (1957) estimated that 87.5 
percent of the increase in gross output per worker-hour from 1909 to 1949 in the 
United States could be attributed to technological change. A subsequent study by 
Denison (1985) led to a somewhat lower estimate, but Solow's general conclusion as 
to the relative importance of technological advance remained unchanged. The purpose 
of this chapter is to study the role of knowledge and hence of technological change' in 
the allocation of resources. Section 2.1 emphasizes the importance of knowledge in 
resource allocation. Section 2.2 provides the basics of patent system and alternative 
forms of economic organizations in inventive activities. Section 2.3 investigates the 
history of patent system and the U.S. patent system. Section 2.4 considers the welfare 
analysis of patent system, relationship between patent system and market structure, 
effects of patent system on information diffusion, and value of patents.
2.1 Resource Allocation, Economic Growth and Knowledge
2.1.1 Economics of Knowledge
Arrow - Debreu^ model of competitive economy, which follows Walrasian^ and 
Paretian approaches, is one of the most notable achievements in economic theory. The
' Technological change consists o f not only knowledge, but also improved organizations and X- 
efficiency.
2 Both o f the authors won Nobel Prize for economics in different years.
 ^ Walras equilibrium can be defined as the state where the value o f the excess demand is zero. 
Alternatively, each individual satisfies his or her wealth constraint, so that the value o f his or her excess 
demand is zero.
theory establishes requirements of the existence and optimality of competitive 
equilibrium. Although many articles contributed^ to this development, the resulting 
structure is mainly based on a series of articles, including Arrow and Debreu (1954), 
Debreu (1959) and Arrow (1970).
According to Arrow (1970), the feasibility and efficiency of the competitive system 
depend largely on the assumptions of convexity, universality of markets and absence 
of uncertainty. Convexity implies the absence of indivisibilities and increasing returns 
to scale in production. The assumption of universality of markets implies the 
existence of markets for all commodities where transactions take place. In economies 
where the assumptions of convexity and universality of markets are satisfied, there are 
no public goods and no externalities. All goods are private goods. These three 
assumptions together with the assumptions on private ownership, largeness, and the 
assumption that each economic unit has perfect knowledge about prices, its 
preferences, its production and consumption sets assure the feasibility and efficiency 
of the competitive mechanism as shown by Debreu (1959).
Subsequent studies have extended the Arrow - Debreu theory to take account of 
asymmetries in information among different agents, incompleteness of markets, and 
sequential markets. Actually these extensions yield new developments in equilibrium 
theoiy. Namely, temporary equilibrium, overlapping generations equilibrium and 
rational expectations equilibrium. However, it is more useful to review the original 
Arrow - Debreu general equilibrium^ theory at this point. Indeed, the major concern of 
Arrow - Debreu theory is to evaluate the applicability and efficiency of market 
system, two of the oldest and important questions of neoclassical theory. The proof of 
the theory is based on the two techniques of mathematics, namely convexity theory 
(also known as separating hyperplane theorem* )^ and fixed point theorem^. The Arrow
4 Actually many other economists and mathematicians contributed to the development o f this 
outstanding theory o f general equilibrium.
5 The Arrow - Debreu model can be extended to several directions, for example it may bear 
uncertainty, public goods or external economy concepts with special inteipretations.
 ^ The separating hyperplane theorem simply says that there must be a separating hypeiplane between 
any two disjoint convex sets.
 ^The fixed point theorem is established by Brouwer and generalized by Kakutani (1941).
- Debreu model can be analyzed within three important concepts, namely 
commodities, consumers, and producers.
A commodity is characterized by its physical properties. However, commodities are 
also distinguishable by their temporal and spatial properties. Debreu (1959) states 
that, "... a good at a certain date and the same good at a later date are different 
economic objects, and the specification of the date at which it will be available is 
essential ... wheat available in Minneapolis and wheat available in Chicago play also 
entirely different economic roles for a flour mill which is to use them. Again, a good 
at a certain location and the same good at another location are different economic 
objects, and the specification of the location at which it will be available is essential". 
In this context all goods and services can be defined as Arrow- Debreu commodities*  ^
with respect to their specifications. On the other hand, it is nearly impossible to find a 
market for a pure Arrow - Debreu commodity in reality. Thus, second best 
transactions take place. This special treatment of commodity enables the model to be 
applied in several different frameworks. Shortly, a commodity is a good or service 
completely specified physically, spatially, and temporally. Each commodity is also 
associated with its price. Price system relatively defines the value of each commodity. 
The Arrow - Debreu model concerns the allocation of commodities between agents. 
Market is established only once at one point in time, and all allocations are achieved 
through exchange. Actually markets can be settled many times, whereas no 
transaction takes place except in the first opening, since all agents have the full 
information regarding all contingencies and the market thus repetition of market 
settlement is unnecessary*^
A consumer can be characterized by her preferences and by the limitations on her 
choice. The role of the consumer is to determine a complete consumption plan out of 
her possible consumption plans. Consumers' choice must satisfy their wealth 
constraint given prices. Consumers' consumption set consists of all possible 
consumption plans, and it is assumed that it is a convex set. Each consumer has well
 ^ AH Arrow - Debreu commodities define the commodity space o f the model and eveiy action o f  
agents is a point in this space.
 ^There is no incentive to revise production or consumption plans, reopen the market, or trade shares.
defined preferences, which are complete, transitive and which have continuous 
ordering. Consumers' preferences can be represented by utility functions. Consumers' 
problem is a utility maximization problem. Utility is defined on the entire 
consumption plan, not the instantaneous consumption. The Arrow - Debreu model 
assumes that preferences are convex and non-satiatied. The convexity assumption 
indicates that commodities are infinitely divisible. If there are many agents in the 
economy or the agents are small with respect to the economy, the non-convexity of 
preferences has no bite. The non-satiation hypothesis implies that there exists always 
a more preferred consumption plan for each consumer. Alternatively, non-satiation 
means that every agent spends all his income in equilibrium.
A representative producer is characterized by its owners' shares and by its teclmology. 
Producers transfomi commodities using their technological capacities. A production 
set is said to include all production possibilities given its limited technological 
knowledge. Producer's problem is defined as profit maximization within its 
production set given prices. This production set is assumed to be convex, closed, and 
contain the no production'*^ case. That is to say, the model also assumes that there is a 
possibility of free disposability. The convexity hypothesis implies that production 
plan is infinitely divisible, and increasing returns to scale is out of scope. As 
mentioned in consumers' case, the small size of each producer relative to the whole 
economy makes indivisibility unimportant. Sum of all producers' output is called total 
supply of economy. The model also rules out free production possibility and 
reversability of production process. The model implicitly assumes that all possible 
future technologies are identified. That is to say, producers are aware of not only 
existing but also the frontiers of future technology. However, this does not mean that 
producers have the necessary know-how of future technologies. They are only aware 
of the possibilities and the outcome of future technologies. Moreover both consumers 
and producers are price takers.
In this context, equilibrium in Arrow - Debreu model can be defined as follows: 
Firstly, the model introduces total resources, which determine attainable actions of 
each agent. That is to say, all of the producers' and consumers' actions must be
10 Any producer has the possibility of producing nothing.
compatible with the total resources of the economy. The economy is assumed to be a 
private ownership economy, which means that consumers own the resources. Private 
ownership economy indicates that producers are controlled by their shareholder 
consumers. In the model, market equilibrium is a state when excess demand is zero. 
An attainable state of the economy is called equilibrium, given prices, when no 
producer can increase its profit and no consumer can increase her utility without 
increasing expenditure. Alternatively, the model implies that there always exists a 
proper price system, which clears all markets. Actually an equilibrium is defined by a 
set of prices, a set of production plans, and a set of consumption plans, which satisfies 
profit and utility maximization problems of agents and equality of total supply and 
demand.
Before stating the first and second welfare theorems, it is worthy to make the Pareto 
optimality concept clear. An attainable allocation is said to be Pareto optimal" (or 
Pareto efficient) if there is no other feasible allocation that all agents prefer. Every 
competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimum (first welfare theorem) and essentially 
every Pareto optimum allocation is a competitive equilibrium (second welfare 
theorem) under convexity assumption and rearranging the initial endowments of 
commodities and ownership shares. Clearly, the first welfare theorem expresses the 
efficiency of the ideal market system without dealing with the income distribution 
issue. On the other hand, the second welfare theorem implies that income 
redistribution should be achieved by a lump sum transfer without disturbing 
prevailing market prices.
As mentioned by Arrow (1962), perfectly competitive economy has a great role in the 
efficient allocation of resources. In this equilibrium, each consumer maximizes her 
utility given initial resources including firm shares and price set. Each producer also 
maximizes its profit given the same price set. Aggregate production plus initial 
resources are equal to aggregate consumption. In this system, prices are the same for 
all individuals. Agents' consumption and production decisions are independent. Arrow
11 Debreu (1959) defines optimality as follows; "... defined as an attainable state such that, within the 
limitations imposed by the consumption sets, the production sets, and the total resources of the 
economy, one cannot satisfy better the preferences o f any consumer without satisfying less well those 
of another".
also indicates that, there is no other resource allocation, which improves agents' 
utilities or profits. On the other side, competitive equilibrium also indicates that any 
non-competitive solution can be improved by further exchange.
As previously mentioned, the model has some critical assumptions, namely 
universality of market, convexity and absence of uncertainty. Actually, universality of 
market assumption of the model cannot be easily satisfied in real world where time is 
relevant. Moreover, the presence of increasing returns to scale also disturbs the results 
of the model unless this deficiency is relatively small with respect to market. These 
real world problems indicate an imperfect competitive equilibrium. They are handled 
by monopolistic competition or game theory approaches. Existence of uncertainty also 
affects results of the model. A itow suggests that any uncertainty can be put into the 
model by making detailed contracts. Insurance and common stock are two real world 
applications in the case of uncertainty, but these are not perfect solutions. All these 
problems about the validity of assumptions can be theoretically solved to some 
degree. Externalities, uncertainties can be regarded as Arrow - Debreu commodities. 
In this sense, they can be internalized, and then indications of the theory remain valid. 
According to Arrow, externality or more generally market failure are the results of 
high transaction costs. For example, if the cost of creating a market for public goods is 
high, its existence is no longer worthwhile. Arrow also indicates that, there are three 
types of transaction costs, namely exclusion cost, cost of communication and 
information, and cost of disequilibrium.
It should be noted that the Arrow - Debreu model of general equilibrium abstracts 
from the consideration of knowledge and its generation. It assumes that knowledge is 
freely available to all economic units. But, today knowledge is becoming a critical 
asset for firms and individuals. The new society is called the knowledge based 
economy. In this society, knowledge is no longer freely available.
How do we incorporate knowledge'^ into the model of general equilibrium? At this 
point, difficulties arise when we consider knowledge as a commodity. Marketability
Today knowledge is o f two types; "codified" and "tacid". Knowledge is codifiable if it can be 
written down and transferred easily to others. Tacid knowledge is often slow to acquire and much more
of knowledge is limited by the following facts: (1) one person's use of a particular bit 
of knowledge does not preclude the use of the same knowledge by others - 
nonrivalrous, (2) when a piece of knowledge is in the public domain, it is difficult for 
its creator to prevent others from using this knowledge - nonexcludable.
These two properties, which are also the main characteristics of public goods, make it 
possible for people to use knowledge without paying for it. Since the assumption of 
universality of markets is no longer satisfied, the resource allocation is not efficient. 
Knowledge is also a key input in the production function. However, nonrivalrous 
characteristic of knowledge implies the presence of increasing returns to scale'^. This 
special property of knowledge also violates perfect competition. Moreover knowledge 
is employed as an input in the production of new knowledge. This positive-feedback- 
type characteristic also violates the assumption of the absence of increasing returns to 
scale in production. Knowledge is also indivisible, thus it fails to satisfy the 
divisibility requirement of Arrow - Debreu model.
The information generation process has a strong effect on economic welfare. 
Empirical studies indicate that output per labor continuously increases, and these 
increments cannot be explained by increased capital. Most of the academicians state 
that infomiation generation is the major source of this productivity gain. Therefore, 
optimality of resource allocation for invention is highly critical. Perfect competition 
yields optimal resource allocation under certain hypothesis. However, competitive 
market structure for information generation fails to be optimal, since information 
generation processes do not satisfy divisibility, appropriability, and certainty. 
Indivisibility, the first reason of failure indicates that marginal cost pricing of 
information results in zero or perhaps negative return for the producer, thus ceases its 
production. Appropriability means that, private and social benefits of information are 
strictly different. The inventor cannot get whole social surplus of his invention, hence 
cannot allocate resources optimally. Finally, inventive activities are highly uncertain.
difficult to transfer. Examples include the knowledge built up during an apprenticeship, or familiarity 
with using a particular technology. Because of its non-transferability, tacid knowledge is often a source 
of comparative advantage.
Arrow indicates that “There has been a long tradition, going back to Adam Smith (1776), that 
technological progress is somehow intrinsically associated with increasing returns”.
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Not only success of the research project, but also its economic return is uncertain. In 
pharmaceuticals industry, for example, only one new drug out of four, that enter 
clinical testing, are ever marketed. Furthermore, it turns out that only 30% of drugs 
that are marketed covers their total cost. This means that only 7.5% of all research 
projects in pharmaceuticals industry covers their cost.
At this point, a question which arises is whether knowledge has always been a critical 
asset for firms and individuals. According to Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986), the 
answer is probably ‘no’. They studied the link between pure science and economic 
growth of Western society. Their findings suggest that, science and industrial 
technology'^^ have always tracked separate paths in the West before the 19^ ’’ century. 
Scientists had no commercial worries, their main aim was to explain natural 
phenomenon. On the contrary, industry had no interest in these scientific 
explanations, since they were not, for the most part, satisfying economic needs. They 
usually had no direct economic application, they emanated mainly from academic and 
independent scientists whose incentives were not basically economic. On the industry 
side, technological developments were achieved by artisans and engineers with little 
or no scientific training. These technological developments were primarily based on 
previous experiences, and craft traditions, which were nothing but learning by doing 
type knowledge generation. Industrialists in general did not employ scientists. These 
observations clearly reveal that, there were no deliberate investments in research and 
development activities in industry.
The situation changed in the last part of the 19^ '’ century. The derivation of new or 
improved materials, products and processes from basic scientific studies mainly in 
chemistry, electricity and other areas became the concern of industrial scientist. In 
fact these new materials, products and processes have potential commercial value. 
The narrowing gap between scientific studies and industry during the 19‘'’ century can 
be explained as follows. Firstly, Western basic science created explanations for 
natural phenomenon that possessed valuable potential applications in industry. 
Secondly, West provided several necessary autonomous institutions, which enabled 
the transfer of basic scientific knowledge accumulation into the industry, eventually
Industrial technology can be defined as applied science in industry with commercial aim.
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into economic growth. In this sense, the major contribution of the West was the 
development of an economic system for innovation'^. Actually Chinese, Indian and 
Islamic cultures had developed several scientific inventions, whereas they lacked 
systematic translation from basic science to industrial application.
The first phase of Western economic system for innovation, alternatively transition 
from basic science to industrial application were the rise of industrial research 
laboratories which performed testing, measuring, analyzing, and quantifying tasks. 
These laboratories hired many scientists systematically for the first time in industrial 
history. However, these laboratories contributed to the standardization of production 
processes rather than invention or new scientific insights. Rarely, these scientists 
produced new products of great commercial value, but they improved the materials 
that were used in known product. Actually only a very few new technologies had such 
economic significance. At the end of the 19*'’ century, industry was moving a closer 
synchronism with basic science. During previous centuries, ideas of basic science 
were waiting for hundreds of years to find a commercial application. On the contrary, 
last part of the 19*'’ century witnessed the fact that the intervals were growing shorter 
between scientific discovery and its commercial application. By the early years of the 
twentieth century, industrial research had clearly turned toward the development of 
new products and processes. If the knowledge required for innovation lay on the 
frontiers of science, then scientists of industrial laboratories studied on or even 
beyond the frontiers.
According to Rosenberg and Birdzell, there is no doubt that basic science contributed 
to the success of Western industrial science. However, the rise of Western industrial 
science cannot be completely explained by either contribution of extensive basic 
science or scale of the West. Actually, the comparative success of the West is based 
on three important points: the decentralization of the selection of innovation projects, 
the incentives for innovation, and the diversity of research agencies.
Green Paper on Innovation (1995) defines innovation as follow, “It denotes both a process and its 
result...it involves the transformation of an idea into a marketable product or service, a new or 
improved manufacturing or distribution process, or a new method o f social service”.
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Firstly, innovation projects, which aim to generate new products, services, or 
processes, bear high uncertainty. It is difficult to predict the success or failure of 
projects in the beginning. Until a product or process has actually been developed, 
there is uncertainty about its technological feasibility, and its cost. There is also 
uncertainty about its commercial success which is determined by consumer's 
response. The West deals with this problem by decentralizing the selection of 
innovation projects. Clearly Western economies allow a large number of independent 
enterprises, as well as individuals who might fonu new enterprises, to decide to 
perform or ignore proposals for innovation. In this sense, the West provides a 
dynamic economic environment for innovation projects, which generally require 
organizational changes. Rosenberg and Birdzell conclude that, innovation is more 
likely to occur in a society that is open to the transformation of new enterprises than 
in a society that relies on its existing organizations for imiovation. Therefore, West 
solves the uncertainty problem to some degree by a decentralized statistical selection 
mechanism.
Secondly, the openness to new forms of enterprises, or to a change in the organization 
of existing ones, has put Western enterprises into a highly competitive environment. 
Since new technologies developed by rivals may severely injure them. In this way, the 
openness of Western societies to the new enterprises, or to changes in the operations 
of existing organizations encourages innovative activities by the threat of penalty for 
failure to innovate.
Thirdly, Western industry supports a wide array of different scientific and industrial 
organizations. These research organizations can be diversified with respect to their 
size, financial structure, goals, personnel, and facilities. It is important to note that, the 
West has no noteworthy obstacles to this proliferation of research organizations. 
These various research institutions both cooperate and compete with each other, and 
create a dynamic industry. In this context, there was no attempt to standardize these 
various structures; conversely diversity and flexibility was allowed. That is precisely 
what was needed to shape institutions according to their own special needs, since 
different sectors may have special requirements.
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Economic growth results from innovation, namely the introduction of products, 
processes and services. Science and technology are key to innovation, but they are not 
sole inputs. The extensive growth in scientific and technical knowledge could not 
have been automatically transformed into continuing economic growth of the West. 
Western societies' social consensus on the demand of new products, seiwices and 
innovation caused this transformation. Actually, markets of the West, most basic 
economic institutions, helped this transition, since they conferred great rewards on 
successful innovations and penalized failures. Rosenberg and Birdzell indicate that 
high degree of autonomy among the political, religious, scientific, and economic 
environment of West enables the enormous development of technology.
Shortly, with the growth of knowledge based economy, the West developed a system 
for innovation and invention. Industrial research laboratories applied scientific 
methods and knowledge to commercial problems.
2.1.2 Role of Patent System in Information Generation
Information generation process is self-sustaining, each newly created information 
which enters public knowledge domain, also helps further infomiation generation 
activities. However, the role of patent system in the generation and diffusion of 
information has been under debate for prolonged periods of time. Patent system is 
designed to achieve a balance between private incentive to invest in research and 
development and the need to protect public interest. Patent system is supposed to 
foster innovative activities by giving exclusive ownership rights to the inventor. 
Unfortunately the success of this theoretical approach is still controversial.
Importance of patent protection varies across sectors; for example, phamiaceuticals 
and infomiation technology industries are very sensitive to patent protection. As 
Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington (1995) state, American pharmaceuticals industry 
heavily depends on effective patent protection, since copying information in this 
industiy is technically easy. Actually phannaceuticals is a leading high-tech industry 
in the United States. Its research and development spending per sales is permanently 
at the top of all American industries. In this environment, research intensive 
pharmaceutical firms strongly advocate the 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Restoration Act’s second part, which extends patent duration. Viscusi, Vernon and
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Harrington also note that some brand name drugs, for example Zantac (Glaxo owns 
the patents on it), reach billions of dollars in sales. According to them, patent 
protection, brand loyalty and research and development scale advantage are the only 
sources of entry barriers to rival finns. In the case of infringement, scale advantage is 
not considered as important due to ease of copying. Moreover, huge amount of sales 
revenue could not be explained by the loyalty issue. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that, patent protection is critical in pharmaceuticals industry and absence of it may 
severely destroy innovative activities in this industry.
On the other hand, the number of patents granted in an industry does not directly 
reflect the intensity or quality of research and development in that industry. Nor does 
the patent indicate any concrete economic activity, since most patents have never been 
used in any productive activity. Patent values are highly skewed, that is to say, most 
patents do not bear any economic value, but some of them have enormous economic 
success in the market. Patent grants are also valued on the market and can be traded. 
This fact suggests that value of patents, as indicators of infonnation, could be 
estimated to some degree.
According to Arrow (1962), uncertainty problem of infonnation generation 
theoretically can be solved to some degree. He proposes that, options market for 
research projects may contribute to the solution, since markets for commodity options 
serve the function of achieving an optimal allocation of risk bearing among all the 
agents of economy. Actually, current economic system has devices for risk 
diversification, but they are limited, imperfect, and costly. Economists are aware that 
these devices can be improved theoretically. However, moral factors create a limit in 
practice. Total risk shifting may cause misuse of the system, for example, most of the 
research projects are performed and financed by public institutions in centrally 
planned economies, but these projects generally do not achieve economic success. 
The point is that, full insurance of inventive activities weaken the incentives to 
success. Therefore risk-shifting mechanism could not achieve optimum resource 
allocation for invention. Large commercial firms and many research projects also 
function as risk minimizing, but these are not perfect solutions. Then these large firms 
behave monopolistically, and create inefficient markets.
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In fact, the problem at hand can be summarized as a tradeoff between optimum 
utilization of information and optimum production of information. Patent system is a 
complex system, which aims to balance these two opposite faces of information. 
Theoretically, patent system solves the inappropriation problem to some degree, since 
actual patent laws sharply determine the appropriation range of an invention, namely 
20 years protection period, actions against infringements, etc. However, practical 
success of the system is still controversial. In this environment, it is expected that free 
enterprise economy is going to underinvest in inventive activities and research 
projects. Especially, basic research activities cannot be optimally allocated. The main 
reasons of underinvestment are high commercial risk, limited appropriation, and 
increasing return in utilization of information.
Arrow (1962) builds an optimal resource allocation model and compares the 
competitive, and monopoly solutions, and determines the level of incentives for 
innovation. In this model, private incentive to innovate is solved under both 
competitive and monopolistic market structures. The appropriation problem is 
assumed to be negligible. In the competitive case, one firm invents and charges an 
arbitrary royalty fee for invention. In the monopolistic situation, only the monopoly 
firm can invent, in this sense, entry into the market is restricted. The invention is 
assumed to be cost reducing. The model can be summarized as follows; both demand 
and marginal revenue curves are assumed to be downward sloping. Moreover, the 
model assumes that costs are constant before and after invention. The model deals 
with two different sizes of cost-saving inventions. In the first case, cost reduction is 
drastic, that is to say after invention, monopoly price is less than competitive price. In 
the second case, only a minor invention takes place.
In the major invention case, competitive firms’ incentives are definitely greater than 
monopolist’s incentive. In the second case, namely minor invention, the analysis 
reveals that the result is the same as in the first case. Therefore, this basic model 
implies that competitive fimis’ incentives are larger than monopolist’s in both eases. 
The only counter-argument is based on greater appropriability in monopoly than in 
competition. Thus, in principle competitive case may induce more incentive to 
innovate and foster growth without effective patent protection.
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It is also beneficial to compare these private returns with social return. In the major 
invention case, consumers are better off since price falls, the inventor may not receive 
total return of his invention. On the other hand, in the minor invention case, 
consumers are indifferent, since price remains the same, all return of invention is 
appropriated by the inventor. Therefore, major inventions are superior in public point 
of view. In any case, potential social benefit is always larger'than realized benefit. 
This result suggests that optimal resource allocation to invention cannot be achieved 
by market forces.
2.1.3 Economic Impacts of Patent System
Firstly, patent system has income distribution effect. Patent owners can make a 
positive profit from their contributions; theoretically stronger patent protection 
increases profit level. Therefore, stringency of protection affects income distribution 
between individuals. Moreover this concept can be extended to the international scale. 
As generally accepted, if northern multinational firms realize most of the innovative 
activities, then they may obtain positive profit. Nevertheless, this is nothing but a rent 
transfer from the south to the north. Clearly, stringency of patent protection may 
affect income distribution between countries.
Besides income distribution effect, patent system has productivity effect; since new 
products and processes increase productivity of firms. Stronger patent protection 
rewards inventive activities, thus fosters growth.
The third patent protection effect is expressed as spillover effect. Human creativity is 
a deep concept and has different dimensions. Generally, creativity starts with 
observation and perception. Specifically, most of the inventors investigate the state of 
the art technology first, then deal with further inventive steps. Patent system is 
designed to reveal the information behind these creative activities. Therefore stronger 
patent protection increases beneficial spillover effect.
Fourth effect of patent protection is on the ethical dimension. Original authorship 
concept dates back to ancient ages. Protection of original authorship incite further
Thi,s finding implies that there is a high risk o f under-investment in inventive activities.
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inventions. Clearly, profit is not the only motivation behind creative activities. 
Personal satisfaction and curiosity also fuel human creativity. Therefore ethical 
importance of protection of intellectual property should also be considered.
2.1.4 Knowledge and Growth Theories
So far, we have concentrated on the role of knowledge in resource allocation. 
Knowledge also has a role in economic growth. Economic growth has been studied 
mainly within the growth theory. Former studies are motivated by two important 
issues, namely the growth over time in living standards, and cross country 
differences'^ in growth rates. In the 1960's, the growth theory consisted mainly of the 
neoclassical model, as developed by Solow (1956). The Solow growth model is the 
starting point for almost all economic growth studies. The model focuses on four 
variables: output, capital, labor and knowledge"*. It identifies differences in capital 
per worker as a possible source of variation''^ in output per worker.
In this framework, a brief investigation of Solow growth theory, which is also known 
as growth accounting, are beneficial. Firstly, the Solow growth model assumes that 
output changes over time only when its inputs change, which indicates that production 
function remains unchanged through time. On the other hand, if knowledge stock 
increases, then the amount of output produced from given quantities of labor and 
capital rises. This may be considered as a technological developmeiiFo of production 
function. Solow assumes that there is a constant returns to scale production function, 
and labor and knowledge grow at constant rates. That is to say, knowledge^' and labor 
are determined exogeneously. The Solow model indicates a balanced growth at the
Average annual growth rates are 6 percent for South Korea and 5 percent for Japan between 1960 
and 1990. On the other hand, the rates are -1 .7  for Chad and -1.3 for Madagascar during the same 
period. These indicate that rates o f economic growth vary substantially across countries.
1 ^  Knowledge can also be inteipreted as effectiveness o f labor.
There is enormous variation in per capita income across economies. The poorest countries have per 
capita incomes that are less than 5 percent o f per capita incomes o f the richest countries.
According to Solow model, technological change multiplies the production function by an 
increasing scale factor.
The model assumes that technology is exogenous. That is, the technology available to firms is 
unaffected by the actions of the firms, including R&D sector.
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natural rate for the economy regardless of its initial point. The growth of output is 
always intermediate between growth of labor and growth of capital. The growth path 
provides that all markets are instantaneously cleared; thus, there is neither 
unemployment nor excess production capacity in the model. The model makes clear 
two potential sources of variation for cross country differences in growth and changes 
over time. Namely, differences in capital per worker and differences in knowledge 
level cause differences in output per worker. The model also shows that differences in 
capital per worker has only modest effect on growth.
As a result, many take physical capital accumulation to be the principle engine of 
economic growth. However, researchers in the neoclassical tradition are also 
documenting the importance of technological progress in economic growth. Studying 
the growth of the U.S. net national product per capita over the period 1869-1953, 
Abramowitz22 (1956) notes that, the main source of the increase in net product per 
capita is not the increase in capital per capita but rather the productivity increase. 
Abraniowitz makes a comparison between the decade 1869-78 and the decade 1944- 
53 and concludes that, net national product per capita increased approximately 
fourfold. Actually, population tripled during these periods, whereas net national 
product in constant prices increases thirteen times. Abramowitz indicates that, the 
input of resources per capita appeared to have increased relatively little while 
productivity of resources increased a great deal. He estimates that, the productivity of 
resources increased 250 per cent from 1869 to 1953. On the other hand, Abramowitz 
denotes that, composition of labor force changed, so its productivity also increased. 
The same kind of change also occured on the side of capital. These types of 
improvements in inputs are difficult to measure. In any case, Abramowitz detemiines 
that knowledge stock concerning the organization and production technique is 
increasing at a high rate. He is also aware of intentional economic activities in 
productivity, he states that “Our capital stock of knowledge ... has grown at a 
phenomenal pace. A portion of this increase -  presumably an increasing proportion -
22 Abramowitz (1956) also deals with three important economic growth concepts, firstly determination 
of net increase of aggregate output per capita, and its distribution among labor, capital input and 
productivity changes, secondly investigation o f retardation or acceleration evidences in the growth of 
per capita income, thirdly determination o f long term and short term fluctuations in the rate o f growth 
of output.
19
is due to an investment of resources in research, education, and the like.” He proposes 
that there is an increasing trend in investment in knowledge and gradual growth of 
applied knowledge resulting from this investment. According to him, this investment 
trend is sustained the growth since every other major element of resources is made for 
retardation in the growth of net product per capita.
Kendrick (1956) supports the findings of Abramowitz using U.S. data. Kendrick, 
considering the U.S. economic performance from 1899 to 1953, concludes that total 
factor productivity (TFP) explains 53 percent of the growth in real aggregate output 
over the period. He also determines that there is no evidence for retardation in growth. 
Finally, Solow (1957) shows that, technical change accounted for 87.5 percent of the 
growth in the U.S. gross output per man-hour over 1909-49. The remaining 12.5 
percent was only associated with increased capital per man-hour. He also indicates 
that, technical change seems to be accelerating after 1929. Solow finally mentions that 
the model is based on the assumption that measured capital earnings fully reflect its 
contribution. In a more recent study, Denison (1985) states that, growth of national 
income can be broadly divided between changes in factor input, namely labor, capital 
and land etc., and changes in output per unit of input. The second type of source can 
be interpreted as technological progress. Denison reports that increase in factor input 
was contributing 63 percent of whole growth rate using the U.S. data from 1929 to 
1982. On the other hand, remaining 37 percent of output growth is associated with the 
changes in output per unit of input. Denison precisely determines the contribution of 
advances in knowledge^^ as 28 percent of whole economy in actual national income. 
Denison also indicates that there has been a slow down in U.S. growth figure since 
1970's. Therefore, one can conclude that, all growth accounting studies, to some 
degree, indicate the importance of knowledge for economic growth.
In summary, knowledge has many types, which are all accumulated and exchanged 
within the economy. Thus, it is virtually impossible to determine the value of 
knowledge. Actually, there is an ongoing controversy on how to measure the value of 
knowledge. In this context, growth accounting studies indirectly measure the 
contribution of it, by postulating that knowledge explains the part of growth that
Advances in technological, managerial, and organizational knowledge belong to this group.
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cannot be explained by the accumulation of tangible factors, such as labor or capital. 
This unexplained TFP growth is also known as Solow residual. However, all of TFP 
should not be associated with knowledge, since there may be other factors in the 
Solow residual.
The neoclassical growth assumed that increased factor productivity is exogeneous, i.e. 
it is due to increases in knowledge unrelated to economic decisions. But the new 
theories of economic growth, known as endogenous, stress that development of 
knowledge and technological change - rather than the mere accumulation of capital - 
are the driving forces behind lasting growth. According to new growth theorists, 
neoclassical growth models do not explain the central concepts of economic growth. 
In fact, these models conclude that capital accumulation cannot account for a large 
part of either long term growth or cross country income differences at least with the 
given definition of capital. However, growth in the effectiveness of labor can sustain 
permanent growth in per capita output. Römer (1996) indicates that differences^^ in 
output per worker cannot be explained completely by the differences in capital per 
worker, under the assumption that capital gains all of its private return.
In this context, new growth theorists propose two complementary views. The first 
view considers the accumulation of knowledge as a main source of economic growth. 
This type of endogeneous growth theory is pioneered^^ and developed by P. Römer 
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992). Actually this 
view of endogeneous growth theory is in line with Solow growth theory. On the other 
hand, the second view is contradicting with the findings of Solow growth theory. 
According to this view, capital accumulation is central to growth, whereas capital 
should be broadly defined in this case. These models include human capital concepts, 
and argue that physical capital's income share is a misleading indicator to determine 
the importance of capital in growth. Human-capital type growth theory is developed
These differences denote either economic growth differences over time or cross country income 
differences.
According to Aghion and Howitt (1998), Kuznets, Abramowitz, Griliches, Schmookler, Scherer, 
Rosenberg, and Schumpeter had also pointed out the importance o f endogenous technological progress 
for growth. Moreover, they state that. Brewer (1991) has traced the roots o f endogenous growth idea 
back to John Rae (1834). However, analytical endogenous growth theory models were not constructed 
until early 1990.
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by Lucas (1988), Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), 
Mankiw, D. Römer and Weil (1992), Kremer and Thomson (1994), Barro and Sala-i- 
Martin (1995).
In one of the pioneering studies, Römer builds a model which consists of intentional 
R&D investments arising from profit maximizing agents' desicions. The model 
consists of four basic inputs, capital, labor, human capital and a technology index. 
Human capital is differentiated from standard labor input. It is assumed that 
technology index can grow without a bound. In the model, a stock of skilled workers - 
researchers scientists, inventors, intellectuals - is available to generate ideas and new 
knowledge. The model has three sectors, namely research, intermediate goods^ *^ , and 
final goods sectors. The research sector uses human capital and existing knowledge in 
order to produce new knowledge. This new knowledge is embodied in new designs. 
The researcher, upon obtaining a useful idea, sell it to a machine maker. These new 
designs or ideas are commercialized within the intennediate goods sector. The 
machine maker builds a machine around the idea, and rents the machine to a 
monopolistically competitive manufacturing industry who - by combining the 
machine with skilled manegerial input - retail the final product to consumers. This 
final good sector uses labor, capital, and output of intermediate good sector in the 
form of producer durables. Römer simplifies the model by assuming constant supply 
of labor, and human capital. Outputs of research sector, namely new designs and ideas 
are assumed to be protected by infniitely ·^  ^ lived patents. Römer also briefly identifies 
alternative institutions for research sector protection. These institutions are assumed to 
provide the right incentives for the creation and dissemination of knowledge by the 
private sector.
The greater the number of researchers and idea producers, the faster the economy 
grows. In this sense, Römer differentiates the largeness of population from its 
researcher intensity. According to Römer, stock of human capital, which has 
innovative capability, detemiines the rate of growth of an economy. Moreover, if
This sector exhibits increasing returns to scale in production due to nonrivalrousness o f knowledge 
embodied in technology.
Obsolescence possibility (or risk) is ignored in the model.
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Stock of human capital is too low, growth may not take place at all. Actually this last 
prediction is also in accordance with real world observations. Römer also identifies 
two attributes of knowledge, namely nonrivalry and nonexcludability. These are well 
known attributes of public goods. Output of research sector depends on the devoted 
amount of human capital and existing knowledge stock. That is to say, knowledge 
generating research sector is a self sustaining one, since the larger the stock of 
knowledge, the higher the productivity in this sector. This side of the model indicates 
a policy implication, open trade regimes allow countries' access to each other's 
knowledge stocks^ .^ Therefore, integration increases the productivity of research 
activities and causally fosters worldwide growth.
Römer also points to the importance of interest rate in his model, since the model 
assumes that the benefits of research activities come largely in the future but its costs 
are paid immediately. If the interest rate decreases, then the rate of technological 
change increases. Therefore the rate of growth of economy is sensitive to the rate of 
interest. The model also implies that, in the absence of an efficient institution, which 
equates social and private returns of research, subsidizing the accumulation of human 
capital can be considered as a second best policy.
Despite the existence of strong theoretical background of endogenous growth theory, 
there are counter-arguments in the field of econometry. Clearly, Jones (1995) states 
that the scale effect prediction of recent R&D based endogenous growth model is not 
consistent with the time series evidence from industrialized economies.According 
to Jones, the major endogenous growth models including Römer, Grossman - 
Helpman, Aghion - Howitt, all share scale effect prediction. That is to say, if the level 
of resources devoted to R&D are increased by a factor, then the per capita growth rate 
of output also increases by the same factor. Generally, the number of scientists and 
engineers hired by the research sector is used as an indicator for its resource usage. 
Jones indicates that, such a prediction receives little support empirically. On the other 
hand, Jones points that other aspects of endogenous growth theory remain valid. 
Therefore, Jones eliminates the scale effect prediction from standard endogenous
It is implicitly assumed that their knowledge stocks have different contents. 
Jones used the data o f U.S., France, Germany and Japan.
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growth model, and constructs an R&D based model of semi-endogenous growth. 
Finally Jones' semi-endogenous growth model proposes that subsidies to 
accumulation of human capital has no long run growth effects as suggested in Solow's 
growth model.
Empirical findings of Jones can be summarized as follows: human capital measured 
as number of scientists and engineers engaged in research sector increased from 
160,000 in 1950 to 1 million in 1988 in the U.S. This figure indicates an increase of 
more than a factor of six. The evidence from other industrialized countries, namely 
France, Germany and Japan, is similar. On the other hand, the figure of average TFP 
growth rate remains nearly constant or even declines. In the light of empirical results, 
Jones concludes that "The assumption embedded in the R&D equation that the growth 
rate of the economy is proportional to the level of resources devoted to R&D is 
obviously false". Jones proposes some explanations for this inconsistency. Firstly, he 
suggests that the possibility of the addition of labor into the R&D sector requires the 
use of less skilled scientists^*·. Secondly, discovery of useful knowledge is getting 
harder. Thirdly, once the economy has accumulated a large stock of knowledge, each 
new idea has only smaller contribution with respect to prior ones in percentage terms. 
In addition, overlapping research projects can also be considered as alternatives.
Keely and Quah (1998) also deal with knowledge and its effects on growth. In their 
study, they review the role of R&D in a well established endogenous growth theory 
framework, and describe existing empirical research which considers R&D as a 
driving force behind economic growth. According to them, less developed and 
developing countries can transfer or copy the existing technology which are 
previously developed in industrialized countries. On the other hand, industrialized 
countries which stand at the edge of high technology, must improve their technology 
level by costly and difficult efforts. Intentional research activity is the most visible 
and systematic mechanism which pushes the frontier of technology.
Eaton, Gutierrez and Kortum (1998) also denote this possibility by stating “...increasing research 
effort may force a country to use less talented researchers, we assume that the productivity o f  
additional researchers declines as the fraction of researchers employed relative to the total labour force
rises
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Keely and Quah identify the three main outcomes of endogenous growth theory and 
empirically evaluate them. Firstly, the relation between increasing amount of resource 
devoted to R&D and measured improvement in technology are studied. Keely and 
Quah conclude that, the number of patents do not reflect an increasing trend in 
resource devotion in aggregate growth. According to them, patents may not be 
sufficient to measure R&D output. On the other hand, they survey empirical literature 
and state that the relation is held in the individual firm level. That is to say, there is a 
positive relationship between technological growth and quantity of resources devoted 
to R&D sector. Further research is required to determine the validity (or invalidity) of 
this scale effect in aggregate case. Secondly, they evaluate the significance of patent 
protection in research sector. According to them, patent protection is effective in a 
few industries, only. Trade secrecy, lead time, and learning by doing are more 
effective than patent system in the rest of the industries. They indicate that, growth 
and IPRs related studies^' should also consider the other forms of protection. 
According to them, in such a broad view, there is no conventional trade-off between 
R&D incentives and detrimental monopoly power created by IPRs protection. Keely 
and Quah also emphasize the importance of government and non-profit organizations 
in research sector. Government or non-profit organizations’ research activities can be 
totally different from private ones. However, most of the studies model inventive 
activities only in profit seeking agents’ body. They state that, these types of R&D 
activités are generally ignored in endogenous growth literature. However, their share^  ^
cannot be negligible. All these imply that, economies of knowledge must be properly 
established in order to achieve full potential of economic growth. Thirdly, 
dissemination and spillover potential of knowledge are investigated by Keely and 
Quah. They conclude that, knowledge spillovers take place, though as limited. Their 
study indicates that, these spillovers are concentrated in spatial, industrial, and 
political clusters. Actually this finding contradicts with the general assumption about 
the free dissemination of knowledge. Keely and Quah’s other conclusions are as 
follows: their study identifies that technological progress is an important engine of
Gould and Gruben (1996) examined the role o f intellectual property rights in economic growth and 
found a positive relationship.
The share o f government and non-profit organizations in total R&D sector is 34 percent in U.S., 32 
percent in United Kingdom, 37 percent in Germany, 45 percent in France and Italy.
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growth and economic incentives. It significantly detemiines the growth performance 
and that knowledge could be interpreted as an accumulation of R&D activity 
outcome. It is useful then to note that knowledge is of two types, codified and tacid. 
Codified knowledge is not enough to transfer the whole knowledge between agents. 
Tacid knowledge should also be transferred, but it is relatively difficult and costly. 
Finally, Keely and Quah agree on the trade side of the endogenous growth theory. 
Open trade regime provides an efficient environment for knowledge spillovers.
2.2 Alternative Allocation Mechanisms for Innovative Activities
As mentioned before, innovative activities have some peculiar properties. They are 
risky, difficult to appropriate and indivisible. All these properties complicate the 
optimization problem of resource allocation in these activities. Patent system regulates 
innovative activities to a certain extent. Clearly, patent system allows the inventor to 
appropriate from his inventions, and reduces uncertainty. However, overall 
performance of the system is still controversial and considered as the second best. 
Moreover, as Arrow (1962) indicates, both competitive and monopoly firms 
underestimate the social value of an invention, thus government intervention may be 
required to achieve optimum resource allocation for innovative activities, especially in 
the basic research.
There are several alternative solutions for the resource allocation problem at hand. 
Namely, government financed research projects, universities and other nonprofit 
research institutes are considered as other alternatives of the patent system. However, 
each of these institutions has some deficiencies. Patent protection system does not 
generate enough investment for invention, but the question “how much additional 
investment is required” camiot be easily answered. Moreover, there are many research 
areas, that is to say, not only the amount of additional research but also the 
distribution of investment is important. In this framework, as Nordhaus (1969) points, 
misallocation may cause larger welfare cost than underallocation.
Government support or warranty may also reduce the efficiency of research activities. 
Private commercial incentives are higher than incentives in government financed 
research activities in average. Moreover, research activities are undetenninistic in
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character. The following table compares alternative forms of economic organization 
in innovation.
Table 2.1. Evaluation of Alternative Forms of Organizations
C r i t e r i a  \  A l t e r n a t i v e  
O r g a n i z a t i o n
P a t e n t  S y s t e m
I n d i v i d u a l  /  L a r g e  
F i r m s
G o v e r n m e n t
I ' i n a n c e d
R & D
N o n p r o l l l
O r g a n i z a t i o n s
A c a d e m i c
I n s t i t u t i o n s
R e s e a r c h  In s .  
F i n a n c e d  b y  
I n d u s t .
R e s o u r c e  A v a i l a b i l i t y l o w  /  h i g h h i g h m e d i u m m e d i u m m e d i u m
I n d i i s l r y  C o v e r a g e h i g h  /  h i g h m e d i u m m e d i u m m e d i u m l o w
O p t i m a l  A l l o c a t i o n  P r o b . l o w  /  l o w h i g h m e d i u m l o w l o w
C e r t a i n t y m e d i u m / m e d i u m h i g h m e d i u m m e d i u m m e d i u m
D e g r e e  o f  S p i l l o v e r  H f t e e t m e d i u m  /  l o w h i g h h i g h h i g h m e d i u m
I n v e n t i v e  S t e p l o w  /  m e d i u m h i g h m e d i u m h i g h m e d i u m
E a s e  o i ' A d m i n i s t r a t i o n m e d i u m  /  h i g h l o w m e d i u m h i g h h i g h
F i f t l e i e n e y h i g h  /  m e d i u m l o w m e d i u m m e d i u m m e d i u m
E c o n o m i e s  o f  S c a l e l o w  /  h i g h h i g h m e d i u m m e d i u m h i g h
Table 2.1. reveals the following results:
• Resource availability is high for large firms under patent protection and 
government financed research projects, however it is low for individuals under 
patent system. This denotes that, individuals should be supported and encouraged 
in inventive investments.
• Industry coverage is high for both large firms and individuals under patent 
protection, but it is low for research institutes financed by government. Patent 
system is applicable in all industries with minor discrepancies, however 
government financed research projects generally cover only limited parts of the 
industries, namely they focus on health care, defense and pure scientific studies. •
• Economy wide optimal allocation probability is low for large finns and 
individuals under patent protection, and academic institutions, since they have 
limited perspective about the social gain of inventions, but government financed 
researches are at least theoretically aware of the whole social return, hence 
achieve optimum allocation.
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• Certainty is high for government financed research projects, that is to say there is 
little uncertainty about the outcome of these kinds of activities.
• Degree of spillover effect is high for government financed research projects, 
nonprofit organizations and academic institutions, but it is low for large firms. 
This shows that large firms prefer to internalize the possible spillovers of their 
inventions in order to keep valuable information away from their rivals. Patent 
system, unfortunately, could not force private finns to reveal whole information 
behind their invention. On the other hand, government financed research projects, 
nonprofit organizations, and academic institutions generate large spillovers, since 
they do not concern profitability as much as commercial firms.
• Inventive steps are high for government financed research projects and academic 
institutions, however they are low for patent system in average. In fact, patent 
system displays large divergence among individual patents. There are some 
patents, which have millions of dollars commercial value, but most of them are 
almost valueless. Therefore, an average patent can be considered as a limited step 
over the state of the art technology among millions of patent grants. On the 
contrary, academic or government financed research projects generally yield large 
steps over the existing technology level.
• Administration mechanism is relatively easy for patent system, academic 
institutions, and research institutes financed by industries, but it is difficult for 
government financed research projects. Academic research activities have their 
own autonomy, and patent system is regulated by law, this means that the 
administrations of both of them do not bear much problem. On the other hand, 
patent litigations are sometimes difficult to solve.
• Patent system is better than other forms of organizations from the efficiency point 
of view, since allocated resources are optimally utilized, but government financed 
research projects are subject to misuse. •
• Large firms under patent protection, government financed research projects, and 
research institutes benefit from their large economies of scale, since they execute
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many projects simultaneously and they have generally large research budget.
Unfortunately, individuals in patent system may suffer from their low scales.
Finally, it should be mentioned that, there are large deviations in practice from 
theoretical approach of each form of organization.
Different institutions are also studied by Nordhaus (1969), who is one of the pioneers 
of theoretical patent studies. He states that the price system is unable to generate new 
knowledge efficiently. Patent system, government financed R&D, subsidy to R&D 
inputs, academic institutions, nonprofit organizations are some alternative solutions^^ 
for efficient knowledge generation, however all of them are incapable to optimize 
society completely. According to Nordhaus, investment on knowledge generation is 
difficult to appropriate and inventive activities have increasing returns, which 
complicate the problem. Patent system creates monopoly power for inventors for a 
given period of time, which distorts product markets. Moreover, inventors try to keep 
key points of their inventions and patent system may not effectively force them to 
reveal. On the other hand, R&D subsidy and other awarding methods are difficult to 
administer, since knowledge is an intangible asset and true value of knowledge cannot 
be determined in all cases. Moreover, such a system may create lobbies of rent 
seeking parties. In any case, Nordhaus models a knowledge generation system and 
evaluates two alternative methods, namely patent and government subsidy systems.
Nordhaus concludes that, patent system is an optimum solution for only small 
inventions. On the other hand, government subsidies for R&D is more efficient in the 
case of drastic technological achievements. Moreover, Nordhaus indicates that, 
optimal patent length is sensitive to the size of inventions, more progressive industries 
require shorther patent length and longer patent length is socially beneficial in the 
lower elasticity of demand case. The model also implies that increasing size of 
inventions causes decreasing efficiency of patent system.
Nordhaus compares the patent and subsidy systems in four main contexts, namely 
appropriability of innovation, differences in industries, knowledge spillovers, and
Actually, variety o f institutions in R&D sector could be beneficial, since distinct sectoral needs and 
changing sizes o f inventions require different institutional structures.
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uncertainty. Firstly, Nordhaus suggests that patent system may create sufficient 
incentives for inventors in return of deadweight loss. On the contrary, properly 
administered subsidy system overcomes this welfare loss and generates enough 
incentives as well. Secondly, several different industries can be regulated efficiently 
under a uniform patent regime, however subsidy system cannot take sectoral 
differences into account directly. Moreover, Nordhaus indicates that misplaced 
subsidy spoils all aspects, and may cause high welfare loss. Thirdly, in the case of 
knowledge spillovers, government financed R&D or subsidy system may be designed 
to reveal all information. Patent system has also provisions to full disclosure of 
information, whereas these provisions are not forced effectively in practice. Fourthly 
patent system decreases the uncertainty over the commercial success of inventive 
activities. However, in the case of double inventors, only the first applicant receives 
patent grant, due to “first to file” principle. On the other hand, in government subsidy 
case, research activities do not bear any risk, since uncertainty is taken by government 
through research contracts.
In summary, Nordhaus states that, patent system is an efficient regulation mechanism 
for the knowledge generation process in the case of small inventions. Whereas, drastic 
innovation requires special treatment in order to reduce possible destructive monopoly 
power of patent protection. Actually, drastic inventions usually require large 
investments and cause large knowledge dissemination, in this sense, they should be 
regulated to be acquired by the public domain efficiently and immediately.
2.3 Patent System
2.3.1 History of Patent System
Intellectual property issues are subject to ongoing controversies although their 
existence go back to very old times. In this section, historical developments of 
intellectual property rights, especially patent system is studied, in order to 
comprehend the reasoning behind modem patent law and intellectual property 
concept. In the history, firstly the concept of intellectual property arose, then the basis 
of patent system is established, and finally copyright protection is constituted. 
Generally, patent system is related to inventive activities in machinery, warfare, 
construction, and handicraft, on the other hand, copyright protection is connected to
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authorship in literature and ownership in printed materials. Historically, novelty 
concept precedes originality concept.
Intellectual property is a legal concept, which arises from various kinds of intangible 
property. Intellectual property issues have been related to craft knowledge and 
practice, invention and authorship in writings in history. Improvements in craft 
processes and development of technological innovations constitute intangible 
properties with commercial value that are separate from concrete products. 
Intellectual property protection, provide a legal framework for inventors that they 
enjoy temporary monopoly power of their exclusive rights. Today's modem 
intellectual property systems have two distinct concepts namely patents and 
copyrights. In history, patent system covered inventions in warfare, machines, 
handicraft, etc. But literary studies and writings were dealt with differently although 
they were not explicitly defined as today’s copyright protection. In any case, coverage 
of patent and copyright protection is somewhat similar both in today’s and old 
intellectual property right systems.
As a starting point, the meaning of patent is investigated. Basically, it is an English 
adjective, which means "open" and its root comes from the translation of Latin 
"litterae patentes". Patent means simply "open letters" as a word. The word patent 
stands for the official certificate, which provides certain privileges, rights, ranks or 
titles that are publicly declared. Roughly, patent system is used by sovereigns as an 
instrument to induce the transfer and disclosure of foreign technologies, to promote 
further technical research, and to keep control of domestic knowledge within the 
domain of sovereigns. David (1993) argues that, ancient patent system’s major aim 
was to promote technology transfer, rather than to stimulate domestic inventive 
activities.
In fact, as David indicates, legal institutions, like the patent system, evolve 
incrementally. They generally preserve many major aspects of its historical roots. 
Thus, although the history of patent system is full of redefinition and reinterpretation 
in response to pressures to accommodate or advance the economic interests of those 
most affected by the laws, many of the patent system's major features continue to 
reflect the historical heritage in which they originated. This historical heritage needs 
far more study since it has a complex background. In this section, the parallelism
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between the recent patent system and its ancient equivalent is also going to be 
indicated. Moreover, as new technologies arise, and world economies develop, the 
patent system or intellectual property concepts continue to evolve. Therefore, 
historical investigation of patent system might be valuable to understand the current 
and future structure of it.
It is clear that, positive valuation of knowledge is a prerequisite condition for 
protection of knowledge. Historically, positive valuation of knowledge goes back to 
mid 5‘'’ century B.C. At that time, all commodities were produced manually, and 
manual work was associated with slave labor. Although society’s intellectual potential 
was not directed to productive activities, craftsmen used to improve their production 
techniques by learning by doing. For example, during the late 6"’ - early 5”’ centuries 
B.C., Ionian poet and philosopher Xenophanes wrote that "Not all things, by any 
means, did the gods show to mortals: rather as time went on, men found improvement 
by constant searching". In addition to Xenophanes' writings, the Hellenistic inventor 
and author Philo of Byzantium in late 3'^ * century B.C. emphasized gradual 
experimental progress of architecture, in which proper proportions of buildings had 
been discovered by trial and error. Anaxagoras, an Athenian philosopher, indicated 
that humans are distinguished from other living beings with their capacity for 
developing arts and crafts. These examples reveal that ancient civilizations were 
aware of the fruits of research and knowledge. Philo was also aware of the 
incremental nature of innovations. According to him, each new invention and writing 
was benefiting from existing knowledge and experiences of previous inventors. This 
observation is absolutely agreed on today, and most of the patent applications take 
existing patents as reference.
However, emergence of a fully developed intellectual property concept did not occur 
until the 12*'’ and 13*'* centuries during the medieval period. Before that time, 
authorship and ownership concepts were weakly applied, for instance, for all of 
antiquity once the first copy of a book had been made and distributed, its fate was 
beyond the author's control. There was no legal system to protect the integrity of the 
book, limit the number of copies, or impede imitation of a new technology. Naturally, 
there were some exceptions; namely Vitruvius, a Roman architect and military 
engineer, paid attention to credit previous authors and inventors. According to him.
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the theft of writings and inventions should be banned. Interestingly, Vitruvius' care 
was not a commercial or benefit oriented effort, rather it only arose from individual 
reputation seeking. Actually, there is little evidence that either writings or inventions 
were viewed as commodities with a marketplace value in the ancient world. 
Authorship was supposed to bring immortal fame, so theft in writings spoils the 
author’s reputation and fame. Pliny, a Roman writer in the 1“‘ century A.D. also 
insisted that authors should receive credit for their contribution and work. According 
to him, like Philo, knowledge accumulation was a cumulative process, and crediting 
original authors and inventors would increase the creation of new knowledge. At this 
point. Long determines that this ancient intellectual property concept had two 
important missing parts. Namely, it was not differentiated from tangible goods and it 
had no commercial characteristics. That is to say, ancient intellectual property concept 
did not deal with commercial care, and it was mixed with tangible commodities.
Fully developed concept of intellectual property emerged with the arise of the 
medieval cities and the market economies that developed within and among them. The 
concept is first evident within the regulation of the craft guilds into which many urban 
artisans had been organized by the mid-13*'’ century in Venetian society without ever 
calling it. The development of guilds, which were organizations of artisans based on 
particular crafts and technologies, is a crucial milestone in the history of intellectual 
property rights. Actually, in the ancient times, the primary purpose of the guild system 
was mainly social solidarity. On the contrary, medieval artisan guilds had also some 
economic functions such as, protecting craft, improving and perfecting production 
techniques, and organizing apprenticeship system. That is to say, the market 
economies, that developed within medieval cities in Europe, provided the essential 
atmosphere for the emergence of a fully developed intellectual property concept. The 
medieval craft guilds significantly developed proprietary concept of craft knowledge. 
The guilds promoted the ownership of intangible property in the fonn of craft 
knowledge which was distinct from material products. For example, the guilds 
pennitted the export of Venetian glass products, which were the finest glass in 
Europe, but the export of the craft itself was strictly forbidden. The view that craft 
knowledge was intangible property with commercial value developed in this context, 
quite apart from notions of individual authorship. The Venetian society considered 
that; craft knowledge was communal property and knowledge should be used for the
33
benefit of Venice. In this sense, private ownership character was missing in early 
Venetian system, therefore intellectual property rights protection provides only 
communal motivation for innovation. The development of the patent system is based 
on the fact that medieval urban economies try to maintain the control over the crafts, 
to possess the benefits of new craft knowledge and to encourage further innovations. 
Clearly medieval craft guilds were aware of commercial value of their knowledge and 
they differentiated it from tangible commodities.
Basically, in medieval Europe, inventions were also awarded by sovereigns to foster 
further innovations and technology transfer. As historians stated, these motivation 
efforts were in some way successful. Nevertheless, this should not be interpreted as a 
well defined and established IPRs protection system. Actually patents were granted 
for inventions in Europe in 1443. The first official IPRs system was bom in Venetian 
Republic in March 19‘'\ 1474, which was known as “Inventor Bylaws”. This law is 
considered as the oldest text of patent system and required that every invention should 
be applied to officials. The patent protection duration was 10 years in this law. This 
Venetian law included some sanctions against infringements. Practically, the limited 
protection period and the sanctions against infringement concepts are similar to 
today's patent laws' provisions. The infringer might be obliged to pay fine and his 
imitations could be destroyed. In the case of infringement, the case could be reported 
to city officials, and if it was verified, then the infringer could be fined. This reporting 
mechanism is also similar to its modern counterpart. On the other hand, Venetian 
Government had the right to use the invention without permission. During these 
periods and before, secrecy was also used as an alternative for patent protection, 
especially outside of Venice. However, patent system was used more widely in the 
16*'' century.
Long (1991) states that, the main interest in patent system was aiming to promote the 
economies of cities and encourage importation of useful inventions from foreign 
countries. Long gives examples, that Venice society awarded patents to both 
Venetians and foreigners. By this way, Venetians encouraged transfer of new 
technologies into their economy and kept their commercially valuable production 
technique and knowledge within Venetian society. According to Long, Venetians 
were aware of the commercial value of their inventions and products, so they tried to
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protect this value not only inside, but also outside their country. By this way, they 
contributed to the constitution and spread of patent system. As Long indicates, "In 
England, for example. Jacobus Acontius, an Italian inventor, petitioned Elizabeth I for 
a patent with an explicit justification that a patent grant should be an award for 
inventors." Long quotes J. Acontius's petition as follows: "Nothing is more honest 
than that those who by searching have found out things useful to the public should 
have some fruit of their rights and labours, as meanwhile they abandon all other 
modes of gain, are at much expense in experiments, and often sustain much loss, as 
has happened to me."
The main reason of the emergence of this IP concept and its protection in medieval 
Venetian society, was taking control of knowledge. On the other hand, according to 
David, as mentioned above, the major aim was to promote technology transfer from 
abroad in order to reach foreign technology level. In this sense, there is a clear strong 
correlation between today’s foreign direct investment (EDI) promoting IPRs 
protection regime and its ancient equivalent. Although it is not proven, it is generally 
believed that strong IPRs protection induces technology transfer from foreign 
countries as a EDI. David gives examples to support his argument; “Letters patent 
were given to the Elemish weaver John Kempe by Edward II in 1331, to two Brabant 
weavers to settle at York in 1336, and to three clockmakers from Delft in 1368.” 
According to David, England was technologically underdeveloped with respect to 
continent of Europe in early century, so foreign craftsmen and artisans were 
granted for patent rights in order to catch up with continent of Europe’s high 
technology level. In fact, in the 14*'’ century, patents were used to encourage the 
immigration of skilled artisans from abroad. Domestic originality of use in England 
was a sufficient condition to be eligible to patent grant at that time. In this way, 
technology transfer was somewhat successfully achieved. Trade secrets were the most 
widely used form of intellectual property protection before the introduction of patent 
system, since masters were not willing to reveal their know-how to potential 
competitors. Trade secrets helped to ensure the privileged status of the master - 
apprentice relationship and of the craft itself There were two types of secrecy in 
crafts knowledge. The first type was “secrets of nature” and the second type was 
“intentional concealment”. Patent system intended to eliminate the second type of
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secrecy, by protecting masters and instructors from the competition^^ of their potential 
rivals and students, by giving them a limited monopoly power of production and 
trade. In this sense, the disclosure provisions of today’s modem patent system arose 
from essential aspects of the efforts to induce foreign artisans to reveal their secret 
knowledge about crafts. These early English patents were 14 years long and had 7 
years extension option. David explains the reasoning behind these protection periods, 
7 years period was supposed to be the duration of apprenticeship, so patent system 
provided at least two generation of trainee long protection. During this era, the 
originality, novelty and nonobviousness were not binding criteria, in fact major 
concern about granting was based on the requirement that the invention should be 
unknown within the sovereign’s or guild’s domain. Absence of these three criteria, are 
the primary differences between ancient intellectual property concept and its current 
counterpart^^. David indicates that, constitution of these three patentability 
requirements took 200 years long struggles. Most historical studies determine that the 
origins of systematic state protection of intellectual property arose from Renaissance 
Italy, from where it spread first to the continent of Europe and later to England. David 
states that: “As early as 1332 the Venetian Grand Council established a privilege fund 
for providing loans and other rewards for a foreign constructor of windmills who 
offered to bring knowledge of this art to the city. In 1416, the council awarded 
Franciscus Petri, from the island of Rliodes, a patent for a superior device for the 
filling of fabrics, which gave Petri and his heirs exclusive rights for 50 years to build, 
alter, and reconstruct the apparatus he would erect for that puipose’’.
In the histoiy of intellectual property, Venetian Republic and Britain do have the 
longest continuous intellectual property protection traditions. In Britain, its origin can 
be traced back to the 15*'’ century, when the crown started making specific grants of 
privilege to manufacturers and traders. After the Venetian patent law, further 
developments were achieved in England. In 1624 “Monopoly Acf’ which defined
Obtaining a patent can reduce or eliminate this competition because it gives the inventor a 
temporary monopoly to produce his invention. It thus helps to ensure a reasonable economic return to 
inventive activity. Patent system provides an important incentive to engage in research and to share its 
outcomes.
Although today a small number o f countries' patent law requires only national novelty, this cannot 
be generalized to whole current patent regimes.
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basic concepts of patents, was enacted. Section 6 of the law states that “for the term of 
14 years or under hereafter to be made of the sole working or making of any manner 
of new manufacturers within this Realm to the true and first inventor”. The 
governments aimed to encourage economic developments through new inventions and 
processes by using patents. When an inventor gets a patent grant, he also gains 
additional benefits, for example tax exemptions, to promote research activities. 
Monopoly Act is still influential on today’s systems.
In 1790, America enacted its own patent law by stating that “in order to promote 
progress of useful technology and sciences, the parliament shall grant limited 
exclusive rights for a certain period of time to inventors” after the independence. 
Modern American patent law is constructed on this old provision. During the 18‘'’ 
century, American system was mainly attaching importance to technology transfer 
side of patent system rather than indigenous invention. In fact, American patent 
system has heavily inspired with English and French patent laws. Next step came 
from France in 1791. In the initial French patent law, there was no examination 
requirement. Naturally, absence of examination weakens the patent law. The first 
mandatory examination system was constituted by Germany in 1877.
In summary, intellectual property protection, especially patent system are regarded as 
public policy instruments that should be designed to enhance economic development 
level by fostering inventive activities. In this section, historical roots of intellectual 
property rights protection is briefly investigated. By doing so, it is aimed that the 
primary motivation behind the system can be identified. Actually, allocative 
efficiency in inventive activities and distributional issues are still the major economic 
policy problems of today’s modem economies. In this context, it can be concluded 
that, modem intellectual property rights protection regimes give great weight to its 
precedent. In fact this is not surprising, since institutional evolution demonstrates 
incremental changes through time. On the other hand, as the nature of technologies 
changes, the system will further evolve. In short, the rise of patent system is heavily 
influenced by the two primary economic aims of old civilizations. Firstly, these 
civilizations were aiming to transfer technology from developed foreing countries, 
and secondly medieval artisan guilds were trying to keep commercially valuable craft 
knowledge within their domain. In this sense, promoting further technological
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developments locally can be considered as a secondary aim. This point may shed light 
on the ongoing controversies betweeen developed and developing countries about the 
stringency of uniform intellectual property rights protection. Historical investigation 
about the rise of intellectual property rights and patent system, do not reveal whether 
the system is economically beneficial or detrimental.
2.3.2 Description of a Patent System: The U.S. Patent Law
In the previous section, historical development of the concept of intellectual property 
rights, and especially patent system is investigated. In this section, one of the most 
advanced and stringent modem patent systems, namely U.S. patent system^^, is 
analyzed. The major aims of this analysis are to describe the patent system in general, 
identify the patentability of inventions, determine barriers for issuing a patent grant, 
and investigate what a patent grant provides to the owner.
Inventions-^  ^are key to a prosperous and developing society. They help to work better, 
to make finer products and to compete more effectively in world trade. Information 
diffusion and exchange of ideas are as important to all economies as the flow of 
money or goods and services. To promote this exchange, while protecting owners' 
rights, legal authorities consider certain kinds of creative activities subject to patent 
protection. Inventors can receive legal recognition for these activities in much the 
same way as anyone receives title to a piece of land. In addition, the records and the 
documents that protect intellectual property owners' rights contain valuable 
information. Much of it is available to the public and may be useful in many ways.
Shortly, patent can be defined as a contract between the government^* and an 
inventor, providing that, in return for full disclosure of the subject matter within the
Title 35 o f U.S. Code, Patents, describes the functions o f Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 
patentability o f inventions and grant of patents, patents and protection o f patent rights, and finally 
relationship with Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).
The invention can be defined as the active combination o f presently known elements into a new 
form, 'file invention term is closely associated with discovery, since discoveries often lead to 
inventions.
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is entitled to perform necessary actions in this contract on behalf 
o f the U.S. Government.
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invention, the government grants the inventor an exclusive right to practice the 
invention for a predefined period of time. During this period, owner of the patent has 
the right "to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout 
the United States." When a patent is granted, the invention becomes the property of 
the inventor, which - like any other form of property or business asset - can be 
inherited, bought, sold, rented, hired, mortgaged and even taxed. These rights are 
granted by United States federal patent law, which provide exploitation of ideas, and 
inventions. Patent rights are territorial; a patent will only give the holder rights within 
United States and its possessions, and rights to stop others from importing the 
patented products into the United States. Global protection requires application in all 
countries. Title 35 of U.S. federal law deals with Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), 
which is an agreement on multiple international patent application.
In this sense, patents can be considered as negative rights; that is, rights to stop 
anyone else from benefiting from an invention. Therefore anyone who is thinking of 
manufacturing a product or putting a process into operation should first check whether 
he would be stopped from doing this by a patent in force, that is still legally 
enforceable. Even if an inventor creates a product or a process that is new, and obtains 
a patent for the invention, this check is still necessary since the obtaining of a granted 
patent does not mean that the patent holder is automatically free to carry out the 
invention. Ignorance that an applicant is infringing someone else's patent has no 
defense. Patent applicants should try to find out about existing patent grants. 
Alternatively, an inventor can choose to let others use it under agreed terms. A patent 
also brings the right to take legal action against others who might be infringing the 
invention and to claim damages. The mere existence of a patent may be enough to 
deter a potential infringer. The United States Patent and Trademark Office, however, 
does not take sides in any dispute. A patent empowers the owner of an invention to 
take legal action against others to prevent the unlicensed manufacture, use, 
importation or sale of the patented invention. This right can be used to give the 
proprietor breathing space to develop a business based on the invention, or another 
person or company may be allowed to exploit the invention and pay royalties under a 
licensing agreement.
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The patent protection system is beneficial not only from inventors’ point of view but 
also from the public point of view, because the society gains advanced knowledge of 
technological developments, which they will eventually be able to use freely after the 
patent expires. At the end of the protection period, the patent becomes public property 
available to all. However, the grant of a patent does not guarantee the owner with the 
full legal right to commercialize the invention, since commercialization may require 
the use of other technologies, which are patented, and thus owned by someone else.
Patents are granted to encourage inventors to disclose their inventions to the public 
and thereby to "promote the progress of science and useful arts." In fact, U.S. 
Constitution- '^  ^empowers the Congress to define and confer these rights to authors and 
inventors for their respective writings and inventions. In the United States, the federal 
patent law protects any "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof which could not 
"have been obvious at the time of the invention".
The United States patent law provides the granting of patents in three major 
categories, namely utility, design and plant patents. Utility patents are granted to 
anyone who invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof Process means 
a process or method; new industrial or technical processes may be patented. 
Manufacture refers to articles, which are made. Composition of matter relates to 
chemical compositions and may include mixtures of ingredients as well as new 
chemical compounds. Design patents are granted to any person who has invented a 
new, original and ornamental design for an article or manufacture. The appearance of 
the article is protected. Plant patents are granted to any person who has invented or 
discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct and new variety of plant, including 
cultivated sports, mutants hybrids, and newly found seedlings.
2.3.2.1 Patentability Conditions
Patent system covers both inventions and discoveries, which are useful, novel and 
non-obvious. Both products and processes are eligible to be granted. Patents are
See provisions o f Article I, section 8 for details.
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generally intended to cover products or processes that possess or contain new 
functional or technical aspects; patents are therefore concerned with, for example, 
how things work, what they do, how they do it, what they are made of or how they are 
made. The vast majority of patents are granted for incremental improvements in 
known technology; it has been said that innovation is evolution rather than revolution. 
Title 35, section 102 of the U.S. Code provides the conditions of patentability. 
According to this section, a patent can be granted unless "the invention was known or 
used by others in the United States, or patented or described in a printed publication in 
the United States or a foreign country before the invention thereof by the applicant" or 
"the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in United States or a 
foreign country or in public use or on sale in United States more than one year prior to 
patent application." These conditions identify whether the invention is novel or not.
An inventor is not required to get a patent in order to put an invention into practice, 
but once the invention is made public, there will be no protection against others using 
the invention. The granting of a patent should not be taken as any indication that an 
invention has any merit or commercial value. Naturally commercial success of any 
invention cannot be obtained by a patent right only. Moreover, it is not possible to 
guarantee that a patent, once granted, is valid. Anyone can apply to the court or the 
patent office for revocation of a patent for reasons that are laid down in the patent law. 
If the person succeeds, the patent must be revoked entirely, or be amended to remove 
the reasons for revocation.
Inventions and discoveries must contain non-obvious subject matter in order to be 
patentable. Section 103 of the U.S. Code states that "if the differences between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art“^'* are such that the subject matter 
as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." Clearly, the 
non-obviousness condition requires that an invention represent more than a trivial step 
over the state of the art. According to Guttennan and Erlich (1997), this condition can
Knowledge is available to the public either prior to the invention by applicant or more than a year 
prior to the effective filing date of his / her application.
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be interpreted as follows, invention should be non-obvious to a person^' of ordinary 
skill in the art. A scientist working in the field, however, can be considered as highly 
skilled, so can exceed the requirement. In fact, this criterion remains open to 
misinterpretation. Moreover, stringency of non-obviousness conditions heavily affects 
the scope of patent rights. For example, weaker standards of non-obviousness relax 
patentability requirements. Generally, as patentability criteria are relaxed, a larger 
number of patents will be granted in the same field of technology, therefore the scope 
of patent rights will be narrowed. Conversely, stringent non-obviousness requirement 
increases the scope of a patent right. An invention does not have to be a basic process, 
machine, article of manufacture or composition of matter to obtain a patent. 
Conversely, an improvement on a previously patented process, machine, or 
composition of matter, or an unobvious combination of old elements may also be 
entitled to patent grant.
An invention is not patentable if it is: a discovery, a scientific theory or mathematical 
method, an aesthetic creation such as a literary, dramatic or artistic work, a scheme or 
method for performing a mental act, playing a game or doing business, the 
presentation of infonnation or a computer program. If the invention involves more 
than these abstract aspects so that it has physical features (such as a special apparatus 
to play a new game), then it may be patentable. In addition, it is not possible to get a 
patent for an invention if it is a new animal or plant variety; a method of treatment of 
the human or animal body by surgery or therapy; or a method of diagnosis. The 
invention must not be contrary to public order and morality. In the United States, 
computer programs are eligible to get a patent grant, but this is not possible in other 
countries. In addition to these technical barriers to get a patent right, sometimes the 
inventor himself loses his right by using or selling the invention prior to the effective 
filing date of a patent application.
Although Title 35 U.S. Code 101 indicates the type of subject matter, which can be 
patented, specific interpretation of this section of the statute is left to the courts. On 
the other hand, as technology changes, the scope of the subject matter upon which a
 ^^  This hypotetical person is assumed to know all o f the relevant prior art.
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patent can be granted also evolves. United States patent law was amended several 
times in order to handle technological developments.
2.3.2.2 Patent Application
Patent applications can be performed by only true inventors or his (her) patent 
attorneys. A draft of the patent application will be prepared, when the decision to file 
a patent application is made. All applications have to be made in written to the 
commissioner. A complete patent application should contain a specification including 
at least a claim, necessary drawings, an oath, and a filing fee.
The specification should contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any skilled person in the related field of technology to make and 
use the same invention in its best mode. If the inventor had specific processes, 
techniques, compositions, material or conditions that he or she recognized at the time 
of filing as the best way of carrying out the invention, then he or she must include that 
information in the patent disclosure. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that 
a patent applicant acts fairly with the patent system. An inventor must disclose his or 
her best mode to the public in exchange for patent protection. Actually, full disclosure 
requirement may be also beneficial for the applicant himself Since as Gutterman and 
Erlich stated “If there are any doubts whether or not information should be included in 
the detailed description of the invention, they should generally be resolved in favor of 
including that information. Failure to include the information often raises serious legal 
implications, since if the information is later required by the Patent and Trademark 
Office, its insertion within the specification may be considered as new matter and this 
newly inserted information will therefore not be given the benefit of the filing date of 
the original application and the Patent and Trademark Office will require that the 
information be stricken from the application. Such additional information can 
thereafter only be inserted by filing another application, referred to as a continuation- 
in-part application. However, in such a continuation-in-part application, the inventor 
also loses the benefit of the early filing date with respect to the new information”. The
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specification should conclude with one or more claims^^ which point out clearly the 
subject matter of the invention. The necessary drawings should be included in the 
application documents. The major aim of the drawings is to explain the invention in a 
better fomi. Specification section should reference the drawings. In the oath, the 
inventor must declare that he or she understood the contents of the specification(s) 
and he or she is the original, first, and sole in v en to fo f the invention. Moreover he or 
she must also declare that, all the necessary infomiation is disclosed in the 
application. The inventor should also state of which country he is a citizen in the oath 
section.
When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they should apply for a 
patent jointly and each should make the required oath. Inventors may apply for a 
patent jointly even though they did not physically work together at the same time or 
each did not make the same type and amount of contribution.
United States patent system allows provisional patent applications '^ .^ Provisional 
patent application system permits the establishment of an initial effective filing date 
without spending from twenty-year term of patent protection. The provisional patent 
application must contain a specification and any necessary drawings in compliance 
with Title 35 U.S. Code 112, and filing fee, but does not have to contain oath, like a 
regular application. The provisional patent applications are kept secret in the patent 
office, and will not be examined. The provisional applications expire within twelve 
months from the date of its file. Regular patent applications should be made within 
these twelve months, then patent examination will be perfonned.
Claims are the numbered sentences appearing at the end of the patent and define the invention. The 
words o f the claims define the scope o f the patent owner's exclusive right during the life o f the patent.
Joint invention and application are also allowed.
The provisional patent application is a form o f preliminary patent application, which can be filed at 
a lower cost and without claims and certain other formalities.
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Title 35 U.S. Code 131 - 135 describes the examination procedure of a patent 
application. Each patent application shall be examined by a patent examiner^s, if such 
an examination concludes that an application satisfies the patentability requirements, 
then the commissioner shall issue a patent therefore. Guttennan and Erlich indicate 
that, the patent application generally waits for approximately one or more years before 
being examined by a patent examiner in the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office. Patent applications are examined in order of its filing date, with the 
application having the earliest filing date being examined first. During the whole 
period of examination, the application is kept confidential regardless of its status. 
Only government personnel and persons authorized by inventor are peiTnitted to 
access the file of the application. The inventor can use, produce, or sell his or her 
invention during the examination period. Moreover, the inventor can place a "patent 
pending" sign on the invention. However, this can only be done in regular patent 
applications, provisional applications cannot be signed. Naturally, examination period 
does not provide a legal protection, since legal protection for the invention is obtained 
only when the patent is issued.
After initial processing stage, which may take 6-9 months or more, a patent examiner 
will review the application and write a letteU*^  commenting on it. The first aim of the 
patent examiner is to detenriine whether the claims are patentable and whether the 
specification adequately describes the invention claimed. In examining a patent 
application, the patent examiner makes a search of the office's patent records and 
other available foreign resources for prior art to the patent application claims. The 
examiner considers whether each claim defines an invention that is original, useful, 
and not obvious in view of this prior art. Following the prior art search and 
examination of the application, the patent examiner then advises the applicant in 
writing what he has found and whether applicant's claims are allowed. The first Office
2.3.2.3 Examination of Patent Applications
Personnel, employed by the Patent and Trademark Office who examine patent applications, each in 
a specific technical area, to determine whether the claims o f a patent application are patentable and 
whether the disclosure adequately describes the invention.
This letter is called as Office Action. Office Action can be defined as communication from the 
patent examiner regarding the specification of the patent application and/or the claims pending in the 
patent application.
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Action often is a refusaF"  ^ to grant the patent, and the applicant then may modify the 
application to overcome the objection of the examiner. The patent attorney will reply 
in writing to the Office Action, usually making some changes with the help of the 
inventor and submits new or modified claims. This process may go back and forth 
between the patent examiner in the Patent and Trademark Office and the applicant 
until the examiner is satisfied, or the application is withdrawn. Typically, at least two 
such exchanges between patent examiner and attorney are necessary to resolve all the 
legal and technical issues. These exchanges and initial processing take an average of 
about 18-22 months from filing date.
When the examiner is satisfied that the application is in proper form and its claims are 
allowable, the applicant is notified that a patent grant will be issued upon the payment 
of final fees. In order to keep the patent in force until it expires, it is also necessary to 
pay progressively higher maintenance fees at 4‘'\ and 12^ '’ years of the patent life. 
The major aim of this progressive fee schedule is to eliminate the commercially 
unsuccessful patent, and force the commercialization of the invention.
2.3.2.4 Exploitation of Patent Grant
As mentioned before, patent is a document, which constitutes exclusive rights for the 
owner like any other properties. The owner of a patent may protect his / her exclusive 
rights embodied in the patent grant against infringers by performing legal actions. If 
these rights are effectively protected by the owner and the law, then they provide 
some opportunities of strategic uses of patent rights. Fundamentally, like other forms 
of properties, patents can be sold, rented, or mortgaged depending on the owner’s 
choice. Naturally this choice is shaped by several external effects, namely financing 
and production skill of the owner^^, existing market structure for innovative products, 
and supportive institutions for inventions. Most inventors seek a patent to obtain the 
actual or potential commercial advantages over their rivals. Given the high cost of
One recent study found that, at least 72 % of all the claims are either amended or canceled. See 
Wayne O. Stacy, Note, Reexamination Reality: How Courts Should Approach a Motion to Stay 
Litigation Pending the Outcome of Reexamination, 66 GEO. Wash. L. Rev. 172 (1997).
A commercially successful invention requires not only new idea, but also competent business skills 
and capital investment. To be successful, an invention (patent) usually needs a coordinated business 
planning, manufacturing, marketing, and sales effort.
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research and development, the opportunity to recoup these costs through commercial 
exploitation may be the primary justification. It is important to note that a patent does 
not give the owner the right to practice the invention. The owner can practice his 
invention only if by doing so, he does not infringe the existing unexpired patents.
Basically the patent owner has five alternative exploitation fonns. In the first 
alternative, the owner renounces from his or her rights and adds his invention to the 
public knowledge domain, which can immediately be used freely. Naturally this 
alternative can be obtained without any patent grant. Secondly, the patent can be used 
to induce domestic and foreign inventors to finance the necessary investment for the 
commercialization of the invention. This alternative is reasonable in the case where 
the owner does not have enough financial and production capabilities. Effective patent 
protection, even limited period of time, provides fruitful term for the investors.
In the third alternative, the owner may exploit his patent himself when he has 
sufficient financial and productive skills. Obviously this is a rare case, since full 
commercialization of an invention may require a large amount of investment. 
Employee patents may be considered as this kind of exploitation theoretically. Many 
of the high technology firms, which have hired inventive and skilled employees, 
provide some benefits as compensation in return to use their patent rights. It should be 
noted that the patent concept is essentially individual property, that is to say it must be 
designated to an inventor or inventors jointly.
However, large firms have thousands of patent grants as a finn asset, since the shop 
right concept grew out of judicial concerns, that employees were taking unfair 
advantage of their employers and that equity necessitated that employers be protected. 
As a result, the patent law prevents employees from claiming infringement on the part 
of employers, when the work done on a patent comes out at the expense of the 
employer’s time or materials, necessitating that the employer be offered certain rights 
in the patent. In fact, in the case where no valid written agreement exists between the 
employee and the employer assigning ownership of the invention to the employer, 
three general common law principles apply: (1) If an employee is not hired 
specifically for the purpose of inventing anything, then whatever he or she may invent 
during the course of the employment will be owned by the employee. No implicit 
agreement to assign any patent to the employer arises. This general rule applies even
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if the invention is related to the employer’s business. (2) When an employee is hired 
to invent, but the employer has no more in mind than a desired result and does not 
give the employee instructions as to the means the employee must use to accomplish 
the particular result, then any resulting invention, even if related to the employer’s 
business, will again be owned by the employee. (3) If an employee is hired to create a 
specific invention and the employer can demonstrate that the means to bringing the 
idea into practical form were clearly spelled out for the employee, the employer will 
be deemed the owner of the invention where the invention is within the scope of the 
inventor’s employment and relates to the employer’s business. Even in the first two 
scenarios, where the employee owns the invention and any resulting patent, the 
employer may have a "shop right" to the invention. A shop right is an employer’s 
non-exclusive, royalty-free, non-transferable license to make, use and sell items 
embodying an employee’s patentable invention, but only within the normal scope of 
its business. A shop right doesn’t automatically arise, however. It typically exists only 
where an employee has used the employer’s time, materials or equipment in creating 
the patented invention. A shop right can last beyond the employee’s tenn of 
employment, but it expires along with the patent at the end of its 20 years long 
protection term. Technically, a shop right is not an ownership right on the patent, but 
is a defense against an employee’s allegation of patent infringement.
Fourthly, if the owner is unwilling or unable to commercialize the underlying 
invention, he can license the right to use the invention to others, in return for a royalty 
payment. Basically the owner may choose to transfer monopoly right over the 
invention in some cases. Lastly, patent rights can be utilized as a contribution to a new 
business enterprise, such as a domestic or foreign joint venture. Naturally, the 
structure of a joint venture enterprise depends on domestic and foreign laws of 
investment and patent. Finally, it should also be noted that, there is difficulty in 
almost all forms of strategic use of the patent rights, except self-commercialization, 
since all forms of contracts, namely licensing, joint venture etc. may bear high degree 
of asymmetric information about the invention between the inventor and the 
contractor.
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Title 35 of the U.S. federal law also deals with the infringement concept and remedy 
for the infringement. A person or company is said to be infringing on claims of a 
patent when they, without permission from the patent owner, make, use, import, offer 
to sell, or sell the patented invention, as defined by the claims, within the United 
States, its territories or possessions, before the term of the patent expiration. A person 
who actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer. A 
contributory infringer can be defined as a person who offers to sell or sells a patented 
product within the United States or imports a patented product into the United States. 
If there is no direct infringement by anyone, there can be no contributory 
infringement.
Infringement is generally classified as either direct or indirect. A direct act of 
infringement is the actual use, or commercialization of the invention. Indirect 
infringement act refers to acts by persons other than a direct infringer. Direct 
infringement can be in two different forms, namely literal infringement and doctrine 
of equivalent. A patent claim is literally infringed only if defendant’s product or 
process includes each and every element or process in that patent claim. Conversely, 
if defendant's product or process does not contain one or more of the elements or 
processes declared in a claim, the claim is not literally infringed. Literal infringement 
must be determined with respect to each patent claim independently. Guttennan and 
Erlich point out that "A person need not have notice or knowledge of the patent in 
order to be liable for direct infringement. The simple act of making, using, offering 
for sale, selling, or importing the claimed invention constitutes infringement 
regardless of the infringer's intent and knowledge of patent." The doctrine of 
equivalent has been developed by courts to resolve those cases where literal 
infringement cannot be proved. Doctrine of equivalent form of infringement is based 
on the fact that patented inventions should be protected against the products, which 
have substantially the same function and are produced in substantially the same 
method. If the defendant's product or process contains equivalent of the element in the 
claim but not the same, this may indicate doctrine of equivalent fonn of infringement.
A patent owner that believes that someone is infringing on his or her exclusive rights 
under a patent may bring a lawsuit to stop the alleged infringing acts and recover
2.3.2.5 Infringement of Patent Rights
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damages. The patent owner has the burden to prove infringement of the claims of the 
patent. The patent owner also has the burden to prove damages caused by the 
infringement. If an infringement case is proved, the infringer has to cover the loss of 
the owner due to infringement damage. The lost profit of the patentee is based on loss 
of potential sales, price reduction of infringer, and loss of profits from projected sales. 
They are all considered in determining the extent of damages in the infringement 
action. Damages may not be less than a reasonable royalty for the use of the 
invention. This kind of remedy is only applicable in the case of appropriate notice or 
marking has been placed on the patented product. A person sued for infringing a 
patent can deny infringement. Inevitably accused party has a right to prepare his 
defense against the litigant. Generally, they try to prove that the asserted claims are 
invalid or unenforceable in order to be released from the case. The accused infringer 
has the burden to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. In evaluating 
infringement or invalidity, each claim should be evaluated independently.
2.4 Theoretical Perspective
2.4.1 Welfare Analysis of Patent System
As a legal regulatory institution, patent system has welfare effects. In this section, 
welfare analysis of patent system is investigated. Roughly speaking, welfare effects of 
patent system depend on its stringency. Stringency of patent system is deteimined by 
both length and scope'*'^  of patent. It is generally shown that if patent length or scope 
increases, then patent system becomes more stringent.
Patent length determines how long patent owner can hold his/her exclusive 
production, selling, and distribution right. Patent law sets maximum allowable patent 
length. A patentee has to pay the annual renewal fee to continue to hold his right. 
However, a patentee can withdraw his right by terminating his payment. In this sense, 
patent length defines the upper bound of a policy variable in patent system. In most of 
todays’ economies, patent laws state that patent length^  ^is 20 years.
Breadth and width o f patent are alternative terms that explains the scope o f patent.
Some authors use patent duration or patent life expressions as an alternative for patent length.
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On the other hand, patent length is not the only policy variable at hand. Patent length 
and patent scope should be considered together. Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) studied 
optimal combination of patent length and scope. According to them, there is a trade­
off between these two policy variables, which possively affect the reward of the right 
holder. They examined socially optimum policy mixture of patent length and patent 
scope for a given reward to patent owner. According to their interpretation, patent 
scope is the ability of the patentee to raise the price, which constitutes the flow rate of 
monopoly profit of patent. Patent length is the duration of this profit flow. Broader or 
longer patent generates higher reward to the innovator. Net present value of total 
reward can be calculated as the integral of discounted flow rate of profit over patent 
length. The model can be described as follows; a social welfare function which 
depends on the flow rate of profit is defined. Social welfare function is the sum of 
consumer surplus and profit terms, it is integrated over the patent length and 
discounted in order to find present value of it. Then the well -  known optimization 
problem can be constructed as follows; the discounted social welfare function is 
maximized such that reward for invention is given. In fact, this problem does not aim 
to determine the optimum reward policy, it just targets optimum implementation of 
patent system while providing constant reward for invention. The model assumes that 
social welfare decreases when profit increases. Broader patents generate higher 
profits, but cause increasing welfare loss in temis of deadweight loss. Then the model 
implies that increasing patent length thus decreasing scope always raises welfare, 
therefore an infinitely lived patent is optimal. This result mainly depends on patent 
breadth’s being increasingly costly in tenns of deadweight loss assumption.
In summary, this model shows that narrow but lengthy patents are socially optimum. 
The model solves an infinite horizon optimization problem. Gilbert and Shapiro 
assume that patent holders are faced with a stationary and predictable environment. 
Their study indicates that optimal patent policy requires an infinite patent length, 
under the assumption that pre-detennined patent reward is adjusted with the breadth 
of patent. Naturally, if the assumption of stationary and predictable environment is 
relaxed, then their results may change. Gilbert and Shapiro focus on a single invention 
in their model. However, this is a strong simplifiying assumption since most of the 
inventions depend on previously taken inventive steps. But, then, infinitely protected 
patent rights may generate too much disincentive for further inventive activities. In
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summary, Gilbert and Shapiro give a policy implication, that infinite patent length^' 
is, clearly, socially optimum under the stationary, predictable and a single invention 
environment.
Scope of patent protection is an important aspect of patent system. Today, United 
States and .iapan patent systems are different from each other in this respect. In Japan 
patent system, a minor change in the patented product is enough to issue a new patent 
grant. However in the United States, scope of patent protection is wider than in Japan 
today. Scope of patent protection and socially optimum patent policy are studied by 
Klemperer (1990).
Eli Whitney’s 1794 cotton gin patent is a well-known and sharp example of narrow 
patent scope. The 1793 American patent act defined nearly zero patent width. At that 
time, competitors of Eli Whitney made minor modifications and granted their own 
patents. Therefore original invention produced very little profits. Nevertheless, 
modem United States patent law allows broader scope of patent. Japanese, Gennan 
and English patent laws have narrow patent width with respect to American 
implementation. A broader patent width allows the patentee to make more profit and 
reduce competitors’ chance to get a patent near the original invention. Therefore, 
scope of patent protection has direct effect on social optimization problem.
Klemperer indicates two kinds of social welfare costs, on the one hand some 
consumers switch to less preferred but unpatented substitutes of original patented 
products while on the other hand some consumers prefer not to consume due to higher 
priced patented product. Wider patents allow patent holders to charge higher prices, 
since competition is banned in the vicinity of the original patent. Two extreme cases 
are worth to be mentioned: infinitely wide and nearly of zero width patent protection 
regimes. In the first case, all consumers make socially efficient allocation between 
varieties of the original product, since patent covers all varieties. Infinite scope of 
patent generates only second kind of welfare loss; some consumers prefer to be 
outside the market. On the other hand, only first kind of welfare loss which indicates 
substitution to the less preferred alternatives, becomes important when patent is of
 ^1 In this sense, it is clear that Gilbert and Shapiro implicitly assume that there is no obsolescence risk 
for inventions.
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nearly zero width. In the light of these two kinds of welfare losses, Klemperer 
concludes that there exists two distinct optimum solutions for the following two 
scenarios. In the first scenario, all consumers have the same per-unit substitution cost, 
so called transport cost, between preferred variety and alternatives. In this case, 
arbitrarily narrow and infinitely long patent protection is socially optimum. In the 
second scenario, all consumers value a preferred variety more than the alternatives by 
the same amount, which is known as reservation price. In this case, short lived and 
infinitely wide patent protection is socially optimum. Thus Klemperer’s results 
suggest how optimal patent policies vary across different product types.
The major assumption of the model is the absence of subsequent inventive activities 
and new patents. In the model, once the patent is awarded, innovative activities are 
ceased. Klemperer is aware of the limitations of this assumption and proposes that 
further studies should be developed to include an optimal patent height^  ^ in addition to 
his theoiy of optimal width, since further innovations may introduce the same 
patented product with higher quality. Optimal patent policy should address another 
policy question, namely how much quality improvement is required to obtain a new 
patent without infringing the original patent? In summary, Klemperer suggests that 
there are two alternative patent shapes which are optimal for two distinct types of 
product demands, without dealing with the supply side of inventive activities.
At this point, investigation of empirical importance of patent scope should be 
beneficial. Lemer (1994) examines the relation between scope of patent and firm 
value, and reports a significant positive relationship using patent data of 
biotechnology firms. According to him, first policy variable is patent length and it is 
examined in detail; however scope of patent is relatively new dimension of the patent 
system and deserves attention. Lemer starts with the theoretical results of Gilbert and 
Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990), then tries to estimate the effect of patent scope 
on fimi values by using International Patent Classification (IPC) scheme.
Most patents become obsolete before the legal patent protection period ends. In 
today’s information era, technological developments are too rapid to hold a patent 
commercially valuable in a long period of time. In this environment, scope of patent
Patent height is defined to determine the protection range o f patent over quality dimension.
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protection is more important than the patent length, nevertheless theoretical and 
empirical studies are not mature yet.
Lerner indicates that there has been a norrowing trend in patent scope in the last two 
decades. This observation suggests two alternatives: one is that increasing number of 
patent applications make the technology space dense, and the other is that there is 
increasing doubt about monopoly effects of wide patent protection. However, 
theoretical or empirical studies on these claims are absent up to now.
Lerner considers that case by case patent assessment is the best way to detennine the 
value, but it is difficult and costly to apply widely. Experienced lawyers and scientists 
spend several weeks for a single patent assessment. Therefore, IPC scheme is 
evaluated as a proxy for patent scope in the study. Clearly, number of subclasses of 
patent classification assigned to a patent are assumed to be correlated with patent 
scope. The data are collected from United States Patent and Trademark Office’s 
(USPTO) database. Two distinct patent classification schemes are used for each 
patent, namely U.S. and IPC. U.S. patent classification scheme is mainly based on 
structure and function of the invention, however IPC patent classification scheme 
considers profession and industry of the invention. Therefore, according to Lemer, 
IPC classification scheme is a more appropriate scope measure than U.S scheme. 
Lemer, then, validates IPC scheme as a proxy for patent scope. Finally, Lemer 
concludes that, there is a positive relation between patent scope and firm value. 
Moreover, he reports the observation that the scope of patent awards has been 
narrowing significantly in the last decade.
Welfare analysis of patent policy is a difficult subject to handle, since scope of patent 
is not directly related to its commercial value. That is to say, some patents may be 
fruitful for further inventions, while they have no commercial value initially. 
Moreover, innovation is a cumulative process and patents are usually based on other 
patents. In this environment, patent scope and infringement claims are strong 
problems which stand in front of patent offices and courts. Chang (1995) builds up a 
model which deals with patent scope and cumulative innovation. According to Chang, 
incentives to invent depend upon the patent scope and anti-tmst policy. Furthermore, 
patent policy should be designed and implemented by considering cumulative nature
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of inventions. Chang indicates that, courts have a great responsibility in the 
implementation of both anti-trust and patent policies.
Chang’s two-period model consists of two finns, and identical consumers with unit 
demand. In each period, only one firm makes a contribution to the state of the art 
technology and second period invention always depends on the first-period invention. 
The model assumes that courts have a perfect information about the value of each 
invention and make correct decisions on infringement claims. Naturally, these 
simplifying assumptions ignore the fact that many firms exist in reality and all of 
them are competing with each other in each period of time and perfect infonnation 
about the value of patents is unrealistic.
Furthermore, patent systems have two major aspects, incentives to invent and 
encouragement for revelation of information within inventions. Incentives to invent 
and in formation revelation are both intensified by broader scope of patents. However, 
broader scope of patent also inhibits other firms to invest in further research. 
Therefore, patent offices and courts should be aware of these two contentious sides of 
patent protection system. In summary, Chang concludes that broad patent protection 
increases the dissemination of knowledge and the value of a patent should cover the 
return on the potential improvements to a certain extent.
2.4.2 Patent System and Market Structure
Conventional view indicates that patent system has two faces. Clearly, patent system 
fosters inventive activities by protecting intellectual property, while creating 
monopoly power which builds a barrier for potential entrants. Welfare impact of this 
tradeoff^^ draws attentions of both academicians and politicians. Bae (1993) 
investigates conventional belief of two contradictory faces of the patent protection. 
According to Bae, patent protection may shorten entry time as well as foster further 
inventive activities. In this sense, conventional view of tradeoff between stimulating 
innovation and monopoly power is a misconception.
This tradeoff can also be expressed as a balance between optimum utilization and optimum creation 
of knowledge.
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The model compares two situations. In the first case, the innovator finn has only one 
option to deter entry namely to invest on an entry barrier. In the second situation, the 
firni has two options. It can deter entry either by investing or by using patent grant 
which impedes entry of others into the officially protected market. Obviously, the 
inventor firm is better-off in the second situation. The model implies that patent 
protection may shorten the entry-deterring period under the assumption that patent 
length is less than optimal duration of deterring entry. The reasoning is that with 
patent protection (the second case), the firm does not invest before the expiration of 
patent but a large amount of entry deterring investment is required between the dates 
of patent expiration and free entry. This large amount of investment requirement may 
affect the desicion of patent owner firm such that it may allow entry at the time patent 
expires. In short, under patent protection it would be better for the incumbent firm as 
it has two options, and it would also be better for the potential entrants since they may 
allowed to enter the market earlier.
In summary, Bae shows that patent system may shorten the entry deterrence period 
without disturbing the patent holder finn. In this sense, patent system fosters inventive 
activities without creating monopoly entry barriers. However, the model only focuses 
on free entry time, monopoly profit and free entry profit. It does not deal with welfare 
loss of consumers and dynamic nature of inventive activities. Moreover, according to 
Mansfield (1984), effective patent protection period is less than its expiration period. 
Therefore the main assumption of Bae, which implies that patent length is less than 
optimal free entry time, is empirically demolished.
Deviating from the optimistic literature, Chou and Shy (1993) show that patent system 
may create crowding-out effects and slow the process of product development. They 
construct an overlapping generation model which deals with saving, investment and 
product innovation. The study is based on a multiproduct general equilibrium model 
of product innovation. Two alternative patent regimes are investigated, namely one 
period-length and infinite length. Chou and Shy conclude that one period patent 
length is socially optimum.
According to Chou and Shy, the assumption that “long duration of patent increases 
the strength of the patent protection and fosters innovation” is not necessarily the 
case. In their overlapping generations model, long duration of patent protection
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creates long-lived monopoly firms, exhausts savings of young generations and 
therefore decreases new product development incentives of next generations. As an 
extreme case, infinitely lived monopolies crowd out the investment of the young 
generations’ investments. More precisely, one period patent life system generates 
more innovation than infinite patent case. Then Chou and Shy indicate that one period 
patent length is optimum for all generations in three distinct model settings. The first 
model setting is love of variety approach of consumers. If consumers highly value 
product variety, one-period patents are optimum for all generations, since they 
generate more innovation. In contrast, infinite patent length regime is optimum if 
products are highly substitutable. The second model setting which gives the same 
outcome is high rates of time preferrences of consumers. Finally, the third model 
setting can be described as low population growth rate and low subtitutability of 
products. One-period patents are again socially optimum in the third case. Moreover, 
Chou and Shy report that high population growth rate results in an insignificant 
welfare difference between the two alternative patent regimes.
Chou and Shy emphasize that, patent system is one of the most perplexing objects in 
the industrial organization literature, since the patent system affects both product and 
R&D markets. The main aim is to encourage R&D markets but the system distorts 
product markets at the same time. Therefore, welfare impacts of patent system is a 
controversial subject. Finally, Chou and Shy denote that product development proeess 
creates externalities. More precisely, future generations benefit from previously 
invented products.
The weakness of the model is that it just compares two limiting patent length regimes; 
one period versus infinitely lived. Naturally, these two alternatives are insufficient to 
shape optimum patent policy. However, several patent lengths are difficult to solve by 
using the model, as the authors indicate.
2.4.3 Information Diffusion
Innovation is a sequencial process, further innovations generally lie on previously 
developed basic knowledge set. In this sense, innovations can be classified into two 
distinct sets, namely major innovations which create further applications, and 
secondary innovations which are applications of basic innovations. Major innovations
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are sources of secondary innovations and should be specially handled with in the 
patent system. Matutes, Regibeau and Rockett (1996) point out pioneer innovations 
and suggest the importance of patent scope in this framework. According to Matutes 
et al., patent system plays an important role in the diffusion of knowledge. Patent 
system should be designed to reduce the waiting period of the next innovation. They 
examine two alternative tools, patent length and scope, and conclude that patent scope 
is an efficient tool for speeding up inventive activities.
Matutes et al., indicate that information disclosure requirement of patent application is 
crucial for information diffusion. Innovative firms are willing to wait until they 
develop further applications before introducing a pioneer patent application, since 
rival firms acquire revealed infonnation and develop commercially successful 
secondary applications. For a basic innovation, this means a high commercial risk. 
However, waiting period for patent applications has a welfare cost. Matutes et al. deal 
with this dynamic inefficiency and suggest an optimum patent policy. According to 
them, finn’s incentive to reveal its pioneer inventive information can be kept alive by 
a wide patent scope. Furthermore, optimal scope and length of patent protection 
increases with the number of rival firms.
Finally, broader patent protection of the basic innovation fuels innovation diffusion 
through information disclosure. Authors also state that optimal patent policy involves 
both length and scope variables. In this sense, Gilbert and Shapiro’s (1990) and 
Klemperer’s (1990) results and their study are considered as complementary.
The value of patent protection, incentives for inventive activities and technical 
information diffusion among firms are all closely related with each other. Scotchmer 
and Green (1990) indicate that legal requirements of novelty and nonobviousness of 
patent application mainly determine the value of these concepts. They state that 
novelty and nonobviousness requirements are hard to define and apply. In fact, patent 
mechanism is a tripot which is constituted by standards, patent office and judicial 
system. However, there is still a gap for determination of optimal novelty and 
nonobviousness requirements.
Patent system roughly defines the novelty and nonobviousness requirements of new 
technology over previous patents. Innovative firms have to disclose the information of
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the new technology in order to get a patent grant. Disclosure of new technology 
creates externalities which indicate that the patent system has a dynamic nature. 
Moreover there are two alternative granting rules for patent applications, “first to file” 
which is applied in all countries except the United States and “first to invent” which is 
applied only in the United States. In the first case, filing is essential to get a grant, 
however in the second case, finns can prove their innovation later by presenting 
required documents.
in this environment, Scotchmer and Green model a dynamic system which represents 
novelty requirements and diffusion of innovation. They investigate two alternative 
requirements, namely strong and weak novelty, and examine the differences of “first 
to file” and “first to invent” policies. Strong novelty requirement creates more 
incentives to invest in inventive activities than v/eak novelty requirement. Since, 
minor improvements are considered as an infringement in the strong novelty 
requirement case, original patent receives higher profit hence incentive to do research 
is higher in this case. On the other hand, weak novelty requirement allows small 
contributions to get a patent award, therefore increases the number of patent 
applications and revelation of infomiation. The public knowledge domain is enriched 
by weak novelty requirement which reduces the cost of sequential research of rival 
firms. These two contradictory effects determine the socially efficient stringency of 
novelty requirement. Scotchmer and Green indicate that alternative patenting rules 
play a major role in this framework. According to them, patent system has two main 
benefits, incentive to do research and infomiation disclosure. Alternative economic 
policies may not achieve these two main benefits, at the same time.
Finally, Scotchmer and Green conclude that weak novelty requirement is the socially 
efficient way to drive both information sharing between firms and incentive to do 
research. The information revelation induces strong competition between firms and 
decreases the potential profit, however the innovative firm has an option to market the 
new technology without patenting. Nevertheless, the fact that “imitation and reverse 
engineering are easy in some sectors, therefore do not apply to the patent” cannot be 
an option for inventive firms. In this framework, “first to file” is a superior patenting 
rule.
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2.4.4 Value of Patents
The determination of patent values is an ongoing empirical study which is still 
inconclusive, since patent counts are misleading indicators. Millions dollars of 
commercial value and valueless patents are all in the same pool.^^ However, 
determination of the precise patent value is critical, since it enables evaluation of the 
patent system and therefore international agreements. In the literature, there are two 
major alternative methods which address these problems. Clearly, patent citation and 
patent renewal methods are the most accepted ones. Lanjouw (1993) builds a patent 
renewal model in order to estimate private value of patent protection.
The model considers four technology fields, namely computers, textiles, 
pharmaceuticals and combustion engines. The data are collected from West Germany 
patent database and includes Japan, Europe and United States originated patents. 
Patent renewal models are based on the fact that an annual patent fee is required in 
order to keep patent in force and there is an increasing fee schedule. In this 
environment, it is logical to free commercially worthless patents to public domain. 
Furthemiore, patent protection requires active participation of the owner, since patent 
system only defines rules and procedures but patent holder has to detect infringements 
by himself If a patent holder is incapable or indifferent of defending his right, then 
others may infringe without any sanction. In this case, private value of the patent 
diminishes. Lanjouw deals with both renewal fee schedule and defending requirement 
and concludes that patent protection varies across technology fields. Moreover, patent 
renewal desicions are affected by infringement threat and litigation. Lanjouw reports 
that 65-95% of patents become free before maximum patent protection period is 
reached. This figure indicates that most patents are commercially worthless^^, and 
proves that patent counts are misleading indicators.
Lanjouw also suggests that the model can be used for the simulations of policy 
implications. For example, effects of patent length and renewal schedule on patent 
protection can be estimated. However, the model is limited to describe the whole
The vast majority o f patents are o f little value, while only a small proportion o f patents are 
extremely valuable.
Actually, this is not the only possibility. Obsolescence of patent causes withdrawing from renewal.
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dimensions of the patent system, since patent scope and discrimination are issues of 
real life but are not incorporated in the model. Nevertheless, skewed distribution of 
patents and rapid obsolescence are observed by the model.
The number of patent applications are continuously increasing, but simple count of 
patents do not represent their technological significance. As mentioned before, patent 
citation is also an alternative for measuring real value of patents. The patent citation 
method depends on the cumulative nature of innovation process. As is well known, 
most of the inventions are only improvements of existing technology. Certainly, some 
inventions realize breakthrough in technology, however these are very rare. Therefore, 
patent data has a large variance, which implies the uncertainty of patent values. In this 
context, patent citations, which indicate references of prior patents, contain valuable 
information about the economic value of patents. Trajtenberg (1990) builds a patent 
citation model in order to evaluate simple patent counts. The model uses a narrow 
data set of Computed Tomography (CT) scanners patents and tests the significance of 
patent citation method. The data set only covers CT patents, since significance test 
requires independent measures of the innovations in this field. Trajtenberg considers 
innovation as a continuous and cumulative process, and concludes that weighted 
patent counts which depend on patent citations can be a good proxy for economic 
value of patents. Moreover, Trajtenberg indicates that, simple patent counts denote the 
level of R&D investments. That is to say, increasing numbers in patent applications 
indicate larger R&D efforts performed. However, larger R&D efforts do not represent 
higher social benefits.
Trajtenberg also states that, patent data is a rich source which covers all technology 
fields, and can be identified for different product classes. Moreover, it covers a long 
period of time, however it requires a refinement process before usage. Finally, the 
model should be tested further for different technology fields in the case of data 
availability of independent measures of patent value.
The majority of patents do not yield any private return, and probably do not have any 
social value. On the other hand, many technological contributions do not end up with 
a patent protection, since basic research activities and ideas are out of patent 
protection scope. Moreover, many firms do not apply for patent for secrecy purposes. 
Briefly, patenting is a strategic decision of finns. The main aim is to limit knowledge
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spillovers to rival fimis. However, academic research activities are, generally, not 
subject to this reasoning. Moreover, as is well known, productivity of a firm depends 
on not only the rival fiiTns' R&D efforts in the same industry but also R&D 
investments in other industries. In this sense patent data, which cover detailed 
information about inventor, location, industry classification etc., provide a tracable 
path for knowledge spillovers. Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1992) build a model 
which investigates the geographic component of knowledge spillovers. Their starting 
point goes back to Alfred Marshall's three factors of geographic concentration, 
namely availability of specialized labor, intermediate inputs and possibility of 
knowledge spillovers among firms. The study uses university and corporate patent 
citation data of United States between 1975 and 1980 and reports the significant 
localization. The study also suggests that geographic localization of patent citations 
fade over time, and university and coiporate originated patent citations show the same 
geographic localization characteristics. In addition, geographic localization is not 
limited within a product class, on the contrary it is widely distributed within all 
product classes.
In summary, Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson investigate the invisible flow of 
knowledge among firms, universities and industries. Their findings suggest that there 
is geographic localization for knowledge diffusion. However, as they indicate, tracing 
information spillover is a difficult task, since there are other reasons for geographic 
localization which complicate the analysis. The Silicon Valley case is a famous 
example; there is a strong geographic localization of patent citations in Silicon Valley, 
but localized knowledge spillovers are perhaps the least effective of all the causes. 
Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson indicate the pre-existing localization of related 
industries in Silicon Valley, and try to separate knowledge spillovers evidenced by 
patent citations from other causes. Finally, globalization efforts, strong competition in 
high-tech products, improvements in communication infrastructure and reducing 
communication costs may change the existing picture in the near future.
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CHAPTER 3
TRADE RELATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Trade ministers from more than one hundred member countries of the GATT signed 
the Final Act embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (MTNs), containing twentyeight agreements, in the ancient city of 
Marrakesh, On April 15, 1994. Among the agreements forming part of the Final Act 
of the Uruguay Round, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) represents a significant development in the evolution of 
international intellectual property rights protection. The purpose of this chapter is to 
study the implications of the TRIPs Agreement. Section 3.1 provides a short overview 
of what intellectual property rights (IPRs) are. Importance of IPRs in international 
transactions is studied in section 3.2 and the main disciplines introduced by the TRIPs 
Agreement are dealt with in section 3.3. In section 3.4, the economic implications of 
the TRIPs Agreement are discussed.
3.1 Intellectual Property Rights
Intellectual property can be defined as information, which possesses commercial 
value. It is an asset, developed by inventive or creative work to which rights to 
exclude its unauthorized use and distribution have been granted by law. Protections*  ^is 
given to ideas, technical solutions or other information that have been expressed in a 
legally admissible form. These expressions are, in some cases, subject to registration 
procedures. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are exercised with respect to the 
products that carry the protected infomiatioii and those who create the intangible may
Because products o f knowledge are typically non-rival and non-excludable, a legal protection 
system is required in order to exploit its benefits by creator.
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regulate the use of the creation and the commercialization^·? of the product that 
contains it.
Intellectual property legislation relates to the acquisition and use of a range of rights 
covering different types of creations. Namely an aesthetic character, technologies as 
well as information and signs of a purely commercial value are all considered as these 
types of creations. The main legal instruments utilized to protect different types of 
intellectual property rights are patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, 
neighbouring rights, breeders’ rights, geographical indications, copyrights, layout 
designs of integrated circuits and trade secrets. A short description of these rights are 
provided below under four headings, following the approach of Primo Braga, Fink 
and Sepulveda (1999): rights on industrial property, rights on literary and artistic 
property, sui-generis protection and trade secrets.
The types of instruments used in the case of industrial property are patents, utility 
models, industrial designs, trademarks and geographical indications. Patents are 
granted by legal authority^ *^  conferring the exclusive right to make, use, distribute or 
sell an invention in manufacturing (mainly in human necessities, transportation, 
chemical, metallurgy, pharmaceuticals, textiles, plastics, paper, engines, turbines, 
electronics, heating, weapons, industrial control and scientific equipment) for a fixed 
period of time such as twenty years^'f In order to be patentable, an invention usually 
needs to meet the requirements of absolute novelty (previously unknown to the 
public), non-obviousness (containing sufficient inventive step over the state of the art 
technology) and industrial applicability (or usefulness). Patents may be granted for all 
types of products and processes in all fields of technology, including those related to 
the primary sector of production, namely metallurgy, construction, agriculture, 
fishing, textile or transportation, etc.
Commercialization o f intellectual property is simply about planning how inventor will take his new 
idea to the marketplace.
National Patent Offices are legal authorities, which can issue patent grants.
Patent duration is counted from the filing date o f patent application.
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Patent-like protection is conferred for functional models and other minor innovations 
in mechanical industry under utility models''^. Under utility models, protection is 
given to the functional aspect of models and designs, generally in the mechanical 
field. Although novelty and usefulness are required, the criteria of inventiveness for 
conferring protection are less strict than for patents. Actually the term of protection is 
shorter than the patent case. Utility models are distinct from industrial designs, which 
normally protect the ornamental or aesthetic aspect of an industrial article. Industrial 
designs in clothing, automobiles and electronics are characterized by their appeal to 
the eye. There is a wide variety of requirements and modalities of protection 
pertaining to industrial designs. In some countries, protection is based on novelty, 
while in others on originality. Further, in some countries specific protection for an 
industrial design coexists with or can be accumulated to copyright or trademark 
protection for the same design. The term of protection generally ranges between five 
to fifteen years across countries.
On the other hand, trademarks are signs or symbols (including logos and names) 
registered by a manufacturer or merchant to identify goods and services of the original 
producer. It is applicable in all industries. A valid trademark allows the owner to 
exclude imitations that are likely to mislead the public, from commerce. The main aim 
is to reflect the quality of product or services to the consumers. Trademark provides 
an exclusive ownership and distinctiveness to a firm over its products. Protection is 
usually granted for ten years, and is renewable^' as long as the trademark continues to 
be used. In this sense, it is different from other types of intellectual properties.
Finally geographical indications are the signs or expressions used to indicate that, a 
product or service such as wines, spirits, cheese or other food products originate in a 
particular country, region or place. There are different types of geographical 
indications. They are called appellations of origin, if the characteristics of the 
products or services can be attributed exclusively or essentially to natural and human 
factors of the place in which the products or services originate.
Utility model is also known as petty patents.
Article 18 of TRIPs agreement states: “the registration o f a trademark shall be renewable 
indefinitely”.
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The second heading in the intellectual property concept is the rights on literary and 
artistic property. The types of instruments used in the case of literary and artistic 
property are copyrights and neighbouring rights. Copyright, unlike the patent 
protection, protects only the expression of an idea, not the idea itself. This means that, 
in principle, protection is only extended to the fonn in which an idea is expressed, but 
not to the concepts, methods and ideas that are expressed. Copyright protection is 
provided to the authors of original works of authorship, including literary, artistic and 
scientific works in printing, entertainment (audio, video, motion pictures), software, 
and broadcasting industry. Copyright has also been extended to protect computer 
software and databases in some countries. Protection generally lasts for the life of the 
author plus fifty years or for fifty years (or more) in the case of works belonging to 
corporate bodies.
On the other hand, protection of perfonuers, producers of phonograms and 
broadcasting organizations are included in neighbouring rights. The owners of 
copyright can generally prevent the unauthorized reproduction, distribution, sale and 
adaptation of an original work. The term of protection is at least fifty years for 
performers and producers of phonograms, and twenty years for broadcasting 
organizations.
The third heading, namely sui generis protection is concerned with breeders' rights 
and integrated circuits. A breeders' rights title is awarded on plant varieties in 
agriculture and food industry if the breeder can both describe genetically the new 
variety and show that it is characterized by homogeneity and genetic stability. That is 
to say, a plant variety must be new, stable, homogeneous and distinguishable in order 
to be protected. Exclusive rights, as a minimum, include the sale and distribution of 
the propagating materials for around twenty years. Unlike patents, breeders' rights 
permit the use by other breeders of a protected variety as a basis for the development 
of a new variety (the breeders' exemption) and for the re-use by farmers of seeds 
obtained from their own harvests (the farmer's privilege).
On the other hand, the integrated circuits layout in microelectronics industry is 
protected in most industrialized countries. It is a sui generis form of protection 
introduced for the first time in the United States in 1984 that allows the owner of the 
design to prevent the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of such designs.
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Here, reverse engineering is generally allowed and the duration of protection is 
typically ten years.
Finally, the last form of protection is trade secrets protection. Trade secrets refer to 
confidential business information, such as lists of clients or recipes. This kind of 
information can be an enterprise's most valuable asset. In fact, trade secrets are one of 
the most widely used instruments in intellectual property protection field. Civil and 
criminal actions are provided for in most legislation against the unauthorized 
disclosure or use of confidential information. Actually, American Law Institute’s 
definition is one of the most widely cited definitions: “A trade secret may consist of 
any formula, pattern device or compilation of information which is used in one’s 
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors 
who do not know or use it ... it differs from other secret information in a business ... 
in that, it is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events ... A trade secret 
is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business”. The last 
part of this definition deserves special attention. In the trade secrets case, there is no 
exclusive right, but an indirect type of protection based on a factual characteristic of 
the information (its secret nature) and its business value. Trade secrets are protected 
as long as the information is kept secret.
IPRs are created by national laws, but legal instruments are just one of the pieces that 
form a national system of intellectual property protection. The other pieces are the 
institutions in charge of administering the system (patent offices and patent attorneys) 
and the mechanisms available for enforcing these rights. Since laws, institutions 
administering IPRs and enforcement of these rights may differ among countries, the 
need for harmonization among nations may arise, as their residents seek protection for 
their works outside of the home country. There are several attempts, which address 
this problem. These attempts have generated numerous international treaties on IPRs. 
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, signed in 1883, and the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed in 1886. 
These treaties have been revised since then and many additional treaties covering 
IPRs have been negotiated. Currently, most of these conventions are administered by 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a United Nation’s specialized
67
agency established in Switzerland in 1967. Despite WIPO efforts, the level of 
harmonization across countries remained limited until the mid 1980s.
The patent protection provided by law is valid only within applied country’s borders. 
Clearly, patent protection has a territorial characteristic, so the grant of a patent in a 
country does not prevent a party in another country from making, using, or selling the 
same invention in that country. If an inventor wants to obtain a foreign patent 
protection, then he or she must apply for that, in that foreign country. National 
differences in application requirements and procedures make this process difficult. 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) was established to overcome these application 
problems in 1970. The PCT was amended in 1979 and modified in 1984.
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) provides a relatively simple vehicle for obtaining 
foreign patent protection through a single application'’^ . By filing a single PCT 
application in the "Receiving Office", patent protection may be sought in the 
participating countries'’^ , which include among others United States, Canada and 
Mexico, most European nations, and Japan. Inventors have the option to file either a 
national or a PCT application first. If a national application is filed first, then the PCT 
application must be filed within one year of the filing date of the national application. 
In either case, inventors obtain the benefit of the first filing date as the "priority" date. 
This priority date attaches not only to the first filed application, but all other related 
applications if all of the subsequent filing date requirements are timely met. Thus, 
publication or commercial usage occurring after the priority date does not affect the 
patentability of the invention.
3.2 Importance of Intellectual Property Rights in International Transactions
The subject of intellectual property rights has gained increasing importance in 
international transactions. Basically, there are three means by which intellectual 
property can be traded. The first one is the most classical way of trade, namely 
international exchange of goods, but in this time, these goods embody a creative
Once such an application is filed, an applicant has time to decide in which o f the countries to 
continue with the application, thereby streamlining procedures and reducing costs.
As o f July 15, 1999 PCT has 104 contracting states.
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component. A second alternative is to undertake foreign direct investment' '^  ^ (FDI), 
which transfers parent firm’s technology, to establish various production and service 
relations. Finally, fimis may trade their intellectual property internationally, by 
directly licensing rights to use in return for negotiated royalty payments.
In the first two cases, it is difficult to decompose the roles and contributions of 
infonnation, capital and labor. On the other hand, it is relatively straightforward to 
determine the value of intellectual property traded in the third case. In addition to 
these three cases, firms may register intellectual property in various countries without 
exploiting the intellectual property in that country. The aim is to reduce the potential 
geographic range of competition for the inventive firm. However, existence of 
compulsory licensing mechanism in some countries may limit this implementation.
In this context, Fink and Primo Braga (1999) point out that the share of knowledge 
intensive or high technology products in total world trade has doubled between 1980 
and 1994 from 12 to 24 percent and as a result, the importance of IPRs for trade has 
gained considerable significance. Table 3.1 shows the exports of these products for a 
selected number of countries in 1996. As pointed out by Fink and Primo Braga (1999) 
most international trade in high technology goods takes place among the developed 
countries. The countries considered include United States, Japan, Germany, UK and 
France from among the industrial countries and Mexico, Korea, China, Turkey and 
Hungary from among the developing countries. The data clearly reveal that the 
intellectual property intensive export volume is one-fifth‘s^  of total export volume in 
1996. The table classified the selected intellectual property intensive goods into the 
following categories: patent, trademark and copyright goods using four digit trade 
data. The total volume of intellectual property intensive trade in selected countries is 
more than $470 billion in 1996; more than 80 percent of it is performed by 5 
developed countries. Actually one fourth of the total trade is performed by United 
States only. Developing countries, except South Korea, achieve the highest export 
volume in ‘Articles of apparel & clothing accessories’ industry classification. 
Concerning the export of the patent goods, the first two countries in export volume are
Joint ventures and subsidiaries are also considered as alternative forms o f foreign direct investment. 
As mentioned previously, the sole role o f IP cannot be derived from these numbers.
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United States and Japan. In trademark goods, the first three countries in export 
volume are United States, China and France. In copyright goods, the first two 
countries in export volume are United States and Germany. Actually these figures 
explain the firm attitude of United States in the protection of intellectual property in 
the world scale.
The increasing importance of IPRs in international transactions is also manifested in 
the growth of trade in services and foreign direct investment (FDI). Services have 
been a dynamic component of world trade with the share of services in global trade 
increasing from 15 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 1995. Among the services, IPRs 
are the most relevant for computer and information services, and loyalties and license 
fees. Studies reveal that, the largest recipient of royalties and license fees has been the 
United States. According to UNCTAD (1998), the US total receipts from patents, 
royalties and license fees has increased from $ 7.9 billion in 1986 to $ 30 billion in 
1996.
On the other hand, the FDI stock has increased fourfold between 1982 and 1994. The 
FDI outflow amounted to $424 billion in 1997. In the same year, the value of 
international production, attributed to 53,000 multinational corporations and their 
450,000 foreign affiliates was $9.5 trillion as measured by the estimated global sales 
of foreign affiliates. In 1996, top four countries'’'’ accounted for 56.2 percent of all 
FDI inflows of developing countries. For the United States, about 50 percent outflow 
in 1997 was in services (including wholesale trade, banking, finance, insurance and 
real estate) and 28.2 percent was in manufacturing. As some of the studies indicate, 
the quality and content of FDI are affected by the stringency of host countries’ 
intellectual property regime.
China, Brazil, Singapore and Mexico are the major FDI receiving countries in 1996.
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Table 3 , 1 E:i^ort5 of IPRs Intensive Goods for Selected Number of Countries during 1996 (Million USD)
Total fj^ort Volume
Ej^oi't Share of Total IP Intensive Goods
Export Share of Patent Goods 
Export Share of Trade Mark Goods 
Export Share of Copyright Goods
Patent Goods
5\2 Alcohols, phenols, halogenat., siJilfonat., nitrat. der.
541 M e dicinal and pharmac eutic al pro ducts, excluding 542 
583 Monofilaments, of plastics, cross-section> 1mm 
728 Other machinery for particular industries, n.e.s.
737 Metalworking machinery (excludingmachine-tools) & parts
751 Office machines
752 Automatic data processing machines, n.e.s.
774 Electro-diagnostic appa. for medical sciences, etc.
7764 Electronic integrated circuits & micro assemblies 
87413 Surveying hydrological, etc., instruments & applian.
Trade Mark Goods
112 Alcoholic beverages
553 Perfumery, cosmetics or toilet prepar. (excluding soaps) 
665 Glassware
784 Parts & accessories of vehicles of 722, 781, 782, 783 
821 Furniture & parts; bedding &  similar stuffed furni.
831 Travel goods, handbags & similar containers 
84 Articles of apparel & clothing accessories 
885 Watches «& clocks 
8942 Children's toys
Copyright Goods
892 Printed matter
898 Musical instruments, parts; records, tapes & similar
Germany J^an USA France UK China Hungary Korea Mexico Turkey Total
512.711 410^^47 582.118 2S397Q 258 P28 151U48 13.145 124J47 95J557 23224 2456294
144% 204% 19,7% 19,9% 19,2% 29j5% 16,8% 19,3% 16^1% 29 ¿>% 19,2%
6,8% 14,2% 11,0% 6,4% 9,2% 4,8% 1,5% 12,7% 5,5% 0,6% 9,3%
6,4% 5,2% 6,8% 12,4% 7,9% 24,1% 14,8% 5,3% 9,9% 28,8% 8,6%
1,3% 1,0% 1,9% 1,1% 2,1% 0,6% 0,5% 1,3% 0,8% 0,6% 1,4%
34.760 58.223 64.160 18.158 23.779 7:321 200 15.764 5226 135 227.725
1.975 864 1.792 582 382 191 7 97 122 21 6.033
3.986 1.170 4.466 1.920 1.447 1.204 53 208 322 37 14.815
583 13 100 96 78 4 6 4 1 5 891
10.542 10.729 9.687 2.384 2.237 417 67 1.307 291 43 37.703
1.646 1.908 1.093 556 452 95 19 111 120 8 6.006
1.218 3.440 1.010 722 1.107 1.118 7 236 387 5 9.250
6.902 15.849 21.385 6.498 11.907 3.690 12 4.707 2.699 11 73.660
2.692 1.779 3.527 790 437 51 18 77 78 3 9.452
5.102 22.283 20.709 4.494 5.534 540 10 9.017 1.196 2 68.885
114 188 391 115 196 12 1 1 11 1 1.030
32j602 21.185 39.550 35202 20.437 36.414 1.950 6j529 9.512 6j581 210.162
1.622 129 1.068 7.330 4.207 107 163 81 572 53 15.332
2.002 347 2.179 5.879 2.272 136 26 60 92 36 13.030
1.161 343 680 1.775 293 252 46 84 222 171 5.028
14.286 17.446 23.832 10.349 6.324 383 256 1.037 2.975 213 77.101
4.408 364 3.323 2.112 1.480 1.887 277 204 1.345 87 15.488
371 37 306 1.233 209 2.725 44 541 143 38 5.648
7.340 498 7.285 5.530 4.894 25.034 1.110 4.221 3.749 6.076 65.737
724 1.879 277 672 413 1.964 4 262 37 2 6.233
686 141 598 322 345 3.924 24 141 378 5 6.566
6454 4282 10.900 3J063 5425 917 63 li534 812 138 33£SS
3.714 489 4.346 1.905 3.414 228 42 183 213 23 14.556
2.740 3.793 6.555 1.158 2.011 689 21 1.451 599 115 19.132
At this point, it is necessary to note that there is no uniformity in IPRs across 
countries. Studies indicate that the stringency of IPRs systems vary significantly 
across countries. United States can be considered to have the strongest IPRs regime in 
the world. The IPRs regimes of other countries range from very low in some of the 
developing countries to high levels of protection prevailing in most developed 
countries. During the 1980s, industrialized countries started to pressure the 
developing countries, which had low levels of IPRs protection, to strengthen their 
IPRs regimes. Among the reasons for the change in policy of the industrialized 
countries, the following arc emphasize:
• Policy makers increasingly recognize technology as a key factor affecting 
competitiveness, particularly in the production and trade of technology-intensive 
goods and services. It is noted that, R&D expenditures have shown a steady 
increase since the 1970s in industrialized countries. Private sector accounts for a 
growing share of total R&D expenditures and in many of these countries, more 
than half of the R&D expenditures is funded by the enterprises themselves. 
Studies reveal that the OECD countries account tor 74 percent of world R&D 
expenditures. These R&D activities are the origin of most innovations, which 
appear in the market. •
• US leadership in manufacturing and technology is challenged by the catching up 
of Japan and a few other countries, including the newly industrialized countries, 
which become aggressive competitors in consumer electronics, microelectronics, 
robotics, computers and peripherals, as well as in various services. These 
challenges are perceived in the United States as resulting from an open 
technological and scientific system, which allow other countries to imitate US 
innovations and which give rise to the proliieration of counterfeiting and piracy. 
Since R&D activities are very costly, there is a strong interest on the part of 
industrialized countries in a more robust and forceful IPRs system in order to help 
their enterprises recoup the costs of their R&D efforts and to strengthen their 
appropriation of the results of R&D.
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• Finally, the application of new technologies has given rise to a number of new 
situations and problems, particularly in the field of infonnation technologies and 
biotechnology. For example, large-scale software producers insist on the 
protection of computer programmes. The same attitude can also be observed both 
in the field of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals.
The data and results reported in the Table 3.2 reveal that, developed countries have 
stronger patent protection systems than developing countries. However, it is 
interesting to note that, less developed countries have generally higher protection 
standards than developing countries. This observation can be explained as they are 
mainly ex-colony countries, and their legislation systems are very similar to 
developed countries’ systems. Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Zaire have more 
patent protection strength than many developing countries as indicated in all of three 
studies, namely Rapp and Rozek (1990), Maskus and Penubarti (1995) and Gould and 
Gruben (1996).
Rapp and Rozek’s index of patent protection is based on surveys of business and 
government officials and an examination of patent laws themselves. The index 
indicates the conformity of a country’s patent laws to the minimum standards 
proposed in the Guidelines for Standards for the Protection and Enforcement of 
Patents of the United States Chamber of Commerce Intellectual Property Task Force 
(1987). Their index ranks the level of patent protection on a scale from 0 to 5, where 0 
is assigned to a country with no patent protection at all and 5 is assigned to a country 
whose laws are fully consistent with minimum standards. The data of this study 
pertains to 1984.
The second index, namely Maskus and Penubarti’s index is based on the index of 
Rapp and Rozek’s, whereas it is corrected by an instrumental variables approach. 
Actually Maskus and Penubarti report that there are two potential sources of error in 
Rapp and Rozek’s study. Firstly, as mentioned above, a number of poor countries, 
such as Ghana and Nigeria, have stringent patent laws at least theoretically, since they 
were British colonies and their regimes were similar to UK patent act.
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Table 3.2. IPRs Protection Regimes in Different Countries
C o u n t r y
A r g e n t i n a
A u s t r a l i a
A u s t r i a
B a n g l a d e s h
B e l g iu m
B e n in
B o l i v i a
B r a z i l
B u r k in a  F a s o  
I C a m e r o o n  
¡ C a n a d a  
C h i l e  
C o l o m b i a  
C o s t a  R ic a  
D e n m a r k  
D o m in i c  R e p .  
F c u a d o r  
E g y p t
I E l S a l v a d o r
F in l a n d
F r a n c e
G e r m a n y
G h a n a
P S I P S I I
1 2 ,5
4 476
4 4 ,4
2 2 ,1
“ 5 4 ,5
Í 2 3 ,2  
1 11
i " i
1,1 
2,1
i 2 3,1
2 3 ,0
4 5 ,0
2 1 ,8
2 1 ,5
3 | 2 ,9
i 5 4 ,4 "
i 2 3 ,2
1 - T 2 ,4
1 2 ~ 2 ,8
P S I I I  P S I V  P  B  P C T
4 ,0
4Â
3¡ 2 ,5
4 ¡  ’ 4 ,3  
4 1 4 ,8
5 ¡ 4 ,5
4 ¡"  2 ,5
6,0
3 ,9
4 ,2
2"^
4 .7
3 .8
5 ,1
5 ,3
G r e e c e 1........ 4 2 ,6 4 ,9
1
G u a t e m a l a i  3 2 . 4 |  ....... ....
H o n d u r a s 1 1 0 ,0 1
H u n g a r y ' 3 ' 2T 9 j............
I n d ia 1 2 ,3 1 3,6
I n d o n e s i a 0 1 ,7 1 0,0
I r e l a n d 4'! 4 ,5 !........4 ,7
¡ I s r a e l ' 5' 4,91
¡ I ta ly 5¡ 4 ,3 1 3 ,7
J a m a i c a 3¡ 3 ,2
J a p a n 4 ¡ 4 .4 "  5 ,7
J o r d a n 4 | 3 ,0
K e n y a 4 3 Â
K o r e a ..... 3 3 ,6 47o
L i b e r i a 4 2 ,1
L i b y a 2 0,0
2: + +
~51 + +
5 + +
3 + +
6 + +
3 4- +
2 + +
2 + +
....3 + +■[
3 +
5 + +
3 + +
3 + +
4 + +
6 + +
4 + +
2 + +
3 + +
4 Í  + 1  +  ~
r  + i  +■ ^
+  1Î .+
9 | +  i +
5 -t ! +
"5 + +
’ 4 +
2 + +_!
+ +
2 + +
+ +
5 + +
6 + -f-
6 + +
+ +
"5 + +
"5 ' + +
'5 ’+ +
4 + +
5 ' + +
+ 1 +
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ I
T  I
T- i
+---1+ i
:c i+ I
C o u n t r y
M a la w i
M a la y s i a
M a li
M a u r i t i u s  
M e x ic o  
M o r o c c o  
I N e th e r l a n d s  
¡N e w  Z e a la n d  
N ig e r i a  
¡ N o r w a y  
O m a n  
P a k is ta n  
P a n a m a  
P a r a g u a y  
P e ru
P h i l i p p in e s  
P o r tu g a l  
S ie r r a  L e o n e
¡ S in g a p o r e  
S o u th  A f r ic a  
S p a in  
S r i L a n k a
S w e d e n
S w i t z e r l a n d
S y r ia
T h a i l a n d
l o g o
T u n i s i a
T u r k e y
U g a n d a
U K
U r u g u a y
U S A
V e n e z u e la
Y u g o s l a v i a
Z a i r e
Z a m b ia
¡ Z im b a b w e
P S I P S I I  P S I I I P S I V P B P C T
' a >....... 3 , l j ......... t ) + + +
2 ‘ 3 ,2! 4 X ^  . .....^ ■+ + —
2! 2,C) 31 + + +
4 2 ,8 5¡ + -
’ 2 "273 T , 3 ' 31 + + +
4 2 ,3 j  51 + + +
5 4 ,3 5,2 ! 6 1 + + +
4 4 ,5 1
I
! 51 + +
4 3 ,3 1 !  3 + 1.:^. ......+  ■ 1
4 3 ,4
j .
5 + 1 + +
0 0 ,9
_
+ I T -
3 2 ,2 4 - + -
2 2 ,7 3 + + -
1 L 6 2 + + ~
1 1 ,3" 1 ,4 2 + + -
4 3,1 5 ,3 5 + + -
3 2 ,8 5 ,1 4 + + +
4 37T ’ 5 + — —
4 3 ,7 T , 7 ¡  5 + +
—
+
5 | 4 ,0 1 " "  6 + + +
4 |! 2 ,7 3 ,8 5 + + +
3 ,8 + +
_ _ T  1
5 4 ’8 5 ,8 6 + + +
5 4 ,9 4 ,8 6 + + +
2 2^0 3 - - -
1 1T 7 2 ,5 2 - + -
"2 3 ,0 3 + + +
3 2 ,4 4 + + -
'  1 1 ,9 2 + + +
4 3,4 5 + - +
5 5 ,2 5 ,7 6 + + +
3 2 ,5 4 + + -
5 5 ,3
-
+ + +
’ 2 i , 8 2 ,5 3 + + -
2 2 ,7 Î + + +
4 1^9 ....... 5 + + -
3 3 ,5 4 + + -
'4 4 ,0 ..... "5 +
P S  I: P a t e n t  S t r e n g t h  in d e x  o f  R a p p  a n d  R o z e k  ( 1 9 9 0 )  ( 0 - 5 )  c o v e r s  m i d - 1 9 8 0  
P S  II: P a t e n t  S t r e n g t h  i n d e x  o f  M a s k u s  a n d  P e n u b a r t i  ( 1 9 9 5 )  ( 0 - 5 )
P S  II I : M o d i f i e d  V e r s io n  o f  P a t e n t  S t r e n g t h  i n d e x  o f  K o n d o  ( 1 9 9 5 )  ( 0 - 6 )  c o v e r s  1 9 7 9 - 1 9 8 7  
P S  IV : P a t e n t  S t r e n g t h  i n d e x  o f  G o u ld  a n d  G r u b e n  ( 1 9 9 6 )  ( 1 - 6 )
P : P a r i s  C o n v e n t i o n  M e m b e r s h i p  a s  o f  S e p te m b e r  2 8 ,  1 9 9 9
B : B e r n e  C o n v e n t i o n  M e m b e r s h i p  a s  o f  S e p te m b e r  2 8 ,  1 9 9 9
P C T :  P a t e n t  C o o p e r a t i o n  T r e a ty  M e m b e r s h i p  a s  o f  S e p te m b e r  2 8 ,  1 9 9 9
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On the other hand, there is no effective enforcement in these countries. Secondly, 
there is a potential endogeneity problem due to mutual causality between level of 
economic development and effectiveness of legislation and enforcement. Maskus and 
Penubarti perform a correction estimation, considering the level of economic 
development (GDP per capita, primary exports as a share of total exports, infant 
mortality rate, and secondary enrollment ratios), a dummy variable corresponding to 
British and French colonies and memberships in intellectual property conventions.
The third index in Table 3.2 is the index ofKondo (1995). He builds an index, which 
covers thirty-three countries and fifteen years long period of time. This index is based 
on three main dimensions of patent laws. They are; patent life, exclusionary 
provisions, and scope provisions. In the first dimension, the patent duration is the only 
patent law provision. The exclusionary provisions dimension covers the specific 
technological fields'’^ , which are excluded from patent protection in some countries. 
The third dimension, namely scope provisions address the restrictions and 
extensions'**^  on the patent grants. The scope provisions consist of fifteen important 
restrictions and extensions. The first dimension is measured easily for all sample 
countries. The second dimension is determined by a relatively easy methodology; 
number of technology fields is counted for each country. The third dimension is the 
most difficult to obtain. Kondo performs a mail survey to obtain the expert opinions 
on the relative importance of the fifteen scope provisions. Kondo then calculates the 
overall patent stringency index by using principal component analysis.
These technological fields are electrical method claims, microbiological processes, 
microbiologically processed products, chemical products, pharmaceutical products, food products, and 
computer programs.
They can be listed as follows; cancellation for non-use, compulsory licensing due to non-use, 
compulsory licensing due to insufficient use, early publication of the patent application, first-to-file 
system, no loss o f novelty if early disclosure o f invention occurred in an official exhibition, no loss of 
novelty if early disclosure o f invention occurred while carrying out research with scientific objectives, 
no loss o f novelty if early disclosure o f invention occurred while carrying out public experimentation, 
patent infringement being a crime, possible cancellation on public interest or national security grounds, 
protection o f applicant against infringers before grant o f patent, regulation restricting licensing, 
requirement o f licensing-dependent patents, requirement o f cross-licensing, validity non-Judicially 
arbitrated.
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Finally, Gould and Gruben’s index is also based on the index of Rapp and Rozek. 
Gould and Gruben adjust the original index and change the scale of it. They also 
indicate the potential problem of overestimation, since the index is primarily based on 
the laws in force against infringement but not on their enforcement or implementation.
To sum up, there is only limited number of studies in the literature, which aim to 
construct a proxy for the strength of patent protection. These studies generally require 
judgment over the role of law, since laws on the books may be different than laws in 
practice. In these studies, only the patent law is investigated to determine the patent 
protection stringency. On the other hand, all forms of intellectual property laws 
should be included in order to determine the overall IP protection stringency. Namely 
copyright, patents, trade secrets, trademarks, chip topology and other forms of IP 
should be considered. In addition, efficiency and transparency of public 
administration should be investigated. Finally, enforcement mechanism should be 
searched. Obviously, full determination of IP stringency is a difficult and costly task 
to perform.
In addition to evaluation of IPRs in international transactions and patent strength, the 
exchange of patents between countries^*  ^ is also an important indicator. Table 3.3 
presents distribution of patent grants among selected 10 major patent source countries 
in 1996. Some important observations can be done using the data presented in Table 
3.3:
• Table 3.3 reveals that United States is absolutely the major patent exporting 
country. Japan and Germany are following United States.
• The selected ten exporting countries cover almost 90% of all patent grants for all 
countries.
Patent data contain valuable information about the density o f information generation activities. 
However as stated in Chapter I, it should be refined before any evaluation, since nearly 80% o f patent 
applications have no economic value. In any case, number o f foreign patent grants indicate the interest 
of source country on host country.
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• The ratio of foreign patent grants to total patent grants in a country is higher than 
90% for Hong Kong, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey and Venezuela. This indicates 
that domestic contribution is negligible in these five countries.
• F/T ratio (foreign to total number of patents) is less than 50% for only .Tapan and 
United States. Actually, Japanese case is strictly different than even United 
States’ case. Foreign patent grants constitute only 13% of total patent grants in 
Japan. The rest of the countries have higher foreign contribution.
• The data also reveal that there is a geographic factor in patent grants. That is to 
say. United States’ share is between 27% and 30% for France, Germany and 
United Kingdom, which show unifonn distribution characteristic. On the other 
hand. United States’ share is 48% for Argentina, 52% for Chile, 68% for both 
Mexico and Venezuela, and finally 52% for Canada. The reasoning behind 
geographic factor may be the effort of deterrence for parallel trade possibility. 
That is to say. United States may aim to prevent the import of copied products 
from its neighbours by obtaining patent protection in those countries. Importing 
from other regions may be more costly due to long distance. •
• The most active patent exchange is between United States and Japan, Table 3.3 
indicates that nearly half of the foreign patent grants in the United States are 
Japan originated. Equivalently, more than half of all the foreign patent grants in 
Japan are United States originated. However, Japanese economy is relatively 
closed to foreign patents, as mentioned above.
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Table 3.3. Distribution of Patent Grants During 1996 (broken down according to the 
country of residence of the applicant) Source: WIPO, Geneva.
H ost C o u n tr ie s
M ajor P aten t Sou rce  C ou n tries  
P ercen tage  o f  P aten t G ra n ts - 1996
C A CH DE F R G B IT JP NL SE US O th ers T otal F /T
A R A rg en tin a 1,3 5,8 8 ,9 6,7 4,2 5,5 2,6 3,7 0,6 47 ,8 12,8 100 0,80
B R Brazil 0,8 5,0 15,7 7,4 4,2 4,3 8,2 8,6 2,3 37 ,8 5,7 100 0,87
C L C h ile 1,9 3,8 8,1 4,4 6,3 0,6 0,0 3,8 7 ,5 51,9 11,9 100 0,87
C N C h in a 1,3 3,8 9,3 7,2 4,1 2,9 27,9 3,7 1,2 28,2 10,4 100 0,54
EG E gypt 0,5 3,9 8,3 10,3 10,3 3,4 3,4 1,0 2,9 46,1 9,8 100 0,82
H K H ong K ong 0,6 4,7 13,9 2,2 11,1 0,6 16,6 8,1 1,0 34 ,9 6 ,2 100 0 ,98
ID In d on esia 1,0 3,7 6,8 5,0 8,9 2,4 26,5 3,3 3,1 26,3 12,8 100 0 ,97
M X M exico 1,9 3,3 7 ,0 3 ,5 2,3 1,7 3,3 1,6 2,9 67,9 4,8 100 0 ,96
K R K orea 0,3 1,8 5,1 2,7 1,9 1,0 57,7 2,6 0,8 23,6 2,6 100 0,50
T R T u rk ey 0,7 5,1 20,2 10,6 7,9 2,7 3,4 4,5 0,5 37 ,9 6,3 100 0,92
V E V en ezu ela 2,2 3 ,8 2,8 3,2 4,2 3,3 1,2 2,6 1,2 68,4 7,1 100 0,94
IN India 1,4 3,0 15,3 6,4 8,2 1,4 6,1 2,7 0,5 42 ,4 12,9 100 0,65
C A C an ad a 1,4 6,0 4,1 3,1 1,4 24,1 1,3 0,9 52,2 5,5 100 0,90
FR F ran ce 0,8 3,9 22 ,9 5,1 3,7 24,0 3,0 1,7 27,3 7,5 100 0,76
D E G erm a n y 0,9 4,7 9,1 5,5 3,8 32 ,8 3,3 2,0 29,7 8,2 100 0,64
IT Ita ly 0,9 4,5 25,2 10,0 5,4 14,3 3,0 1,9 26,8 7,9 100 0,78
JP J ap an 0,9 4,2 17,4 6,1 3,6 2,1 3,7 1,6 51,4 8,9 100 0,13
N L N eth erla n d s 1,0 4 ,4 23,2 8,9 6,2 3,7 14,7 2,2 27,2 8,6 100 0,93
SE S w ed en 1,2 4,5 22,9 9,5 6,7 4,5 9 ,9 3,3 27,6 9,8 100 0,91
CH S w itzerlan d 1,0 27,5 9,6 6,0 4,4 9 ,8 3,1 2,4 25,0 11,2 100 0,88
G B U K 1,0 3,3 20,0 7,7 3,1 25,5 2,7 1,7 27 ,4 7,7 100 0,90
U S U SA 4,6 2,3 14,0 5,7 5,1 2,5 47 ,5 1,6 1,8 14,9 100 0 ,44
F/T: Ratio o f Foreign Grants o f Patents to Total Grants o f Patents
3.3 The TRIPs Agreement
3.3.1 Historical Developments of Multinational Trade Negotiations (MTNs)
Concept of globalization has gained growing importance recently. Especially after the 
end of the second world war, there is a trend towards economic and military 
integration. International integration and multilateral negotiations are supported by 
peace keeping efforts. United Nations is established during this period of time. Its 
main objectives are solving disputes by negotiating and increasing the level of world 
welfare. These two objectives are assumed to reduce the risk of the third world war.
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In such an environment, first multilateral trade negotiations started with the 
contribution of 23 countries in 1947 in Geneva. Initially, barriers to trade were 
targeted. These trade negotiations were later called General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariff (GATT). Following multilateral trade negotiations, which again focused on 
reduction of tariff, were held in Annecy in 1949, in Torquay in 1951, in Geneva in 
1956, 1960, and 1961. 13 countries in 1949, 38 countries in 1951, 26 countries in 
1956, and 26 countries in 1960-1961 contributed to these trade negotiations. Naturally 
these multilateral trade negotiations have no solid legal foundation. In any case during 
the post war period, world trade has experienced an exceptional growth. Volume of 
the total trade in 1997 was 14-times the level of 1950. Increasing volume of the world 
trade indicates the success of these tariff reduction efforts.
In 1964, Kennedy Round of GATT launched in Geneva. Kennedy Round lasted for 3 
years and it was the first time, anti-dumping measures were included in the agenda of 
negotiations. The next round, which is known as Tokyo Round, started in 1973 and 
lasted for 6 years. The agenda of Tokyo Round consisted of tariffs, non-tariff 
measures and framework agreements. Tokyo Round had a narrow focus on the issue 
of counterfeit good trading. The last and the broadest scoped round is Uruguay Round 
(UR) which started in Punta del Este in September 1986 and was signed by member 
countries’ ministers in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994. This eight years long round dealt 
with tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services, intellectual property rights, dispute 
settlements, textiles, agriculture, and creation of the World Trade Organization.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the outcome of this last GATT round and 
came into being on January 1, 1995. WTO can be considered as an ultimate successor 
to the multilateral trade negotiations. WTO is a single institution, which encompasses 
the whole aspects of the GATT. Ministerial Conference of the WTO comes together 
at least once in every two years. WTO has 134 member countries as of 1999. 
Administering WTO trade agreements, forum for trade negotiations, handling trade 
disputes, monitoring national trade policies, technical assistance, and training for 
developing countries and cooperation with other international organizations are major 
functions of the WTO.
1994 GATT agreement introduces new arrangements such as abolition of non-tariff 
barriers, reductions in the subsidies and tariffs, the adoption of an anti-dumping code.
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and constitution of international rules concerning intellectual property rights and trade 
related investment measures, technical regulations and standards, custom 
classification, valuation and preshipment inspection and rules of origin.
The World Trade Organization rests on three main agreements, namely General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs). Basically, GATT deals with trade in goods, GATS deals with trade in 
services, and TRIPs deals with such issues as copyright, trademarks, patents, 
industrial designs and trade secrets. The main objective is welfare gain and political 
stability through liberalization of the international trade. TRIPs is perhaps one of the 
most negotiated agreements in the international arena. Some parties even argue that 
IPRs are not trade-related, however opposite parties advocate TRIPs, since IP 
intensive trade has continuously increased in the last two decades and must be 
regulated under an international umbrella. Therefore, international hannonization of 
national IPRs policies is required. In any case, the trade aspects of IPRs is needed to 
create a fair multilateral trade system in the 21“‘ century.
3.3.2 Importance of Multilateral Agreements in IPRs
Information, technology, and quality concepts are rising values of this century, and 
obviously will be in the next. As mentioned before, increasing amount of knowledge 
intensive goods trade takes place. Moreover, global communications networks are 
continuously improving and reducing cost of usage. Inforaiation processing systems, 
electronic economy, and the internet face an enormous demand. A huge amount of 
infomiation can be easily reached with almost zero cost through the internet from all 
around the world. All of these increase the dissemination of knowledge. In addition, 
digitization of knowledge, existence of low cost duplication and distribution increase 
the risk of piracy. One important subject needs to be mentioned here, namely 
changing characteristics of today's technologies. The rise of new technologies create a 
number of new situations and problems, especially in the biotechnology, 
microelectronics, and information technologies. Today’s commodities are different 
from old ones. Therefore, international rules, standarts and enforcements must evolve 
to handle these changes in the 21“‘ century. Infonnation technologies, 
microelectronics and biotechnology are all new branches of the modem industries.
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They can be easily copied so they need strong IPRs protection to recover initial R&D 
investments. Clearly global economy becomes more sensitive to losses from piracy 
and infringement.
Electronic economy covers production, advertising, sales and distribution of products 
via electronic networks. The rise of electronic economy requires new ways to protect 
IPRs. Significantly, this issue cannot be regulated without global cooperation such as 
TRIPs. WTO member countries and TRIPs Council have begun to explore how 
electronic economy should be regulated.
Global competition requires high research and development investments both in firm 
scale and national scale. Improving design and production techniques and shortening 
product life cycles make reverse engineering and consequently imitation of new 
products easier. This indicates that recouping'^o of research and development 
investment is getting difficult without world wide intellectual property protection. 
Moreover, acting with some encouragement from other industrially advanced 
countries, the United States generated a pressure over the countries' '^ which were 
infringing developed countries’ intellectual property during the 1980s. The pressures 
generated by the United States and increasing importance of intellectual property 
intensive trade put uniform and strong intellectual property protection on the agenda 
of both developing and developed countries. These policies’ major aim was to 
stimulate technological development and enhance economic welfare. According to 
developed countries, this kind of interventions are required to achieve optimum 
allocation of resources in invention and innovation. However, economics of 
intellectual property rights are not concluded yet. This inconclusiveness depends on a 
question, namely how responsive is the supply of inventions to the stringency of 
intellectual property protection. There is no empirical answer to this question.
Although counterfeit good trade had taken place for a long time, as technologies for copying 
became more advanced and the reproduction of IP easier and cheaper, trade in goods embodying stolen 
IP became an increasingly important issue for inventive countries.
Maskus (1997a) indicates that Canada, New Zealand, Portugal, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Indonesia, Republic o f Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chile, 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Hungary, Mali, Egypt and China adopted stronger patent legislations after 1985. 
However, the reason o f these policy shifts cannot be directly associated to the pressure o f United States 
and European Union.
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In this environment, TRIPs agreement determines the minimum and non- 
discriminatory standards for protecting various forms of intellectual property in the 
global scale. Until the UR, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a 
United Nations specialized agency, was the main international organization for IPRs 
protection. In fact WIPO is estalished on several international conventions and 
treaties. The major conventions and treaties are Paris convention (1883) for the 
protection of intellectual property, Bern convention (1971) for the protection of 
literary and artistic works, Rome convention (1961) for the protection of performers, 
producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations and Washington treaty 
(1989) on intellectual property in respect of integrated circuits. However these 
conventions and treaties could not enforce signatory countries’ governments to adopt 
higher protection for IPRs. In this context, WTO and WIPO made an agreement to 
cooperate in the implementation of the TRIPs agreement in 1995. This agreement, 
which entered into force in 1996, consists of three main areas, namely technical 
cooperation between Council of TRIPs and WIPO, implementation of protection 
procedures, and accessibility and translation of national regulations and laws.
Developing and developed countries have strictly different viewpoints in IPRs 
protection. Strong negotiations between developing and developed countries during 
UR justify this idea. Developing countries’ point is that, stronger IP protection creates 
internationally unbeatable monopolies, therefore stronger IPRs protection is not 
optimum. However, developed countries state that, higher protection standards are 
welfare enhancing due to dynamic nature of IP production and lead to increments in 
knowledge dissemination. At this point, differences among developed countries 
should also be mentioned. United States, that has a strong comparative advantage, is 
the strongest advocate of the developed block. United States has high technology 
which is very sensitive to IPRs protection, namely broadcasting, entertainment, 
software, information systems, genetics, biotechnology, and pharmacology. However, 
other developed countries are reluctant as compared to United States. United States 
insists that all aspects of IPRs should be covered rather than counterfeit good trade 
only. On the opposite side, developing countries have no consensus among 
themselves either. Least developed countries, generally colony countries, had stronger 
IPRs protection relative to developing countries before multilateral trade negotiations.
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In fact, least developed·^  ^ a^ id industrialized countries have stronger intellectual 
property protection than developing countries that have medium income level.
Developing countries were generally passive observers until the UR of multilateral 
trade negotiations. TRIPs agreement was the scene of the active participation of 
developing countries. Developing countries prepared several alternative proposals. 
Initially, developing countries argued that TRIPs was not a GATT related issue. 
Specifically Argentina, Brasil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Nigeria, Peru, 
Tanzania, and Uruguay submitted a proposal which suggested a dual-track approach. 
According to these 10 developing countries, counterfeit good trade could be covered 
within GATT structure, but enforcement of IPRs should be implemented outside of 
this system.
Finally, strong negotiations ended up with an agreement in 1994. The final text of 
agreement includes a transition period for the least developed and developing 
countries. TRIPs agreement was activated in January 1995 for developed countries. 
Developing and former centrally planned countries have 5 years, and least developing 
countries^^ have 11 years to implement the TRIPs agreement. On the other hand, the 
non-discrimination principle of the agreement was in force for all member countries 
from the beginning. All WTO member countries agreed to modify their national laws 
to conform to TRIPs standards. However, several developing countries will not be 
able to regulate their national policies in time due to scarcity of resources. Therefore, 
WTO prepares some support programmes for the least developed and developing 
countries. TRIPs agreement specifies minimum standards and is a binding 
enforcement mechanism but member countries are free to detennine how to 
implement. Naturally, freedom in national implementation policy can be considered 
as a gap according to developed block. However, TRIPs is the most extensive 
agreement on IPRs protection ever concluded. In addition, the TRIPs agreement is to 
be reviewed periodically in order to deal with further developments in technology and 
in the world trade.
The least developed countries’ intellectual property protection is well established at least in law 
books.
Least developed countries may request a further extension.
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3.3.3 Inclusion of IPRs in MTNs: The Overview of TRIPs Agreement
During the 1980s pressures from industrial countries gained momentum in the world 
economy for strengthened IPRs protection. As international disputes over IPRs 
became common, a marriage between trade law and IPRs law started to emerge. To 
reduce piracy abroad, developed nations started to use trade measures and at the 
multilateral level, they pushed for the inclusion of trade related IPRs issues in the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The introduction of IPRs as one of the new 
issues in the Uruguay Round was approved at the Ministerial meeting held in Punta 
del Este in 1986, but it was limited only to the issue of trade in counterfeit goods. The 
industrialized countries' proposals concerning matters for negotiation were later 
extended to other aspects of IPRs. Until 1989, developing countries refused to enter 
into detailed negotiations, but the threat of unilateral retaliatory trade sanctions by the 
developed countries played a role in changing the stand of many developing countries 
on the matter. Finally, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) was signed by the vast majority of the contracting parties in 
Marrakesh in April 1994 together with the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) and the GATT-1994.
The TRIPs Agreement is the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on 
intellectual property rights until now. The areas of intellectual property that it covers 
are: copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial 
designs, patents, the layout designs of integrated circuits, and trade secrets. The 
Agreement^^ sets minimum standards of protection to be provided by each member by 
requiring that the substantive obligations of the main conventions of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works in their most recent versions, must be complied with. With the 
exception of the provisions of the Berne Convention on moral rights, all the main 
substantive provisions of these conventions^^ are incorporated by reference and thus
Articles 2.1 and 9.1 o f the TRIPs Agreement define the protection standards.
These conventions did not achieve harmonization and go much beyond an agreement to apply the 
national treatment principle.
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have become obligations under the TRIPs Agreement between WTO Member 
countries. In this sense, the TRIPs agreement covers all sides of intellectual property 
concept. On the other hand, TRIPs agreement has also an enforcement mechanism 
unlike these conventions.
Article 7 defines the objectives of the TRIPs agreement. It states that; “the protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to balance of rights and obligations”.
The TRIPs Agreemenfi<  ^ follows the GATT tradition in adopting the multilateral 
disciplines of non-discrimination and transparency commitment. Article 3.1 of the 
Agreement, namely national treatment, establishes that each member shall accord to 
the nationals of other members treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its 
own nationals with respect to the protection of intellectual property. Article 4 brings 
the concept of Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment to the realm of international 
agreements on IPRs. The article establishes that any advantage, favor, privilege or 
immunity granted by a member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other members. The national 
treatment and the MFN principles are meant to end discrimination, both between 
foreigners and nationals and between nationals of different countries, which arises 
when IPRs are granted only to the nationals of the country that pressed for them. 
Article 63 on the other hand, introduces the principle of transparency. According to 
this article, members are required to publish laws, regulations, administrative and 
judicial procedures.
The TRIPs agreement was also motivated by a desire to improve on the existing 
situation characterized by widely varying standards in the protection and enforcement 
of intellectual property rights, and the lack of a multilateral framework of principles, 
rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods. With the
The 'I’RlPs Agreement has been analyzed by various economists. See e.g. Primo Braga (1995), 
Maskus (1997a) and Hoekman and Kostecki (1995).
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ongoing integration of the world economy, and production and trade becoming more 
knowledge intensive, there was a concern that the inhannonious or absence of a 
multilateral framework for addressing intellectual property issues could create 
conflicts, including tensions in international trade. On the other hand, the TRIPs 
agreement is required to be improved to solve these problems, since it only defines the 
minimum standards. In accordance with Article 1, countries are free to determine the 
appropriate method for implementing the Agreement within their own legal system 
and practice. It states that: “Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in 
their law more extensive protection than is required by this agreement, provided that 
such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement”. Article 8 of 
the Agreement states: "Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and 
regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology." These provisions facilitate legislating limitations to exclusive rights, as 
well as the enactment of legislative provisions concerning the compulsory licensing of 
certain IPRs.
Article 40 states the control of anti-competitive practices in contractual licenses. It 
denotes that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property 
rights may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and 
dissemination of knowledge by restraining competition. In these cases this article 
allows member countries to control and ban restrictive practices. The Agreement thus 
introduces the competition test for the purpose of verifying and stopping the use of 
restrictive clauses.
The Agreement also contains detailed provisions regarding judicial and administrative 
procedures and other measures related to the enforcement of rights. The provisions on 
enforcement contained in Part III of the Agreement aim to ensure that effective means 
of enforcement are available to right holders, and that enforcement procedures are
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applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to 
provide for safeguards against their abuse. Non-compliance with the rules of the 
TRIPs Agreement gives rise to a dispute settlement procedure under the general WTO 
rules and to retaliatory commercial measures in any field by the country whose 
nationals are affected by such non-compliance. Since, within the WTO, adherence to 
the new IPRs universal standards will be monitored by the Council for TRIPs, the 
possibility of deviations from those standards is drastically reduced, unless a non­
complying country is prepared to bear the costs of any trade restrictions that may be 
imposed. Article 64 defines the dispute settlement mechanism. Actually, it states that 
the provisions of Articles 22 and 23 of GATT 1994, which elaborate and build the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, shall be applied in the case of conflicts between 
member countries.
The Agreement contains provisions, namely Article 65, that allow developing 
countries to delay complying with any or all of the Agreement's obligations for up to 
five years from the date of entry into force of the Agreement. An additional five years 
is allowed in the case of countries which did not grant product patents before entry 
into force of the Agreement but which now has to do so under the terms of the 
Agreement. Article 66 indicates that the least-developed countries may delay 
implementation for up to 11 years. This term may be extended by the Council for 
TRIPs upon request setting out the reasons. Article 66 also indicates that, developed 
country members should provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their 
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to these 
least developed countries. The major aim is to support local technological base.
Finally, Article 71 of the Agreement defines the review and amendment conditions of 
TRIPs agreement. It states that the Agreement is to be reviewed for the first time five 
years from the date of its entry into force, and at two-yearly intervals thereafter. The 
Council for TRIPs may also undertake reviews when new developments warrant 
modifications.
The above considerations reveal that the TRIPs Agreement establishes minimum 
standards concerning the availability, scope, use and enforcement of IPRs. The 
Agreement does not cover utility models and breeders' rights. The absence of these
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two categories from the Agreement is explained by the relative lack of interest on the 
part of the major industrialized countries in these categories. Thus countries, in 
formulating and implementing national laws on utility models and breeders' rights, are 
not bound by any provisions of the TRIPs Agreement. In the following part, we 
concentrate on issues related to patents and industrial designs only and abstract from 
consideration of the other categories of IPRs.
3.3.4 Patents
Until 1995, countries were free to deteniiine areas of non-patentability, the duration of 
the terms of patents and the set of exclusive rights conferred on patent holders. 
According to developed countries, this freedom, which was used by developing 
countries to frame their patent laws in accordance with their own objectives and 
interests, caused substantial frictions among the countries. In particular, industrial 
countries complained that in certain developing countries, the coverage of patents was 
very limited, that protection was provided for relatively short periods of time, that 
scope for compulsory licensing was broad and that there was ineffective enforcement. 
Developed countries argue that, they invest in research and development activities, 
whereas developing countries free ride. The TRIPs Agreement addressed all of these 
issues. Section 5 defines patentable subject matter, exclusive rights conferred, patent 
application conditions, exceptions, other use without authorization of the right holder, 
revocation, ternis of protection, and patents in processes in detail.
Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement states that patents shall be available for any 
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology subject to the 
requirements of novelty, inventiveness and industrial applicability. Exclusions from 
patentability, to protect public order or morality, to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment, as well as to protect human, animal and plant life, are allowed. These 
exceptions are constrained by the requirement that the non-patentable invention be 
ban'ed from commercial exploitation in the member country. According to Article 
27.3, members may also exclude the following processes from patentability: (a) 
diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals; 
(b) plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes 
for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological 
processes. Thus, countries are required to provide protection for biotechnological
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inventions but may exclude traditional breeding methods and higher life organisms 
from patentability. The second sentence of Article 27.3.b states that members should 
provide protection for plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis 
system or by any combination thereof As a result of this requirement, countries, 
which do not protect plant varieties have some room to develop their own systems of 
sui generis protection.
Article 28 of the TRIPs Agreement sets out the rights that a patent should confer on 
its title-holder, referring to the two traditional categories; product and process 
inventions. Patents relating to products confer the right to prevent third parties, which 
do not have the patentee's consent from making, using, offering for sale or importing 
that product for those purposes. On the other hand, patents relating to processes confer 
the right to prevent third parties from using the process and from using, offering for 
sale, selling, or importing the product obtained directly by that process. Patent owners 
shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to 
conclude licensing contracts. Although the Agreement mentions the right of 
importation, it does not stipulate the conditions of exhaustion of IPRs at international 
level. Article 6 of the TRIPs Agreement allows member countries to provide for the 
international exhaustion of rights and to admit parallel imports if they wish so.
With respect to the terms of protection of patents, we can note that Article 33 of the 
TRIPs Agreement requires the terms of protection available not to end before the 
expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.
The Agreement’s provisions concerning compulsory licenses are presented in Article 
31. This article contains a detailed set of conditions and limitations with respect to the 
granting of such licenses. Article 31 allows countries to detemiine the grounds for 
granting compulsory licenses in their national legislation. Although it refers to some 
specific grounds^^, it does not limit the purpose for which a compulsory license can be 
granted. The only exception with regard to the granting of compulsory licenses relates 
to "semiconductor technology", which can only be subject to compulsory licenses for 
public non-commercial use and to remedy anti-competitive practices. The granting of
Specifically, national emergency, anti-competitive practices, public non-commercial use, dependent 
patents cases are subject to compulsory licensing.
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compulsory licenses may be considered on various grounds. Article 8 of the TRIPs 
Agreement states, as mentioned above, the right of parties to adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, 
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 
Based on this provision, and subject to the conditions specified in Article 31, 
compulsory licenses could be granted, for instance, for reasons of "public interest", or 
to satisfy public health objectives. Nevertheless, Article 27.1 of the TRIPs Agreement 
tends to limit this obligation, stating that, “patents shall be available and patent rights 
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology 
and whether products are imported or locally produced”. Thus, the requirements of 
the provision will be met if the compulsory licensing rules do not treat imported and 
locally produced products differently. Thus, compulsory licenses can be granted in 
order to facilitate the import or the local production of a patented product.
A very detailed provision concerning compulsory licenses based on the dependency of 
patents is contained in Article 31.1. It sets out a number of conditions to be fulfilled 
for the granting of a compulsory license, relating to the technical and economic 
importance of the "second patent", the granting of "a cross license on reasonable 
tenns" to the owner of the "first patent", and the non-assignability of the license. 
Compulsoiy licenses can also be conferred under Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement 
in cases where the patent-holder refuses a third party's request for a voluntary license, 
whenever such a request is made based on reasonable commercial terms. As 
mentioned above, the Agreement does not limit the grounds on which a compulsory 
license may be granted and applied, with the exception of the case of semiconductor 
technology. Furthermore, although it is not possible to designate that all patents in a 
certain field of technology, such as phamiaceuticals, shall be subject to compulsory 
licensing. Article 27.1 does not prohibit compulsory license systems defined on the 
basis of a specific objective (e.g. to protect public health or the environment), the 
achievement of which would normally require the use of inventions belonging to 
different technological fields (e.g. chemistry, biotechnology, mechanical engineering. 
X-ray technology, etc.). Article 31.h stipulates that in the case of compulsory 
licensing, the title holder shall be paid "adequate remuneration in the circumstances of
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each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization^^". This 
provision would apply, in principle, to any kind of compulsory license.
South Centre (1997) emphasizes that the word ‘adequate’ does not give precise 
guidance to national judicial and administrative authorities. Considerable latitude is 
left for interpretation at the national level regarding the criteria to be used in 
determining what level of remuneration is to be deemed adequate. The same provision 
provides two elements affecting the interpretation: circumstances of each case and the 
economic value of the authorization. Thus, the economic environment of the licensee 
and of the country where it operates, as well as the purpose of the license, should be 
taken into consideration when establishing the remuneration due. A license conferred 
in order to satisfy public health or other social needs may be subject to parameters 
different from those applicable when purely commercial and industrial interests are 
involved. The economic value will differ depending on the size of the market to be 
supplied, the age of the technology, the rate of obsolescence in the respective sector, 
the degree of competition from substitute products and the coverage of the patent. 
These all indicate that compulsory licensing and adequate compensation are difficult 
to determine in any case.
3.3.5 Industrial Designs
Industrial designs are generally defined as features of ornamentation applied to an 
article. They consist of the shape, configuration, pattern or ornament or a combination 
thereof that give a product eye-appeal. Industrial designs are normally distinguished 
from designs, which are determined by their functional usefulness. The protection of 
industrial designs is probably one of the areas of intellectual property rights, with the 
greatest diversity in terms of the forms and extent of available protection. The matter 
of protection of industrial designs is dealt with, in two articles of the TRIPs 
Agreement.
In accordance with Article 25.1 of the Agreement, members are obliged to protect 
industrial designs that are new or original. The minimum standard specified in the
Article 31 .i indicates that, the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization o f sueh use 
shall be subject to judicial review.
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first part of Article 25.1 may be subject to other conditions. In addition to the 
condition that a design must be "new" or "original" to qualify for protection, members 
may require that designs differ significantly from known designs or combinations of 
known designs, that is, that they also possess a "distinctive character". On the other 
hand, members may exclude from protection designs, which are dictated essentially 
by technical or functional factors.
Article 26.1 requires Members to grant the owner of a protected industrial design, the 
right to prevent third parties that do not have the owner’s consent from making, 
selling or importing articles bearing or embodying a design which is a copy, or 
substantially a copy, or the protected design, when such acts are undertaken for 
commercial purposes. On the other hand. Article 26.2 allows Members to provide 
limited exceptions to the protection of industrial designs, provided that such 
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of protected 
industrial designs, and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of the 
owner of the protected design, taking into account the legitimate interests of third 
parties. Finally Article 26.3 states that, the duration of protection shall amount to at 
least 10 years.
3.4 Economic Implications of the TRIPs Agreement
Some of the MTN parties, especially developing countries' representatives, oppose the 
inclusion of intellectual property protection under the WTO umbrella. According to 
them, multilateral trade agreements should only be limited to cover counterfeit good 
trade, but not national intellectual property protection policies. Some economists'^ 
indicate that intellectual property protection is not trade related, such as labor 
standards and environmental standards. They argue that, inclusion of such disciplines 
into trade negotiations may demolish the entire success of WTO, and trade 
negotiations, especially WTO should focus on trade liberalization. Panagariya (1999) 
dealt with this subject and has shown that world wide strong intellectual property 
protection shall disturb developing countries, moreover the overall effect may be 
welfare reducing. In this section. North - South patent models and effects of IPRs
See Jagdish Bhagwati and Martin Klior's presentations at the conference at Colombia University on 
Examining the Agenda for the Seattle Round, July 22-23, 1999.
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protection on FDI are briefly surveyed in order to discuss the controversies about 
IPRs protection.
3.4.1 North -  South Patent Models
In today’s world, there is a strong conflict between developing and developed 
countries about the intellectual property protection. In fact, the last round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, Uruguay Round, witness solid disagreement between 
these two blocks of countries on TRIPs agreement. The TRIPs agreement involve, 
perhaps more than any of the other agreements, substantial changes in national 
legislation. These changes are designed to strengthen the protection of IPRs and have 
a positive impact on local innovation, foreign direct investment and technology 
transfer. On the other hand, a number of negative impacts, at least as far as less 
developed and developing countries are concerned, are also expected. Clearly, higher 
prices for technologies under patent protection and decrease in technology diffusion 
through reverse enginnering are predicted. Local innovative activities in developing 
countries are expected to be fostered to some degree, however, these countries have 
comparative disadvantage in innovation with respect to developed countries. In this 
context, developing countries argue that strong protection rules decrease world 
welfare due to increasing monopoly power of few multinational innovative firms. 
Deardorff (1992) shows that developing countries’ argument may be proved under 
specified circumstances.
Deardorff builds a static model of invention and patent protection in order to examine 
the welfare effects of global protection. The model is based on four main assumptions. 
First, inventions take place in a single country, and the other country only makes 
consumptions of existing products. This assumption is widely accepted, and generally 
used in the North-South modeling technique. Second, there are identical demands for 
invented products across countries. However, the major results of the model may 
change by releasing this assumption. As Diwan and Rodrik (1991) indicate, if some 
inventions would be demanded more in the south than in the north, then extending 
patent protection may create welfare gain even for the south. Deardorff is also aware 
of this possibility. The third assumption is the linearity of the surplus function. The 
curvature and position of surplus function affect the result of the model. On the other 
hand, actual shape of surplus function is a subject of empirical studies rather than
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theoretical. The assumption of linearity is acceptable in the absence of such studies. 
Finally, the fourth assumption is about the diffusion of information. Deardorff 
assumes that innovation diffuses between countries without any cost and delay. In 
fact, this is the case in some industries, but it may not be generalized to the whole 
economy.
In the context of this model, Deardorff suggests that globally extended patent 
protection may be hamiful for the world welfare as a whole. Definitely, innovative 
countries’ welfare increases due to global patent protection, but welfare loss of other 
countries may outweigh this gain, since benefits of extending patent protection fall 
short with respect to costs of monopoly pricing of existing inventions at some point. 
Naturally, this result is an important policy implication which should be considered in 
the multilateral trade negotiations. According to Deardorff, at least the poorest 
countries should be left outside patent protection. Alternatively, sufficient transitional 
arrangements should be constituted for these least developed countries. During this 
period, developed countries and international organizations should support developing 
and less developed countries to build an effective national patent law and to create 
their own technological base. In fact, TRIPs agreement which is one of the major 
outcomes of Uruguay Round, constitutes transitional arrangement for least developed 
countries. The least developed countries are allowed 11 years to regulate their national 
laws and have options to lengthen this period.
Finally, Deardorff points out the similar reasoning behind limited period patent 
protection and limited geographic protection. According to him, both limitations are 
aimed to reduce the adverse monopoly effects of patent system. Nevertheless, the 
model simplifies the dynamic nature of the patent system and ignores its externalities.
The weak patent protection in developing countries, which is supposed to be 
supported by free-riding incentives, allows imitations of inventions of developed 
countries. Several developing countries have limited sectoral coverage, insignificant 
infringement fees, absence of specialized courts, discrimination in domestic 
applications, and administrative difficulties in their patent regimes before the TRIPs 
agreement. In addition, most of the inventive activities take place in the developed 
countries and are financed by their domestic markets. The cost of copyright and patent 
infringements in the United Stated is estimated as $15-60 billion by U.S. International
94
Trade Commisioii. According to the developed countries, free-riding incentives cause 
an underestimation of social value of innovations and there is a requirement of a 
cooperation which constitutes a socially efficient global intellectual property 
protection. The difference between private and social value of innovation causes 
undersupply in research and development activities. In this sense, TRIPs agreement is 
a great achievement for developed countries and a valuable milestone in the way of 
higher standards of intellectual property protection. In this framework, Diwan and 
Rodrik (1991) indicate that, developing countries may have incentives to provide an 
adequate patent protection to innovating fmns in developed countries under a specific 
model assumption.
Diwan and Rodrik build a simple static model in the North-South context and 
examine the effects of patent protection. The model considers continuum of potential 
technologies, allows free entry into research and development sector, segments the 
northern and southern markets with respect to patent policy, examines the effects of 
strength of patent protection. According to Diwan and Rodrik, different technological 
needs and tastes may exist in the North and the South. In this sense, most of the 
literature deal with the quantity of innovations. However, scarcity of inventive 
resources and differences in the demands of northern and southern consumers, 
increase the importance of quality of innovations rather than quantity. All these 
indicate that the South may have incentives to protect patent rigths even in the 
absence of domestic innovations.
Diwan and Rodrik conclude that, increments in the strength of the southern patent 
protection cause increments in innovative activities for their preferred technologies, 
which means a reduction in innovations of other technologies preferred by the 
northern consumers. If technological differences between the North and the South 
diminish, then optimal patent protection both in the North and the South decrease. 
Finally, increase in the southern market size leads to the same result with the 
diminishing tehnological gap case. The model may not be applicable in all sectors, 
since technological needs and tastes are very close in some sectors, namely defence, 
telecommunications, information technology. In summary, differences in 
technological needs and tastes and scarcity of research resources may induce a race of
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patent protection between the North and the South. However, increasing globalization 
is expected to reduce national differences across countries except geographical ones.
On the other hand, innovative activities have a dynamic nature. New technologies 
build on previously taken steps. Dynamic nature of innovation constitutes the main 
argument of developed countries in the multilateral trade negotiations. In this 
environment, Helpman (1993) builds a dynamic general equilibrium, a free research 
market entry model which is based on the North -  South framework. Helpman 
reaches interesting results which also deserve further theoretical and empirical 
investigations.
The model assumes that the north produces, saves, invests on research and innovates, 
however, the south only imitates northern innovations and produces. Imitation is 
assumed to be resource free, therefore does not bear any cost. Naturally, cost free 
imitation is a strong simplifying asumption, which ignores the fact that imitation cost 
may reach 65 percent of innovation cost of the same product. However, this figure 
changes in several sectors. Furthermore, the model assumes that, international capital 
market does not exist, and there is no risk for a patent to be obsolete. Imitation efforts 
of the south is the only risk for new technologies.
In this context, Helpman concludes that stronger patent protection always disturbs 
southern welfare level. On the other hand, northern welfare level depends on initial 
rate of imitation. Northern consumers also lose in the case of low imitation rate, but 
their welfare may improve otherwise. Therefore, small rate of imitation is globally 
optimum. Moreover, Helpman indicates that short term and long term results of the 
model are different, since tightening patent protection initially raises the rate of 
innovation in the north, but this figure is reversed in the long run.
The welfare analysis of the model has four parts, namely terms of trade, production 
composition, intertemporal allocation of consumption and availability of products. 
Stronger patent protection worsens all of these for the south, however there is a 
conflict between these for the north. Clearly, tightening patent protection improves 
terms of trade, but deteriorates production composition of the north. The temporal 
increment of the innovation rate in response to tightening patent protection is less than 
the detrimental results.
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In summary, the model suggests that, a low level of imitation may be optimum for 
both the north and the south. However, policy implication of this result is difficult to 
apply, since patent policy strength and true imitation rate cannot be determined 
precisely. Moreover, externalities of innovative activities should be studied further. 
Sustainable growth of innovation seems to be achieved by only positive externality of 
innovations and its diffusions.
Helpman also models foreign direct investment in this context, and concludes that 
existence of foreign direct investment possibility reverses the welfare results for the 
north. Clearly, increasing strength of patent protection causes a welfare improvement 
for the north even in the case of low initial imitation rate. However, the same previous 
results are still valid for the south.
The patent protection system is one of the most examined of the IPRs protection 
policies. However, many firms also use alternative tools in order to consolidate 
protection of their new technologies. Naturally, alternative tools and their 
effectivenesses may change across industries. Taylor (1993) investigates one of these 
alternatives, namely masking, and builds a static partial equilibrium model which 
deals with north -  south model of technology transfer. Masking efforts are widely 
applied in the form of encription, use of special materials and signs, copy protect 
schemes, and dummy codes, etc. Taylor considers imitation as a means of unintented 
technology transfer, and leaves licensed technology transfer and foreign direct 
investment outside the model. The model considers a duopoly structure without free 
entry and the northern and southern firms are assumed as first mover and follower 
respectively.
The model investigates the level of masking endogenously and suggests 
substitutability between official patent system and masking efforts. The north and the 
south are represented as an iimovating, and imitating fiim respectively. As is well 
known, northern firm invests in and develops high technology products, and southern 
film invests in reverse engineering efforts in order to imitate these high technology 
products. Stringency of southern patent protection, which affects the level of masking 
in the north and the cost of imitation in the south, is the policy variable of the model. 
In this model setting, Taylor reports that, northern firm may compensate the 
decreasing stringency of southern patent protection by increasing masking efforts.
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Therefore, the north may abonden the strategic movement of the south and keep its 
output unaffected which also indicates that southern output remains unchanged. 
Taylor also expresses that an increase in the stringency of southern patent protection 
raises the quality of imitation efforts. On the contrary, weak patent protection in the 
South causes little contribution to southern technology base.
In summary, Taylor concludes that patent protection system has two different faces in 
theory and in practice. Generally, theoretical studies ignore market created protection 
barriers for imitators, however, they are widely used in some industries. Moreover, 
stringeny of patent protection in the south and masking invesments in the north are 
substitutable implementations. On the other hand, these two implementations differ in 
northern profit terms. Clearly, weaker patent protection in the south decreases the 
profit of the northern firm, but may increase the profit of the southern firm. Naturally, 
this contradiction in the interests of the north and the south suggests that, an 
intermediate level of patent protection is globally optimum. Finally, Taylor also 
indicates that stringency of patent protection is a similar policy implementation as 
export subsidy.
Like stringency of patent protection, uniform patent protection across countries also 
deserves investigation, since asymmetric protection regimes may cause totally 
different results with respect to symmetric protection. Taylor (1994) builds a two 
country endogenous growth model corcerning two alternative patent regimes, namely 
symmetric and asymmetric protection between countries. The model allows 
continuum of products and international diffusion of knowledge. Whereas, gradation 
of patent strength is ignored, only two limiting alternative cases are considered. 
Clearly, in the first case, countries take domestic and foreign intellectual properties as 
the same and protect them equally. However, in the second case, home and foreign 
countries only protect their own intellectual properties. WTO member countries, 
which have to obey TRIPs requirements, are obligated to treat all countries equally. 
TRIPs agreement states that member countries cannot discriminate between other 
member countries, and have to obey most favoured nation principle. In this sense, 
symmetrical protection regime is guaranteed officially, but effects of asymmetrical 
protection regime should be further investigated, to discuss whether non­
discrimination and most favoured nation principles are welfare optimum or not.
98
The model relates the patent protection regimes to pattern of trade and level of 
research, and investigates the effects on worldwide growth and welfare. Taylor states 
that ineffective patent protection may cause low level of investment on research, slow 
worldwide growth, and less technology transfer between countries.
Taylor concludes that, asymmetric patent protection may change the whole picture, 
clearly, it distorts trade in both product and research markets and creates a barrier to 
technology transfer and decreases relative wage in the R&D exporting country. 
Furthennore, R&D activities are slowing down in R&D exporting countries under 
asymmetric patent protection, and both domestic and foreign countries’ welfare levels 
are damaged. In summary, asymmetric protection regimes distort natural trade pattern 
and decrease the level of R&D investment which causes slower worldwide economic 
growth.
The TRIPs agreement implies that signatory countries have to comply with minimum 
requirements of internationally accepted patent protection standarts. Moreover, non­
discrimination principle of GATT is also an obligation for member countries which 
indicates that member countries have to treat both domestic and foreign patent holders 
equally. Clearly, TRIPs agreement requires unifonn patent protection in world scale 
with only two exceptions. The first is a transition periodic for developing and less 
developed countries. The second is that, member countries might set higher 
standards**' for their national treatment, however non-discrimination principle is still 
an obligation. However, several patent protection standards exist in practice, in 
addition, some member countries violate non-discrimination principle of the GATT. 
For example. United States and European Union have higher protection standards for 
their national patents. This observation indicates a controversy among developed 
countries whether a unifomi patent protection in all parties is welfare optimum or not. 
Proponents of discrimination argue that, higher internal patent protection standards
Actually most favored nation principle is also binding in the transition period, whereas existing 
structure o f national patent laws may create a natural barrier for foreigners.
The TRIPS agreement requires members to comply with certain minimum standards for the 
protection o f IPRs covered in it, but members may choose to implement more extensive protection in 
their laws than is required in the agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene with the 
other provisions o f the agreement.
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promote domestic inventive activities, and do not damage foreign researches. Aoki 
and Prusa (1993) examine the effects of alternative patent protection on inventive 
activities worldwide. Their model is based on two fimis - two countries R&D game 
and consists of four factors, namely relative efficiency of the firms, cost levels of 
R&D, pre-existing products and finally the value of innovation.
The model indicates that, discriminatory patent protection may be used to promote 
domestic R&D for the infant industry. On the other hand, foreign R&D investments 
decrease in response to discrimination. Moreover, if the size of innovation is larger 
relative to its cost, then discrimination would yield better results for domestic markets 
again. Finally, if domestic R&D activities are more efficient with respect to foreign 
R&D, then uniform patent protection standard is beneficial for the home country. In 
the light of their findings, Aoki and Prusa conclude that, discrimination is not always 
beneficial for discriminating country’s R&D activities. In addition, they point that 
potential retaliation response of foreign country is ignored in the model which may 
further worsen the position of discriminating country. Aoki and Prusa indicate that, 
worldwide discrimination case should also be investigated to understand the whole 
picture.
In spite of these, GATT states and forces minimum protection standards and non­
discrimination principle. The model has some missing parts, namely welfare analysis, 
counter measures of foreign government, multi-country modeling and dynamic nature 
of innovation. Nevertheless, the model implies that asymmetric patent protection may 
not be preferred to symmetric protection under specific settings.
To sum up this section, it is difficult to conclude that there is an agreement in 
literature on the relative importance of pros and cons of intellectual property 
protection. This clearly reveals that more research is needed in this subject. However, 
complexity of the subject and interaction with the other subject make it inconclusive. 
In any case, it may be stated that research and development activities should be 
supported without disturbing competition too much.
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3.4.2 Role of TRIPs Agreement on FDI
As mentioned before, TRIPs agreement requires stronger protection for intellectual 
property rights in developing countries. Developing countries argue that stronger 
protection regime creates welfare loss for them, since they have strict comparative 
disadvantage in inventive activities. An important provision for least-developed 
countries is Article 66.2^ 2^  which requires developed countries to provide incentives to 
promote technology transfer to least developed countries. In this framework, foreign 
direct investment seems to be one of the most effective ways of technology transfer.
Primo Braga, Fink and Sepulveda (1999) report the increasing importance of FDI. 
Clearly inward FDI is 4.6 percent of world gross domestic product in 1980, which 
reaches 10.1 percent in 1995. This indicates that FDI stock is doubled nearly in a 
decade. The figure is more dramatic for developing countries, that is, FDI stock has 
increased nearly fourfold between 1980 and 1995. On the other hand, there is no clear 
evidence at hand, which points that these increases are based on the developments of 
intellectual property protection. In fact, China^  ^ ¡g an obvious counter example, that is, 
China is one of the major FDI receiving countries, but its IPRs protection system is 
very weak. China is receiving 18.2 percent of its gross domestic product as an inward 
FDI stock in 1995. Therefore, one should be careful when detemiining the effects of 
TRIPs agreement on FDI. In fact Maskus (1993) points that, choice among FDI, 
license and trade is complex and depends on a variety of strategic factors. Moreover, 
Maskus also reports that, most of the global expansion in foreign investment has been 
within the industrial countries.
Maskus indicates that there is no direct relation between FDI and IPRs protection 
systems, but he mentions two possible motivations for local governments of 
developing countries, which regulate stronger IPRs regimes. The first one is, some 
fimis in developing countries seem to have developed a greater awareness of potential
^2 Article 66.2 states tliat "developed country members shall provide incentives to enterprises and 
institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to 
least-developed country members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological 
base".
China has changed its intellectual property legislation recently.
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benefits of stronger protection, including greater incentives for local innovation and 
more access to foreign technology. These firms may be gaining political influence in 
national debates over technology policies. Second, local governments may use 
stronger IPRs protection regimes as a signal for invitation of multinational enterprises' 
investments. That is to say, it is suggested that enhanced IPRs protection would attract 
more FDI, because multinational enterprises may interpret it as a greater commitment 
by host country governments to establish and provide a mild investment environment 
for them.
In another study, Maskus (1997) states that strong IPRs protection alone is insufficient 
for generating strong incentives for firms to invest in a country. Both trade and 
competition policies of the host country are also effective. Maskus summarizes 
predictions about IPRs, FDI, and technology transfer between countries as follows. 
Firstly, FDI and technology transfer is expected to be insensitive to IPRs protection in 
old technology products and labor intensive technologies. Secondly, FDI inflow is 
sensitive to strength of IPRs protection in easily copied technologies such as 
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and information technologies. Thirdly, it is also 
expected that stronger protection of IPRs may reduce the licensing costs. Finally, if an 
effective IPRs protection is guaranteed, the likelihood of most advanced teclinology 
transfer increases. Maskus' analysis indicates that, FDI flow is dependent on five 
groups of factors, namely macroeconomic factors*^ '*, relative input costs, 
agglomeration effects* ,^ policy variables*^ *^  and risk factors.
In this context, Ferrantino (1993) builds an econometric model and evaluates the role 
of IPRs on international trade and investment. He tries to explain the dependent 
variables (total export, sales, royalties and license fees) using three groups of data, 
namely, economic distance (distance, persons per telephone, political risk, colony 
dummy, Europe dummy), policy distance (tariff revenue, investment regime, foreign
Market size, rate o f growth o f real GDP, and GNP per capita are the major FDI attracting
macroeconomic factors.
Concentration of relateci economic activities in a location wouM decrease the production costs, thus 
attracting FDI into that location.
Tax rates, trade policy and level o f domestic human capital effect FDI flow.
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exchange regime, Paris and Berne Convention memberships, duration of patent) and 
other independent variables (unit labor costs, population and GDP). The findings can 
be summarized as follows. First, there is a weak association between countries' IPRs 
policies and their openness to trade and FDI. Second, there is no clear evidence about 
the relationship between IPRs regime and arms' length exports or affiliate sales. Third, 
transfer exports are significantly dependent on IPRs regimes. Fourth, receipts of 
royalties and license fees are higher in the case of strong IPRs regimes. In the light of 
these findings, Ferrantino concludes that the effect of IPRs on trade and investment 
should be studied further in order to be fully confirmed.
The early econometric studies show that there is no significant relationship between 
IPRs protection system and FDI flow*^ .^ Specifically, Kondo (1995) focuses on the 
patent protection. Kondo investigates the effects of patent protection on FDI using the 
American manufacturing FDI data and patent strength index** of 33 countries. He 
clearly concludes that, there is no evidence about the existence of an association 
between FDI and patent protection. In addition, Maskus and Eby Konan (1994) 
indicate that they could not find any evidence about the potential effects of TRIPs 
agreement. On the other hand, recent studies have found evidences of relationship, 
namely Lee and Mansfield (1996) and Maskus (1998). Lee and Mansfield report that 
there is a significant negative relationship between weaknesses of IPRs protection and 
American originated FDI. Maskus finds that American firms positively react to 
strength of patent system in FDI receiving countries. There is also evidence that a 
weak IPRs protection policy in FDI receiving country reduces the quality of 
technology transferred. Finally, there are indications that strengthening IPRs can 
increase the technology transfer and FDI inflow, but there are also other important 
factors which affect the decision of firms. Therefore, potential effects of the TRIPs 
agreement could not be assessed directly.
See Mansfield (1993), Maskus and Eby Konan (1994) and Kondo (1995).
Kondo estimates a patent strength index, which covers the main national patent law provisions, 
namely patent life, exclusionary provisions (patentability o f computer programs, pharmaceuticals, 
microbiological processes etc.) and scope provisions (cancellation for non-use, compulsory licensing, 
first to file system, patent infringements etc.).
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CHAPTER 4
ECONOMICS OF PATENT PROTECTION
The purpose of the patent system is to reward innovators. Since rewards are based on 
the creation of market power, they necessitate welfare loss. The chapter discusses the 
tradeoff between the benefits associated with innovation and the costs of patent 
monopoly power. The problem is analyzed using first a partial equilibrium and 
thereafter a general equilibrium framework. The final section of the chapter deals with 
issues related with the inclusion of intellectual property rights through the so-called 
TRIPs Agreement into the WTO disciplines.
4.1 Partial Equilibrium
4.1.1 Theoretical Analysis
We follow Armington (1969) in defining the composite good q, called widgets, as a 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of the different types of widgets Xj 
(i=l,..,n)
/=1
Let Pi (i = l,..,n) be the price of the i-th widget. Consider the optimization problem
maximize [ ¿ a ,  .
/=1
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nsubject to the budget constraint Y = E a  X j, where Y denotes total expenditure on
/=1
widgets. From the first order conditions we derive the demand functions for different 
types of widgets, assuming Y and prices pi (i = l,..,n) to remain fixed, as
\oc. Y (i=l,..,n) (4.1)
P i )
where we define the following relationships:
p  = [ ( r - l ) / r ]
and
^ = iE a > ;· ' r " " ’ (4.2)
/ = I
Here 71 is called CES dual price. It is the aggregate price of widgets and the parameter 
T is called the substitution elasticity, which is derived from the relation
d{X^IXj){p^lp,)
d { p , I P j ) { X J X j )
= - T .
Let Rj denote the cost of innovating the i-th widget and let c, be the constant unit cost 
of production of widget i after it has been invented. Finally, define demand for the 
composite good as
q = ^
where r| denotes the elasticity of demand for the composite good widget. Since by 
definition Y = 71 q we have
Y = k, TV\ - n (4.3)
The above system of equations can be solved for the equilibrium values of prices and 
quantities once we specify the policy regimes. Following the approaches of Deardorff
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(1992) and Panagariya (1999) we consider three policy regimes within our model 
settings: (i) an R&D subsidy that covers the cost of innovation but permits no patent 
protection, (ii) patent protection over T years during which time monopoly rights are 
granted to firms producing the widgets over these years and (iii) no protection at all.
Under the first policy regime the government gives R&D subsidy to the inventor to 
the full extend of the cost, raising the subsidy via a lump sum tax. Since the widget 
once invented can be produced at the constant marginal cost c, the equilibrium price 
under perfect competition will equal the marginal cost. In Figure 4.1 DD’ represents 
the demand for the i-th widget and Cj the constant marginal cost of production. Under 
the assumptions introduced, the equilibrium price will be Cj and equilibrium quantity
X j . The consumers’ surplus during a given time period equals the area A + B + C 
under the demand curve while producers’ surplus is 0. The net benefit to the society 
from the invention is the discounted value of consumers’ surplus over the entire life of 
the product minus the cost of invention R, .
Next consider the outcome under the patent. In this case the market for the i-th widget 
will be characterized by monopoly over the duration of patent life. The innovator will 
produce fewer i-th widgets and charge higher price than under competition. 
Maximization of profits yields the optimality condition that marginal revenue equals 
the marginal cost
S:
(4.4a)
where
(4.4b)
./=1
denotes the elasticity of demand for the i-th widget with respect to the i-th widget 
price pi. In Figure 4.1 the monopoly equilibrium is shown by the price p”-° and
quantity A,'"". The consumers’ surplus during the time period t equals the area A 
under the demand curve while producers’ surplus is B. Compared to the full R&D 
subsidy case consumers’ surplus declines by the areas B and C. Producers’ surplus
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rises by the area B. As a result the society suffers, relative to the R&D subsidy case, 
during each period a deadweight loss measured by the area C.
Finally we note that the product will not be innovated at all as long as the government 
does not subsidize innovation and nor grant a patent. The message given by 
consideration of this case is rather clear. As long as innovations are costly no one will 
engage in innovation unless the costs of innovation can be recovered.
Figure 4.1
4.1.2 Numerical Analysis
In calibrating the model we scale the quantities so that perfectly competitive prices 
under R&D subsidy are all unity in the benchmark. This includes the price for the 
Armington composite good q. We assume that initially there are three varieties of 
widgets and that patents have expired for these widgets so that in equilibrium the 
prices of these widgets equal their marginal costs which in turn equal unity. Next 
consider the case of a single invention. We assume that the producer has designed a 
new product, a fourth widget, at a research cost of R4. Once invented the fourth 
widget can be produced at the constant marginal cost C 4 . We scale the quantity so that 
marginal cost C4 equals unity. Finally we assume that different types of widgets are 
consumed in equal amounts and that the consumption of the fourth type of widget will
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equal that of the other widgets. Using the demand functions (4.1), the CES weight for 
each type of widget is detemiined as follows
a, =
\  ^ J
(i=l,..,4)
Table 4.1 presents the spreadsheet implementation of the Armington model with four 
types of widgets and Table 4.2 the formulas underlying the determination of 
monopoly equilibrium in Table 4.1. We assume that the product life of the widget is at 
least as long as the duration of the patent. Given the value of the elasticity of 
substitution we determine the price of the fourth widget for which marginal cost 
equals the marginal revenue using the SOLVER facility of MS Excel for Windows 
Program**^ . This case is denoted by “monopoly in sector 4” and shown on the left hand 
side of Table 4.1. On the other hand the solution of the case when government 
subsidizes the R&D in sector 4 is given on the right hand side of Table 4.1.
We consider three different values of total expenditure on widgets (1000, 2000 and 
3000), five different values for the duration of patent (5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 years) and 
five different values of the elasticity of substitution (2, 4, 6, 8, 10). In each case we 
determine the discounted value of excess profits in sector 4 over the patent life under 
the assumption that at the end of patent duration the price of the commodity will fall 
down to the marginal cost so that there will be no excess profits after T years. The 
interest rate is assumed to be 5 percent'^ ^^ .
Ч
The figures in Table 4.3 need some clarification. We assume that the cost of 
innovation underlying the Table 4.2 equals R4 = 500. Dividing the discounted value of 
excess profits by cost of innovation we obtain the figures in Table 4.3a which indicate 
the discounted value of excess profits per unit of research cost in sector 4. Thus values 
below unity indicate situations where the discounted value of excess profit stream 
over the duration of the patent is less than the cost of the innovation.
Microsoft Excel and Windows are trademarks o f Microsoft Corporation.
The magnitude o f numerical results are sensitive to changes in interest rate, however policy 
implications r emain the same.
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T a b ic  4 .1 :  E f fe c ts  o f  P a te n t  P r o te c t io n  in  S u b s e c t o r  4  o n ly
iM O M O D O I V  IXI G O V E R N M E N TIVIUINLM U I j V I in
S U B S I D Y  T O  R i& D IN
3
A
S E C  F O R  4
5 B c n c l i in a r k  V a lu e s  a n d  P a r a m e te r s
6 B e n c h m a rk  T o ta l S a le s  (Y , G Y ) 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
7 N u m b e r  o f  W id g e ts  in  S e c to r  2 (n , G n ) 4 4
8 B e n c h m a rk  S a le s  o f X 2 1  ( S _ l ,  G S _ 1 ) 7 5 0 7 5 0
9 B e n c h m a rk  S a le s  o f  X 2 2  (S _ 2 , G S _ 2 ) 7 5 0 7 5 0
10 B e n c h m a rk  S a le s  o f  X 2 3  (S _ 3 , G S _ 3 ) 7 5 0 7 5 0
11 B e n c h m a rk  S a le s  o f  X 2 4  (S _ 4 , G S _ 4 ) 7 5 0 7 5 0
12 E la s t ic i ty  o f  D e m a n d  - C o m p o s i te  G o o d  (s q ) 1,5 1,5
13 E la s t ic i ty  o f  S u b s t i tu t io n  (s t) 2 2
14 C a lib r a t io n
15 S h a re  P a ra m e te r  o f  X 21 ( a _ l , G a _ l ) 0 ,5 0 0 0 0 ,5 0 0 0
16 S h a re  P a ra m e te r  o f  X 2 2  ( a _ 2 , G a _ 2 ) 0 ,5 0 0 0 0 ,5 0 0 0
17 S h a re  P a ra m e te r  o f  X 2 3  (a _ 3 , G a _ 3 ) 0 ,5 0 0 0 0 ,5 0 0 0
18 S h a re  P a ra m e te r  o f  X 2 4  (a _ 4 , G a _ 4 ) 0 ,5 0 0 0 0 ,5 0 0 0
19
20 P a te n t  P r o te c t io n  u n d e r  M o n o p o ly  in  S e c to r  4  o n ly
21 M a rg in a l  C o s t  o f  X 2 1 (M C  1, G M C 1) 1 1
22 M a rg in a l  C o s t  o f  X 2 2  (M C 2 , G M C 2 ) 1 1
23 M a rg in a l  C o s t  o f  X 2 3  (M C 3 , G M C 3 ) 1 1
24 M a rg in a l  C o s t  o f  X 2 4  (M C 4 , G M C 4 ) 1 1
25 P r i c e o f X 2 l  ( P _ I , G P _ I ) 1 1
26 P r ic e  o f  X 2 2  ( P _ 2 . G P _ 2 ) 1 1
27 P r ic e  o f X 2 3  ( P _ 3 ,G P _ 3 ) 1 1
28 P r ic e  o f X 2 4  (P _ 4 , G P _ 4 ) 2 ,1 5 4 7 1
29 C o m p o s i te  G o o d  P r ic e  (P q , G P q ) 1 ,1 5 4 7 1 ,0 0 0 0
30 ' f h e  T e rm  A  (A , G A ) 0 ,8 6 6 0 1 ,0 0 0 0
31 f ö ta l  E x p e n d i tu re  o n  C o m p o s i te  G o o d  (E , G E ) 2 7 9 1 ,8 1 4 6 3 0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0
32
33 D e m a n d  fo r X 2 1  ( D 1 ,G D 1 ) 8 0 5 ,9 3 7 5 0 ,0 0
34 D e m a n d  fo r  X 2 2  (D 2 , G D 2 ) 8 0 5 ,9 3 7 5 0 ,0 0
35 D e m a n d  fo r  X 2 3  (D 3 . G D 3 ) 8 0 5 ,9 3 7 5 0 ,0 0
36 D e m a n d  fo r  X 2 4  (D 4 , G D 4 ) 1 7 3 ,5 9 7 5 0 ,0 0
37
38 P r ic e  E la s t ic i ty  in  S e c to r  21 ( s p l ,  G s p l ) 1 ,7 1 1 3 1 ,7 5 0 0
39 P r ic e  E la s t ic i ty  in  S e c to r  2 2  ( s p 2 , G sp 2 ) 1 ,7 1 1 3 1 ,7 5 0 0
40 P r ic e  E la s t ic i ty  in S e c to r  2 3  ( s p 3 , G s p 3 ) 1 ,7 1 1 3 1 ,7 5 0 0
41 P ric e  E la s t ic i ty  in S e c to r  2 4  ( s p 4 , G sp 4 ) 1 ,8 6 6 0 1 ,7 5 0 0
42
43 M a rg in a l  C o s t  - M a rg in a l  R e v e n u e  in S e c to r  4  (M C  M R ) 1,2 0 9 7 E -0 8 0 ,5 7 1 4
44 lY ice  - M a rg in a l  C o s t  in S e c to r  4  (P _ M C ) 1 ,1 5 4 7 0 ,0 0 0 0
45
46 P r o f it s  in  s e c t o r  4
47 S u b s id y  to  R & D  (S P ) 0
48 M o n o p o ly  (M P ) 2 0 0 ,4 4 3 3
49
50 W e lfa re  L o ss  (W L ) 3 3 2 ,7 9 1 1
51 In te re s t  R a te  ( i) 0 ,0 5
52
53 P r e s e n t  V a lu e  o f  E x c e s s  M o n o p o ly  P r o f it s  a n d  W e lfa r e  L o s s
P V  o f  E x c e s s  P r o f it  in
54 P a te n t  D u r a t io n  ( in  y e a r s ) S e c t o r  4
P V  o f  W e lfa r e  L o s s
55 5 8 6 7 ,8 1 1 .4 4 0 ,8 1
56 10 1 .5 4 7 ,7 7 2 .5 6 9 ,7 2
57 15 2 .0 8 0 ,5 3 3 .4 5 4 ,2 6
58 20 2 .4 9 7 ,9 7 4 .1 4 7 ,3 1
59 25 2 .8 2 5 ,0 4 4 .6 9 0 ,3 4
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A J _______________________B______________________ 1 c
1
2
T a b l e  4 .2 :  E f f e c t s  o f  P a t e n t  P r o t e c t i o n  in  S u b s e c t o r  4  o n l y  ( F o r m u l a s )
3
M O N O P O L Y  IN  S E C T O R  4 G O V E R N M E N T  S U B S I D Y  T O  R & D  I N  S E C T O R
4
5 B e n c h m a r k  V a l u e s  a n d  P a r a m e t e r s
6 B e n c h m a r k  T o ta l  S a le s  ( Y ,  G Y ) 3 0 0 0 - Y
7 N u m b e r  o f  W id g e t s  in  S e c to r  2  ( n ,  G n ) 4 - n
8 B e n c h m a r k  S a l e s  o f  X 2 I  ( S _ l ,  G S _ I ) - Y / n - G Y / G n
9 B e n c h m a r k  S a l e s  o f  X 2 2  ( S _ 2 .  G S _ 2 ) - Y / n - G Y / G n
10 B e n c h m a r k  S a l e s  o f  X 2 3  ( S _ 3 ,  G S J ) - Y / n - G Y / G n
11 B e n c h m a r k  S a l e s  o f  X 2 4  ( S _ 4 ,  G S _ 4 ) - Y / n - G Y / G n
12 E la s t i c i t y  o f  D e m a n d  - C o m p o s i t e  G o o d  ( s q ) 1.5 - s q
13 E la s t i c i t y  o f  S u b s t i t u t i o n  ( s t ) 2 •-s t
14 C a l i b r a t i o n
15 S h a r e  P a r a m e te r  o f  X 2 1 (a  1, G a  1) - ( S _ . l A ' ) ^ ( l / s t ) - ( G S _ I / G Y ) ^ ( l / s t )
16 S h a r e  P a r a m e te r  o f  X 2 2  (a  2 , G a  2 ) - ( S _ 2 A ') ^ ( l / s t ) = ( G S _ 2 / G Y ) ' '( I / s t )
17 S h a r e  P a r a m e te r  o f  X 2 3  ( a  3 . G a  3 ) - ( S _ 3 A ') ' ( l / s t ) - ( G S _ 3 / G Y ) ^ ( l / s t )
18
19
S h a r e  P a r a m e te r  o f  X 2 4  (a  4 .  G a  4 ) - - ( S _ 4 A ') ' ' ( l / s t ) - ( G S _ 4 / G Y ) '^ ( l / s t )
2 0 P a t e n t  P r o t e c t i o n  u n d e r  M o n o p o l y  i n  S e c t o r  4  o n ly
21 M a r g in a l  C o s t o f X 2 l  ( M C I ,  G M C l ) 1 1
2 2 M a r g in a l  C o s t  o f  X 2 2  ( M C 2 ,  G M C 2 ) 1 1
2 3 M a r g in a l  C o s t  o f  X 2 3  ( M C 3 ,  G M C 3 ) 1 1
2 4 M a r g in a l  C o s t  o f  X 2 4  ( M C 4 ,  G M C 4 ) 1 1
2 5 P r ic e  o f  X 2 I  ( P _ I , G P _ 1 ) - M C I - G M C l
2 6 P r i c e  o f X 2 2 ( P _ 2 .  G P _ 2 ) - M C 2 - G M C 2
2 7 P r ic e  o f X 2 3  ( P J . G P J ) - M C 3 - G M C 3
2 8 P r i c e  o f  X 2 4 ( P _ 4 .  G P _ 4 ) 2 ,1 5 4 7 0 0 5 1 4 0 6 0 0 9 - G M C 4
( ( a  1 ^ t ) * ( P _ r (  1 -St)) t ( a _ 2 ' 's t ) * ( P _ 2 ^ (  1 - ( ( G a _  1 ' ' s  t)*  ( G P _  1 ^( 1 - s t ) ) - ^ ( G a _ 2 ''s t )*  ( G P _ 2 ^ (  1 -
C o m p o s i t e  G o o d  P r i c e  ( P q ,  G P q ) s t ) ) + ( a  3 ^ 's t)* (P  3 ^ ( l - s t ) ) + ( a  4 ^ s t ) * ( P ^ 4 ^ ( l - s t ) ) ) ^ ( l / ( l s t ) ) + ( G a  3 ' 's t ) * ( G P  3 ^ ( l - s t ) ) + ( G a  4 ^ s t ) * ( G P  4 ^ ( 1 -
2 9
St)) s t ) ) ) - ( l / ( l - s t ) )
H ie  T e r m  A  (A , G A )
( a _  1'  St)* ( P _  1 ^ ( 1 - s t ) ) + ( a _ 2 ^ s t ) * ( P _ 2 ^ (  1 - ( G a _ C s t ) * ( G P _ K (  1 - s t ) )  t ( G a _ 2 's t ) * ( G P _ 2 ^ (  1 -
s t ) ) + ( a _ 3 ^ s t ) * ( P  _3 ' ( 1 - s t ) ) + ( a  J ' ' s t ) * ( P _ 4 '  ( 1 - s t) ) s t ) )  f (G a _ 3 ^ 's t)* (G P _ 3 '^ ^ (  1 - s t ) ) + ( G a . . 4 ^ s t ) * ( G P _ 4 ' '(  1 - s t )
3 0
31 T otal E x p e n d i tu r e  o n  C o m p o s i t e  G o o d  (E , G E ) - Y * P q - ( l - s q ) - G Y * G P q ^ ( l - s q )
3 2
3 3 D e m a n d  f o r X 2 1  ( D l . G D l ) - E * ( ( a _ l / P _ l ) ' ' s t * P q ^ ( s t - l ) ) - G E * ( ( G a _ l / G P _ l ) 's t * G P q ^ ( s t - l ) )
3 4 D e m a n d  f o r  X 2 2  ( D 2 .  G D 2 ) - ^ E * ( ( a _ 2 /P _ 2 ) ' ' s t * P q ' '( s t - 1)) - G E * ( ( G a _ 2 / G P _ 2 ) ' 's t * G P q ^ ( s t - 1))
3 5 D e m a n d  f o r X 2 3  ( D 3 ,  G D 3 ) - E * ( ( a . 3 / P _ 3 ) ' ' s l * P q '( s t - l ) ) - G E * ( ( G a J / G P _ 3 ) ^ s t * G P q ^ ( s t - l ) )
3 6 D e m a n d  f o r  X 2 4  ( D 4 .  G D 4 ) - E * ( ( a _ 4 / P _ 4 ) ^ s t * P q ^ ( s t - l ) ) - G E * ( ( G a _ 4 / G P _ 4 ) ^ s t * G P q ' ' ( s t - 1))
Z l
3 8 P r ic e  E l i i s t ic i ty  in  S e c to r  21 ( s p l ,  G s p I ) -^ s t- ( s t- l  ) * ( a _ r s t ) * ( P _ L  ( 1 - s t ) ) *  A ^ ( - 1) - s t - ( s t - 1 ) * ( G a _  1 ^ s t ) * ( G P _  1 ^( 1 - s t ) ) * G A ^ - 1)
3 9 P r ic e  E la s t i c i t y  in  S e c to r  2 2  ( s p 2 ,  G s p 2 ) - s t - ( s t - 1 ) * ( a _ 2 ' 's t ) * ( P _ 2 ^ (  1 - s t) )*  A ^ ( - 1) - s t - ( s t - 1 ) * ( G a _ 2 '^ t ) * ( G P _ 2 ^ (  1 - s t ) ) * G A '^ ( - 1)
4 0 P r i c e  E la s t i c i t y  in  S e c to r  2 3  ( s p 3 ,  G s p 3 ) - s t - ( s t - 1 ) * ( a _ 3 ' 's t ) * ( P _ 3 ' '(  1 - s t) )*  A '^ ( - 1) - s t - ( s t - l  ) * ( G a _ 3 ^ s t ) * ( G P _ 3 ^ (  1 - s t ) ) * G A ^ ( - 1)
41 P r ic e  E la s t i c i t y  in  S e c to r  2 4  ( s p 4 ,  G s p 4 ) - s t - ( s t - 1 ) * ( a  4 ''s t ) * ( P _ 4 ^ '(  1 - s t ) ) * A '^ ( - 1) - s t - ( s t - 1 ) * ( G a _ 4 ' 's t ) * ( G P _ 4 ^ (  1 - s t ) ) * G A ^ - 1)
4 2
4 3 M a r g in a l  C o s t  - M a r g in a l  R e v e n u e  in  S e c to r  4  ( M C _ M R ) - M C 4 - P _ 4 * ( l - ( l / s p 4 ) )  1- G M C 4 - G P . . 4 * ( l - ( l / G s p 4 ) )
4 4 P r ic e  - M a r g in a l  C o s t  in  S e c to r  4  ( P _ M C ) - P _ 4 - M C 4  1- G P _ 4 - G M C 4
4 5
4 6 P r o f i t s  in  s e c t o r  4
4 7 S u b s id y  to  R & D  ( S P ) 0
4 8 M o n o p o ly  ( M P ) - ( P _ 4 - M C 4 ) * D _ 4
4 9
5 0 W e lf a r e  L o s s  ( W L ) - ( 1  / 2 ) * ( G D  4 - D _ 4 ) * ( P _ 4 - G P _ 4 )
51 I n te r e s t  R a te  ( i ) 0 ,0 5
5 2
5 3 P r e s e n t  V a l u e  o f  E x c e s s  M o n o p o l y  P r o f i t s  a n d  W e l f a r e  L o s s
5 4 P a t e n t  D u r a t i o n  ( i n  y e a r s ) P V  o f  E x c e s s  P r o f i t  in  S e c t o r  4 P V  o f  W e l f a r e  L o s s
" 55· 5 - P V ( i ; A 5 5 ; - M P ) - P V ( i ; A 5 5 ; - W L )
5 6 10 - P V ( i ; A 5 6 ; - M P ) - P V ( i ; A 5 6 ; - W L )
5 7 15 - P V ( i ; A 5 7 ; - M P ) - P V ( i ; A 5 7 ; - W L )
5 8 2 0 - P V ( i ; A 5 8 ; - M P ) - P V ( i ; A 5 8 ; - W L )
5 9 2 5 - P V ( i ; A 5 9 ; - M P ) ■ - P V ( i;A 5 9 ;-W L )
1 1 0
As a result the product will not be innovated under the patent system. In those cases 
where the values are less than unity the producers will not apply for patent protection. 
Producers will apply for patent protection only in those cases where the values in 
Table 4.3a equal to or exceed unity. The results in Table 4.3a and 4.3b are plotted in 
Figure 4.2 and 4.3 respectively, only for the first case which is, total expenditure on 
all types of widgets amounts to 1000. A close consideration of the figures in Table 
4.3a reveals the following aspects:
• For any given level of patent duration and market size, producers’ net benefit 
derived from patent protection decreases with increases in the value of the 
elasticity of substitution. The patent system is sensitive to changes in value of 
the elasticity of substitution and producers will be reluctant to innovate the 
product for larger values of the elasticity of substitution.
• For any given level of the elasticity of substitution and market size, producers’ 
net benefit increases with increases in the duration of the patent. The patent 
system is sensitive to changes in the duration of patents. Producers reluctant to 
innovate the product will be induced to innovate the product and apply for 
protection with increases in the duration of patents.
• For any given level of the elasticity of substitution and duration of patent, 
producers’ net benefit increases with increases in the market size. The patent 
system is sensitive to changes in the market size. Producers reluctant to 
innovate the product will be induced to innovate the product and apply for 
protection with increases in the market size.
Consider the case when expenditures on all types of widgets equal 2000, elasticity of 
substitution is 6 and patent length is 15 years. In this case the producer will not 
innovate the product. The producer will innovate the product when either the market 
size increases to 3000 or when elasticity of substitution decreases to 4, or when patent 
length increases to 25 years.
Table 4.3b showing the present value of the welfare loss approximated by the area C 
in Figure 4.1 reveals the following aspects
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• For any given level of patent duration and market size, present value of the 
welfare loss derived from patent protection increases with decreases in the 
value of the elasticity of substitution. The welfare loss is sensitive to changes 
in value of the elasticity of substitution.
• For any given level of the elasticity of substitution and market size, present 
value of the welfare loss increases with increases in the duration of the patent. 
The welfare loss is sensitive to changes in the duration of patents.
• For any given level of the elasticity of substitution and duration of patent, 
present value of the welfare loss increases with increases in the market size. 
The welfare loss is sensitive to changes in the market size.
Comparison of the figures in Table 4.3 reveal that the welfare cost of patents is 
substantial in all cases where the present value of excess profits exceeds the cost of 
innovation. Cases where the welfare cost of patents are relatively low refer to cases^' 
where the present value of excess profits falls short of the cost of innovation.
The upper part of Table 4.4a shows the discounted value of excess profits in sector 4 
per unit of research cost for the case when expenditure on different types of widgets 
remains constant. The lower part of the table is derived under the assumption that the 
producer of widget 4 has managed to obtain patent rights not only for widget 4 but 
also for widget 3. In this case we assume that patents have expired for the first two 
widgets. The table reveals that for given levels of patent duration, elasticity of 
substitution and market size, the producers’ net benefit derived from patent protection 
increases as the firm obtains patent rights for close substitutes (widget 3). On the other 
hand Table 4.4b shows the figures for the present value of the welfare loss. The lower 
part of the table is derived again under the assumption that the producer of widget 4 
has managed to obtain patent rights not only for widget 4 but also for widget 3. The 
table shows that for given levels of patent duration, elasticity of substitution and 
market size, the present value of the welfare loss in sector 4 decreases as the firm 
obtains patent rights for close substitutes.
Actually in these cases, product would not be innovated under patent protection.
1 1 2
Table 4.3a: Effects o f  Changes in Duration o f  Patents, Elasticity o f  Substitution 
and Market Size on discounted value o f  profits per unit o f  research 
cost in sector 4
C a s e  1: E x p e n d i tu r e  on all  ty p e s  o f  w id g e t s  a m o u n ts  to  100 0
D u r a t io n
5
10
15
20
25
E la st ic i ty  o f  S u b s t itu t io n
2 4 6 8 10
0 ,5 7 9 0,261 0 ,1 6 9 0 ,1 2 4 0 ,0 9 9
1,032 0 ,4 6 6 0,301 0 ,2 2 2 0 ,1 7 6
1,387 0 ,6 2 6 0 ,4 0 4 0 ,2 9 8 0 ,2 3 6
1,665 0,751 0 ,485 0 ,3 5 8 0 ,2 8 4
1,883 0 ,8 5 0 0 ,5 4 9 0 ,405 0,321
C a s e  2: E x p e n d i tu r e  on all  ty p e s  o f  w id g e t s  a m o u n ts  to 2 0 0 0
5 1,157 0 ,5 2 2 0 ,3 3 7 0 ,2 4 9 0 ,1 9 7
10 2 ,0 6 4 0,931 0,601 0 ,4 4 4 0 ,3 5 2
15 2 ,7 7 4 1,252 0 ,808 0 ,5 9 7 0 ,4 7 3
20 3,331 1,503 0 ,9 7 0 0 ,7 1 6 0 ,5 6 8
25 3 ,7 6 7 1,699 1,097 0 ,8 1 0 0 ,6 4 2
C a s e  3: E x p e n d i tu r e  on all  ty p e s  o f  w id g e t s  a m o u n ts  to 3 0 0 0
5 1,736 0 ,783 0 ,5 0 6 0 ,373 0 ,2 9 6
10 3 ,0 9 6 1,397 0 ,9 0 2 0 ,6 6 6 0 ,5 2 8
15 4,161 1,877 1,212 0 ,8 9 5 0 ,7 0 9
20 4 ,9 9 6 2 ,2 5 4 1,455 1,074 0 ,8 5 2
25 5 ,6 5 0 2 ,5 4 9 1,646 1,215 0 ,9 6 3
'fable  4.3b: Effects o f  Changes in Duration o f  Patents, Elasticity o f  Substitution
and Market S ize  on the Present V alue o f  Welfare; L oss in sector 4
C a s e  1: E x p e n d i tu r e  on all  ty p e s  o f  w id g e ts  a m o u n ts  to 1000
5 4 8 0 ,2 7 138,22 79 ,23 55 ,3 4 4 2 ,4 7
10 8 5 6 ,5 7 2 4 6 ,5 2 141,30 9 8 ,7 0 75 ,7 5
15 1151 ,42 3 3 1 ,3 8 189,94 132,67 101,83
20 1382 ,44 3 9 7 ,8 7 228 ,0 5 159 ,29 122 ,26
25 1563,45 4 4 9 ,9 6 257,91 180,14 138 ,26
C a s e  2: E x p e n d i tu r e  on all  ty p e s  o f  w id g e t s  a m o u n ts  to  2 0 0 0
5 9 6 0 ,5 4 27 6 ,4 5 158,45 110,68 8 4 ,9 4
10 1713,15 4 9 3 ,0 5 282,61 197,39 151,50
15 2 3 0 2 ,8 4 6 6 2 ,7 6 3 7 9 ,8 8 2 6 5 ,3 4 2 0 3 ,6 5
20 2 7 6 4 ,8 7 7 9 5 ,7 4 4 5 6 ,1 0 3 1 8 ,5 8 244,51
25 3 1 2 6 ,8 9 899 ,93 515 ,8 2 3 6 0 ,2 9 2 7 6 ,5 3
C a s e  3: E x p e n d i tu r e  on all  ty p e s  o f  w id g e t s  a m o u n ts  to  3 0 0 0
5 1440,81 4 1 4 ,6 7 2 3 7 ,6 8 166,01 127 ,42
10 2 5 6 9 ,7 2 7 3 9 ,5 7 423,91 2 9 6 ,0 9 2 2 7 ,2 5
15 3 4 5 4 ,2 6 9 9 4 ,1 4 569 ,83 398 ,01 3 0 5 ,4 8
20 4147 ,31 1193,61 6 8 4 ,1 6 4 7 7 ,8 6 3 6 6 ,7 7
25 4 6 9 0 ,3 4 1349 ,89 7 7 3 ,7 4 540 ,43 4 1 4 ,7 9
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Table 4.4a: Effects of Increasing Patent Rights to Close Substitutes on the 
discounted value of profits per unit of research cost in sector 4 
when expenditure on different types of widgets amount to 2000
Case: Patent granted to sector 4 only
__________ Elasticity of Substitution
Duration 10
5 1,157 0,522 0,337 0,249 0,197
10 2,064 0,931 0,601 0,444 0,352
15 2,774 1,252 0,808 0,597 0,473
20 3,331 1,503 0,970 0,716 0,568
25 3,767 1,699 1,097 0,810 0,642
Case: Patents granted to sectors 3 and 4
5 1,259 0,619 0,408 0,304 0,243
10 2,245 1,103 0,728 0,543 0,433
15 3,018 1,483 0,979 0,730 0,582
20 3,623 1,781 1,175 0,876 0,699
25 4,098 2,014 1,329 0,991 0,790
d'able 4.4b: Effects of Increasing Patent Rights to Close Substitutes on the
present value of welfare loss in sector 4 when expenditure on
different types of widgets amount to 2000
Case: Patent granted to sector 4 only
Elasticity of Substitution
Duration 2 4 6 8 10
5 960,54 276,45 158,45 110,68 84,94
10 1713,15 493,05 282,61 197,39 151,50
15 2302,84 662,76 379,88 265,34 203,65
20 2764,87 795,74 456,10 318,58 244,51
25 3126,89 899,93 515,82 360,29 276,53
Case: Patents granted to sectors 3 and 4
5 969,160 263,170 147,050 101,290 77,070
10 1728,510 469,380 262,270 180,660 137,460
15 2323,490 630,940 352,550 242,850 184,770
20 2789,670 757,540 423,280 291,570 221,850
25 3154,940 856,720 478,700 329,750 250,890
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Figure 4.2. Ratio of Monopoly profit to R&D cost (Expenditure on all types of 
widgets amounts to 1000)
Ratio
Elasticity
Figure 4.3. Welfare Loss in Sector 4 (Expenditure on all types of widgets amounts to 
1000)
2000,00
1750,00
1500,00
1250,00
Welfare
Loss 1000,00
750,00
500,00
250,00
0,00 Patent Length
Elasticity
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4.2. General Equilibrium
4.2.1 Theoretical Analysis
Following Krugman (1979), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Horstmann and 
Markusen (1986) we consider the two goods and one factor model of general 
equilibrium. We suppose that commodity 1 is produced competitively according to 
the production function Qi = L| / li, where Li denotes labor employed in sector 1, Q| 
output of sector 1 and li the constant labor-output ratio in the same sector. The second 
industry produces the composite good called widgets. We assume that firms in the 
second industry incur initially some large fixed R&D cost for innovating the product, 
but thereafter can produce the product at constant marginal cost. The labor used in 
producing widget i of sector 2 by firm i in the industry is assumed to be a linear 
function of output, i.e. it equals Zj, = 02, during the initial time period when
the product is innovated, and Zj, = c,. 22, thereafter.
We assume that community preferences can be represented by the utility function 
M = [ « where 9 = \l{\-/3) denotes the elasticity of substitution 
between commodity 1 and composite good X2. The composite good widgets is 
assumed to be as before a CES function of the different types of widgets X2i
n
(i=l,..,n): X^=['Y^ai ■ We denote by r  = l /( l- /? )  the elasticity of
/=1
n
substitution between different types of widgets and by k -  [ Z « > r ' I h e
/=1
aggregate price of widgets. Choosing the first commodity as the numeraire we obtain 
the demand for the aggregate commodities Xi and X2 as
W,=
(1 +
(¿/a) ( \ K \ - P ) )
and W, =
7 t
(/^ /(1-/0) ^(1+ {bUi) I/(!-/!)-
(4.4)
where Y = X| + 71X2 denotes total income in the economy. Under perfect competition 
in sector 1 the price equation reduces to w h = pi where w denotes the wage rate and 
P i the price of commodity 1. We choose the first commodity as the numeraire. Hence 
we get w =  1/1] indicating that wage rate equals the marginal product of labour in
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sector 1. The cost of producing commodity 2i by firm i (i=l,...,n) can now be
R c.
specified as C = = — + — during the initial time period when the product is
/] /j
C-
innovated, and as C' = = — Qn thereafter.
A
We assume that all firms are alike so that Rj = R and Cj = c for all i (i=l,..,n). Given 
the total labor supply L in the economy and the number of widgets n, the equation of 
the production possibility frontier of the economy for the period under consideration 
is written as Qi = (L / li) -  (c / 1|) [ Q21 + .. + Q211] as long as all of the n widgets have 
been innovated in the previous periods. In the case the (n-1) widgets were innovated 
in the previous periods and the n-th widget were to be innovated during the time 
period under consideration, the equation of the production possibility frontier of the 
economy becomes: Qi = (L / h) -  (R / h) -  (c / h) [Q21 + .. + Q211] ·
Denoting total expenditure on widgets by Z = 7t X2 we obtain the demand functions 
for the 11 widgets as
X  =
Pij
n r - l Z (i=l,..,n) (4.5)
The above system of equations can be solved for the equilibrium values of prices and 
quantities once we specify the policy regimes. Following the approaches of Deardorff 
(1992) and Panagariya (1999) we consider as before three policy regimes: (i) an R&D 
subsidy that covers the cost of innovation but permits no patent protection, (ii) patent 
protection over T years during which time monopoly rights are granted to fmns 
producing the widgets and (iii) no protection at all.
Under the first policy regime the widget once invented can be produced at the 
constant marginal cost (c / h). The equilibrium price under perfect competition will 
equal its marginal cost. When determining equilibrium in the model we scale the 
quantities so that perfectly competitive prices of all widgets under R&D subsidy are 
all unity. As a result the aggregate price of widgets n is also unity. Under full 
employment of labor, income Y in the economy equals the labor supply L. Given Y 
we determine the demands for X| and X2 from (4.4) and hence Z = tt X2 Given Z the
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demand for the various types of widgets is determined from (4.5). The solution under 
R&D subsidy is then obtained by setting the outputs of widgets Q2i equal to demand 
for widget Xa, (i=l,..,n).
On the other hand the equilibrium with patents is characterized as follows. We assume 
that patents for all of the (n-1) widgets have been granted during the previous periods 
and that these patents have expired so that the prices of these (n-1) widgets under 
competition equal their marginal costs. The market for the n-th widget is characterized 
by monopoly over the duration of patent life. Compared to the case under R&D 
subsidy, the innovator of the n-th widget will produce fewer widgets and charge 
higher price. Maximization of profits yields the optimality condition that marginal
revenue equals the marginal cost /?„(!— i-) = (c//,) where
n
\^oi] p) ' denotes the elasticity of demand for the n-th
/=1
widget with respect to the n-th widget price pn. When determining the equilibrium in 
the model we again scale the quantities so that marginal costs of the n widgets are all 
unity. Income Y in the economy is defined as Y = Qi + p2i Q21 + .. + P2n Q211 ·
Given Y, we determine the aggregate price of widgets as 71 -  [ T  C C - p ]  ’’ ]- r  - i l / d - r )
1 = 1
demands for X] and X2 from (4.4) and hence the value of expenditures on X2 as Z = tt 
X2. Given Z the demand for the various types of widgets is determined from (4.5). 
The solution under patent is then obtained by setting the outputs of widgets Q2i equal 
to demand for widget X2i (i=l,..,n) and by imposing the condition that marginal 
revenue equals the marginal cost in the sector for the n-th widget, i.e.
p A \ - - )  = {clh).
Given the equilibrium price of the n-th widget and its marginal cost (c/ h), excess 
profits per unit of output is defined as (pn - (c/ h)) and excess profits during period t is 
given as Tint = (pn - (c/ h)) * Q2nt· Given the rate of interest r, which we assume to stay 
constant over time, the present value of excess profits over the duration of the patent
118
is detemiined by the relation V ---- ^  . We assume that at the end of patent
t ; ( i + o
duration the price of the commodity will fall down to its marginal cost so that there 
will be no excess profits after T years.
4.2.2 Welfare Analysis
To assess the welfare costs of patents we introduce the concept of a hypothetical level
of expenditures  ^ defined as the level of expenditures that households would
require if, at the prices prevailing under R&D subsidy, the households are to enjoy the 
same level of welfare as they would under patent protection. Letting and 
be the price vector of widgets under R&D subsidy and patent protection respectively, 
measured in terms of the first commodity, and and the level of income
under R&D subsidy and patent protection, we have u Y’’"'"’" ) =
Ypalent^
Figure 4.4 Welfare Analysis (Equivalent Variation)
The welfare loss due to patents at any moment of time can now be evaluated by the
welfare loss defined by Welfare Loss = Y*^ ""’p - y/""™'
119
Next, we determine the discounted value of welfare loss over the patent life under the 
assumption that at the end of patent duration the price of the commodity will fall 
down to the marginal cost so that there will be no more welfare loss after T years.
Finally we again note that the product will not be innovated^^ at all as long as the 
government neither subsidizes innovation, nor grant a patent. The message given by 
consideration of this case is rather clear. As long as innovations are costly no one will 
engage in innovation unless the costs of innovation can be recovered.
4.2.3 Numerical Analysis
111 calibrating the model we scale the quantities so that perfectly competitive prices 
under R&D subsidy are all unity in the benchmark. This includes the aggregate price 
71 of widgets. Using the demand functions (4.5), the CES weight for each type of 
widget is determined as follows
<X: =
X:
(i=lv,n)
Table 4.5 presents the spreadsheet implementation of the general equilibrium model 
with four types of widgets. We assume that the product life of the widget is at least as 
long as the duration of the patent. Given the values of the parameters we detennine 
equilibrium under patent using the SOLVER facility of Microsoft Excel Program. The 
case of “patent protection” is shown on the right hand side and the case when 
government subsidizes the R&D is given on the left hand side of the Table 4.5.
We consider four types of widgets. We consider five different values for the duration 
of patent (T=5, T-10, T=15, T=20 and T=25 years) and five different values for the 
elasticity of substitution (x-2, x=4, x=6, x=8, x=10). The demand structure for 
aggregate commodities X| and X2 is given by the parameters (a=0.875, b=0.125, p= 
(1/3)). In each case we determine the discounted value of excess profits in the n-th 
widget sector over the patent life. Similar considerations apply for detennination of
In this case, there is no innovation, production or consumption o f widgets. This means net welfare 
gain is zero from innovation.
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the welfare cost. Finally, we assume that the interest rate stays constant at 5 percent 
over the period.
The figures in Table 4.6a need some clarification. The figures in the table have been 
obtained by dividing the discounted value of excess profits by the cost of innovation, 
which we assume to amount to 200. Thus values below unity in Table 4.6a indicate 
situations where the discounted value of excess profit stream in sector 24 over the 
duration of the patent is less than the cost of the innovation. As a result the product in 
those cases wilt not be innovated under the patent system. Producers will apply for 
patent protection only in those cases where the values in Table 4.6a equal to or exceed 
unity.
In the table we assume in the first two cases that demand pattern for the consumption 
of widgets remains unchanged. In particular we assume in cases 1 and 2 that the four 
widgets are consumed in the proportions (10, 20, 60, 10) indicating that the share of 
e.g. the third widget in total expenditure on widgets in the benchmark is 60 percent. 
On the other hand in the case 3 of Table 4.6 we assume that the widget demand 
pattern changes. In particular we assume that demand for fourth widget decreases^^. 
Inspired by the approach of Diwan and Rodrik'^ '* (1991) we assume that the 
proportions become (20, 60, 18, 2) indicating that the share of e.g. the fourth widget 
in total expenditure on widgets has decreased from 10 to 2 percent. A close 
consideration of the figures in Table 4.6a reveals the following aspects;
• For any given level of patent duration, market size, and demand pattern, 
producers’ net benefit derived from patent protection decreases with increases 
in the value of the elasticity of substitution. The patent system is sensitive to 
changes in value of the elasticity of substitution t. Producers will be reluctant 
to innovate the product for relatively larger values of the elasticity of 
substitution T.
This case may arise due to existence o f absorption lag o f new technology by the society.
In fact, Diwan and Rodrik clearly proposed that there may be differences between the needs or 
tastes o f the North and the South. According to them, the South may need drugs for tropical diseases, 
whereas the North may need drugs for cancer. In this study, their idea about the demand differences is 
evaluated within our model setting.
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• For any given level of the elastieity of substitution, market size and demand 
pattern, producers’ net benefit increases with increases in the duration of the 
patent T. The patent system is sensitive to changes in the duration of patents T. 
Producers reluctant to innovate the product will be induced to innovate the 
product and apply for protection with increases in the duration of patents.
• For any given level of the elasticity of substitution x, duration of patent T and 
pattern of demand, producers’ net benefit increases with increases in the 
market size. The patent system is sensitive to changes in the market size. 
Producers reluctant to innovate the product will be induced to innovate the 
product and apply for protection with increases in the market size.
• For any given level of the elasticity of substitution x, duration of patent T, and 
market size, producers’ net benefit decreases with decreases in the demand for 
the product under consideration. The patent system is sensitive to changes in 
the demand pattern. Producers reluctant to innovate the product will be 
induced to innovate the product and apply for protection with increases in the 
demand for the product.
Consider the case when income under R&D subsidy equals 20000, elasticity of 
substitution is 6, patent length is 15 years and demand pattern is (10, 20, 60, 10). In 
this case the producer will not innovate the product. The producer will innovate the 
product when either the market size increases to 60000 or when elasticity of 
substitution decreases to 2. In this case an increase in patent length even to 25 years 
will not affect the decisions of producers and the product will still not be innovated. 
The decision not to innovate will not change with a decrease in the demand for the 
product.
Table 4.6b showing the present value of the welfare loss reveals the following aspects
• For any given level of patent duration T, market size and pattern of demand, 
present value of the welfare loss derived from patent protection increases with 
decreases in the value of the elasticity of substitution x. The welfare loss is 
sensitive to changes in value of the elasticity of substitution x.
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• For any given level of the elasticity of substitution x, market size and pattern 
of demand, present value of the welfare loss increases with increases in the 
duration of the patent T. The welfare loss is sensitive to changes in the 
duration of patents T.
• For any given level of the elasticity of substitution x, duration of patent T and 
pattern of demand, present value of the welfare loss increases with increases in 
the market size. The welfare loss is sensitive to changes in the market size.
• For any given level of the elasticity of substitution x, duration of patent T, and 
market size, present value of welfare loss decreases with decreases in the 
demand for the product under consideration. The welfare loss is sensitive to 
changes in the demand pattern.
The figures in Table 4.6 also indicate the tradeoff between the benefits associated 
with innovation and the costs of patent monopoly power. The table reveals that the 
welfare cost of patents is substantial in all cases where the present value of excess 
profits exceeds the cost of innovation. Cases where the welfare cost of patents are 
relatively low refer to cases where the present value of excess profits falls short of the 
cost of innovation.
4.3. North-South Model
Consider the world as divided into two regions. North and South. Both regions are 
assumed to face the same cost of innovation R = 200, the same marginal cost of 
production (c/li), and similar demand structures (a=0.875, b=0.125, 0=1.5)) for 
aggregate commodities X] and X2. We suppose that governments in the two regions 
do not subsidize the R&D expenditures, and assume that each region is free to choose 
what it considers to be the optimal intellectual property rights regime for itself The 
main difference between the two regions lies in the size of their labor forces. Total 
labor supply equals 60000 in the North and 20000 in the South.
One could assume that the North has comparative advantage in innovations by requiring that the 
cost o f innovation in the North R" is smaller than the cost o f innovation in the South R^ or that the 
marginal cost o f production in the North c" is smaller than the marginal cost o f production in the South 
c^ In the text, none o f these assumptions are introduced.
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A 1 B 1 c  1 D
1
2
T a b i c  4 .5 :  E lT c c fs  o f  P a t e n t s
3 P a r a m e t e r s P n r n m c i c r s
4 L a b o r  C o e f f i c i e n t  in  S e c to r  1 ( l _ l ) s 1 ,0 0 B e n c h m a r k  T o ta l  S a l e s  in  S e c to r  2  ( X _ 2 ) 1 0 0
5 L a b o r  C o e f T ic ie n t  in  S e c to r  21 ( c _ l ) 1 ,0 0 B e n c h m a r k  S a le s  o f  X 2 1  ( B X _ 2 1 ) 10
6 L a b o r  C o e f f i c i e n t  in  S e c to r  2 2  ( c _ 2 ) 1 ,0 0 B e n c h m a r k  S a le s  o f  X 2 2  ( B X _ 2 2 ) 2 0
7 L a b o r  C o e f f i c i e n t  in  S e c to r  2 3  ( c _ 3 ) 1 ,0 0 B e n c h m a r k  S a le s  o f  X 2 3  ( B X _ 2 3 ) 6 0
8 L a b o r  C o e f f i c i e n t  in  S e c to r  2 4  ( c _ 4 ) 1 ,0 0 B e n c h m a r k  S a l e s  o f  X 2 4  ( B X _ 2 4 ) 10
9 F ix e d  R & D  C o s t  ( R D ) 2 0 0 ,0 0 T o ta l  L a b o r  S u p p ly  (L ) 6 0 0 0 0
10 C o e f f i c i e n t  o f  C E S  U t i l i t y  F u n c t io n  f o r  S e c to r  1 ( a ) 0 ,8 7 5 I n te r e s t  R a te  ( i ) 0 ,0 5
11 C o e f f i c i e n t  o f  C E S  U t i l i t y  F u n c t io n  f o r  S e c to r  2  ( b ) 0 ,1 2 5
12 E la s t i c i t y  o f  S u b s ,  in  th e  C E S  U t i l i t y  ( s C E S )  0 1,5 C a l i b r n t i o n
13 E la s t i c i t y  o f  S u b s .  P a r a m e te r  o f  t h e  U t i l i t y  ( p C E S )  p 0 ,3 3 3 3 S h a r e  P a r a m e te r  o f  X 2 1 ( a _ 2 1) 0 ,3 1 6 2
14 E la s t i c i t y  o f  S u b s ,  in  th e  C E S  S u b - U t i l i t y  ( s S u b )  t 2 S h a r e  P a r a m e te r  o f  X 2 2  ( a _ 2 2 ) 0 ,4 4 7 2
15 E la s t i c i t y  o f  S u b s .  P a r a m e te r  o f  t h e  S u b - U t i l i t y  ( p S u b )  p 0 ,5 0 0 0 S h a r e  P a r a m e te r  o f  X 2 3  ( a _ 2 3 ) 0 ,7 7 4 6
16 N u m b e r  o f  F i r m s  in  S e c to r  2  ( n ) 4 S h a r e  P a r a m e te r  o f  X 2 4  (a  2 4 ) 0 ,3 1 6 2
17
R & D  S u b s i d y P a t e n t  P r o t e c t i o n
18 Q 2 1  ( 0  2 I . P P Q  .2 1 ) 3 0 7 ,3 7 2 9 6 8 3 1 6 ,4 2 6 3 7 1
19 Q 2 2  ( Q . .2 2 .  P P Q _ 2 2 ) 6 1 4 ,7 4 5 9 3 6 6 3 2 ,8 5 2 7 4 3
20 Q 2 3  ( Q _ 2 3 ,  P P Q _ 2 3 ) 1 8 4 4 ,2 3 7 8 0 8 1 8 9 8 ,5 5 8 2 2 8
21 Q 2 4  ( Q . .2 4 ,  P P Q _ 2 4 ) 3 0 7 ,3 7 2 9 6 8 7 4 ,7 7 6 1 1 3
22 Q l  ( Q _ I . P P Q _ I ) 5 6 9 2 6 ,2 7 5 7 0 7 7 ,3 9
23 M a r g in a l  C o s t  o f  Q 2 I  ( M C 2 1 ,  P P M C l ) 1 1
24 M a r g in a l  C o s t  o f  Q 2 2  ( M C 2 2 ,  P P M C 2 ) 1 1
25 M a r g in a l  C o s t  o f  Q 2 3  ( M C 2 3 ,  P P M C 3 ) 1 1
26 M a r g in a l  C o s t  o f  Q 2 4  ( M C 2 4 ,  P P M C 4 ) 1 1
27 P r ic e  o f  Q 2 I  ( P . 2 I ,  P P _ 2 I ) 1 1
28 P r ic e  o f  Q 2 2  ( P _ 2 2 ,  P P ...2 2 ) 1 1
29 P r ic e  o f  Q 2 3  ( P _ 2 3 ,  P P _ 2 3 ) 1 1
30 P r ic e  o f  Q 2 4  ( P _ 2 4 .  P P _ 2 4 ) 1 2 ,0 5 4 1
31 C o m p o s i t e  G o o d  P r ic e  (P q ,  P P q ) 1 ,0 0 0 0 1 ,0541
32 T h e  T e r m  A  ( T A . P H 'A ) 1 ,0 0 0 0 0 ,9 4 8 7
33 Y . P P Y 6 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 7 8 ,8 2
¿4 D e m a n d  f o r  X I  ( D  I . P P D l ) 5 6 9 2 6 ,2 7 5 7 0 7 7 ,0 7
3Ö D e m a n d  f o r  X 2  ( D  2 , P P D 2 ) 3 0 7 3 ,7 3 2 8 4 7 ,7 1
36 T o ta l  E x p e n d i tu r e  (Z , P P Z ) 6 0 0 0 0 ,0 0 6 0 0 7 8 ,8 2
37 S h a r e  o f  X 2  in  T o ta l  I n c o m e  ( S X 2 ) 5 ,1 2 4 ,7 4
38 V a lu e  o f  E x p e n d i tu r e  o n  X 2  ( Z _ 2 ) 3 0 7 3 ,7 2 9 7 3 0 0 1 ,7 5
39 D e m a n d  f o r  X 2 1  ( D _ 2 1 ,P D 2 1 ) 3 0 7 ,3 7 3 0 3 1 6 ,4 1 2 7
40 D e m a n d  f o r  X 2 2  ( D _ 2 2 ,  P D 2 2 ) 6 1 4 ,7 4 5 9 6 3 2 ,8 2 5 5
41 D e m a n d  f o r  X 2 3  ( D _ 2 3 ,  P D 2 3 ) 1 8 4 4 ,2 3 7 8 1 8 9 8 ,4 7 6 4
42 D e m a n d  f o r  X 2 4  ( D _ 2 4 ,  P D 2 4 ) 3 0 7 ,3 7 3 0 7 4 ,9 9 1 8
43 P r ic e  E l a s t i c i t y  in  S e c to r  21 ( s p l ,  P P s p l ) 1 ,9 0 0 0 1 ,8 9 4 6
44 P r ic e  E la s t i c i t y  in  S e c to r  2 2  ( s p 2 ,  P P s p 2 ) 1 ,8 0 0 0 1 ,7 8 9 2
4б P r ic e  E la s t i c i t y  in  S e c to r  23  ( s p 3 ,  P P s p 3 ) 1 ,4 0 0 0 1 ,3 6 7 5
46 P r ic e  E la s t i c i t y  in  S e c to r  2 4  ( s p 4 ,  P P s p 4 ) 1 ,9 0 0 0 1 ,9 4 8 7
47 M C  - M R  in  S e c to r  21 ( M C _ M R 2 I ,  P M C _ M R 2 I ) 0 ,5 2 6 3 0 ,5 2 7 8
48 M C  - M R  in  S e c to r  2 2  ( M C _ M R 2 2 ,  P M C _ M R 2 2 ) 0 ,5 5 5 6 0 ,5 5 8 9
49 M C  - M R  in  S e c to r  23  ( M C  M R 2 3 ,  P M C _ M R 2 3 ) 0 ,7 1 4 3 0 ,7 3 1 2
50 M C  - M R  in  S e c to r  2 4  (M C  M R 2 4 ,  P M C _ M R 2 4 ) 0 ,5 2 6 3 0 ,0 0 0 0
51 S u b - u t i l i t y  ( s U ,  P P s U ) 3 0 7 3 ,7 3 2 8 4 7 ,7 1
52 U t i l i t y  (U .  P P U ) 4 4 6 5 3 ,1 9 4 4 5 9 2 ,8 3
53 E S _ 2 1 ,  P E S _ 2 I 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 ,0 1 3 6
54 E S _ 2 2 ,  P E S _ 2 2 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 ,0 2 7 3
55 E S _ 2 3 .  P E S _ 2 3 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 ,0 8 1 8
56 E S _ 2 4 ,  P E S _ 2 4 0 ,0 0 0 0 - 0 ,2 1 5 7
Ö7 P l i c e  - M C  in  S e c to r  21 ( P _ M C 2 1 ,  P P _ M C 2 1 ) 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0
Ö8 P r i c e  - M C  in  S e c to r  2 2  (P .  M C 2 2 ,  P P _ M C 2 2 ) 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0
"59 " P r ic e  - M C  in  S e c to r  2 3  (P  M C 2 3 ,  P P _ M C 2 3 ) 0 ,0 0 0 0 0 ,0 0 0 0
60 P r ic e  - M C  in  S e c to r  2 4  ( P _ M C 2 4 ,  P P _ M C 2 4 ) 0 ,0 0 0 0 1 ,0541
61 In co m e '* ' 5 9 9 1 8 ,9 1
62 E x p e n d itu re ·*  o n  X I - 5 6 8 4 9 ,3 3
63 E x p e n d i tu r e " ' o n  X 2 ■ 3 0 6 9 ,5 8
64 D e m a n d  f o r  X 2 I" · 3 0 6 ,9 6
65 D e m a n d  f o r  X 22"· - 6 1 3 ,9 2
66 D e m a n d  f o r  X 23"· 1 8 4 1 ,7 5
“FT D e m a n d  f o r  X 2 4 ’* 3 0 6 ,9 6
б 6 S u b - u t i l i ty " · 3 0 6 9 ,5 8
69 U t i l i t y  D i f f e r e n c e 0,OO O O E+O 0
7о W e lf a r e  L o s s - 8 1 ,0 9 3 4
71 E x c c .s s  P r o f i t  i l l  S i i b - s c c t o r  2 4 7 9 ,0 4 8 3 2 7 0 8
І 2 W c i f n i  c  L o s s  ( W L ) 8 1 ,0 9 3 4
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74 P r e s e n t  Ѵ л іі іс  o f  E x c e s s  M o n o p o l y  P r o f i t s  n m l  W e i f n r e  L o s s
75
P a t e n t  D n r n t i o n  ( i n  y e n r s ) P V  o f  E x c e s s  P r o f i t  in  S e c t o r  4 P V  o f  W e I f n r e  L o s s
Т Г 5 3 4 2 ,2 4 3 5 1 ,0 9
~ Т Г 10 6 1 0 ,3 9 6 2 6 ,1 8
78 15 8 2 0 ,4 9 8 4 1 ,7 2
"7 9 “ 2 0 9 8 5 ,1 2 1 .0 1 0 ,6 0
- W 2 5 1 .1 1 4 ,1 0 1 .1 4 2 ,9 3
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Table 6a: Effects o f  Changes in Duration o f  Patents, Elasticity o f
Substitution and Market Size on discounted value o f  profits per unit
o f  research cost in sector 4_______________________________________
E lasticity  o f  S u bstitu tion
D u ration 2 4 6 8 10
C ase 1: So lu tion  for the N orth
5 1,711 0,739 0,472 0,347 0,274
10 3,052 1,317 0,841 0,618 0,489
15 4,102 1,771 1,131 0,831 0,657
20 4,925 2,126 1,358 0,998 0,789
25 5,570 2,405 1,536 1,128 0,892
C ase 2: S o lu tion  for  the South  w hen dem and pattern in the South  equals
th at o f  the N orth
5 0,570 0,246 0,157 0,116 0,091
10 1,017 0,439 0,280 0,206 0,163
15 1,367 0,590 0,377 0,277 0,219
20 1,642 0,709 0,453 0,333 0,263
25 1,857 0,802 0,512 0,376 0,297
C ase 3: S o lu tion  for the South w hen dem and pattern in the South  is lagged
on th at o f  the N orth
5 0,112 0,047 0,030 0,022 0,017
10 0,199 0,084 0,054 0,039 0,031
15 0,267 0,113 0,072 0,053 0,042
20 0,321 0,136 0,086 0,063 0,050
25 0,363 0,154 0,098 0,072 0,057
T able 6b: ElTects o f  Changes in Duration o f  Patents, Elasticity o f
Substitution and Market Size on welfare cost in sector 4
C ase 1: So lu tion  for the N orth
5 351,09 122,04 73,48 52,52 40,85
10 626,18 217,67 131,06 93,67 72,85
15 841,72 292,59 176,17 125,91 97,93
20 1010,61 351,29 211,52 151,17 117,58
25 1142,93 397,29 239,21 170,96 132,97
C ase 2: So lu tion  for the South w hen dem and pattern in the South  equals
th at o f  the N orth
5 117,03 40,68 24,49 17,51 13,62
10 208,73 72,56 43,69 31,22 24,28
15 280,57 97,53 58,72 41,97 32,64
20 336,87 117,1 70,51 50,39 39,19
25 380,98 132,43 79,74 56,99 44,32
C ase 3: So lu tion  for the South  w hen dem and pattern in the South  is lagged
on that o f  the N orth
5 22,40 7,81 4,71 3,37 2,62
10 39,50 13,93 8,40 6,01 4,68
15 53,70 18,73 11,30 8,08 6,29
20 64,48 22,49 13,56 9,70 7,55
25 72,92 25,43 15,34 10,97 8,54
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Suppose that the patent system is used in the North but not in the South. Assume that 
the four widgets as a share of total expenditure on widgets are consumed in the same 
proportions (10, 20, 60, 10) in the two regions. In this case Table 4.2a indicates that 
the North will innovate the product as long as for the combination of (x, T) the value 
in the table equals to or exceeds unity. The north will then consume the 4-th widget at 
the monopoly price p4 which exceeds its marginal cost. Since there is no patent 
protection in the south the commodity will not be innovated in the south. The south 
will either not consume the product at all or it will imitate the product produced 
(invented) in the north. Abstracting from the cost of imitation we note that under 
competition the 4-th widget will be sold in the South at its marginal cost. The 
situation described above will not change at all if we further assume that widgets in 
the South are demanded in the proportions (20, 60, 18, 2) whereas the North demands 
them in the proportions (10, 20, 60, 10).
The introduction of the patent system in the South does not necessarily lead to a better 
resource allocation. Suppose that the patent length in the North is 20 years. The 4-th 
widget will then be innovated in the North as long as the elasticity of substitution x is 
less than 8. On the other hand assume that the patent length introduced in the South is 
5 years. Then the product will not be innovated in the south for all possible values of 
the elasticity of substitution x under consideration and for the pattern of demand 
considered. The North will consume the 4-th widget at the monopoly price over the 20 
year patent length. The South could choose not consume the product at all or it could 
consume it over the 5 year period at the monopoly price detemiiiied for the South, 
which may be different from that detennined for the North. After the expiration of the 
patent in the South the 4-th widget could be sold in the South at its marginal cost.
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Table 4.7: Welfare Effects of the TRIPs Agreement
Elasticity of Substitution
2 4 6 8 10
NORTH
Annual Income Transfer from South to North 17,2 7,4 4,7 3,5 2,8
Income of the North before the Transfer 60079 ,0 60034,1 60021 ,8 6 0 016 ,0 6 0 012 ,7
Cain as a percent of Income 0 ,029 0 ,012 0,008 0,006 0,005
SOUTH
PV of Welfare Loss in the South 219,8 76,4 46 ,0 32,9 25,6
PV of Income Transfer from South to North 214,3 92,5 59,1 43 ,4 34,3
Present Value of Total Loss 434,1 168,9 105,1 76,3 59,9
Annuitized Value of Total Loss 34,8 13,6 8,4 6,1 4,8
Income of the South before the Transfer 20026,3 2001 1,4 20007 ,3 20005,3 20004 ,2
Annual Loss as a percent of Income 0,174 0,068 0 ,042 0,031 0 ,024
The introduction of the TRIPs Agreement, which extends patent life in the South 
from 5 to 20 years has according to Panagariya (1999) two main effects. First it 
extends the monopoly distortion in the south on all products innovated from 5 to 20 
years. The resulting inefficiency lowers the welfare of South. In addition, the 
extension of the patent transfers a part of Southern consumers’ income to Northern 
innovators through higher product prices. This redistribution further lowers the 
income in the South and raises that in the North. Secondly, the extension of the 
Northern stringent patent regime to the South will have beneficial effects on product 
innovation in the South. Table 4.7 shows that the welfare effect of the TRIPs 
Agreement changing the patent life from 5 to 20 years in the South depends on the 
elasticity of substitution x, and that it increases with decreases in the value of the 
elasticity of substitution x. The beneficial effects of the extension of the Northern 
patent regime to the South is obtained by considering the case when the South 
consumes the 4-th widget at monopoly price versus the case when the South does not 
consume*^ ’^ the commodity at all.
In this case, it is assumed that imitation is not possible or profitable.
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CHAPTER 5
TECHNOLOGICAL LAG AND PATENT LENGTH
The chapter five, considering the relationships between technological lag, patent 
duration and monopoly markups within a North-South framework, shows that for 
newly developed products the technological (demand) lag between North and South 
increases as the patent length is raised in South or reduced in North. Moreover, even 
when North and South agree upon the same tenns of protection, the reduction in the 
global patent length shortens the technology lag between the two regions.
The analysis of patent protection continues to be of a considerable interest to 
academicians as well as to policy makers. In a seminal paper Diwan and Rodrik 
(1991) analyse the welfare effect of the strength of patent protection within a North- 
South framework where the two regions have different needs and tastes. They show 
that due to the scarcity of R&D resources which are assumed to be owned entirely by 
the North, a reduction in patent protection by the South lowers incentives to conduct 
R&D, giving rise to the production of technologies demanded by the South. Taylor 
(1993) emphasizes that the reduction of Southern protection may induce the North to 
employ other barriers such as masking or copy-protecting in order to prevent 
imitation, and shows that such costly efforts can raise the monopoly markups and 
reduce Southern welfare. If Southern firms try to unpackage the technologies masked 
by their Northern rivals, the efforts on masking and the costs of packaging rise even 
further. Competition between imitators and inventors raises both imitation and 
production costs leading to a fall in aggregate world welfare. Under those
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circumstances the North and the South can both gain from an multilateral agreements 
on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs).
Besides the studies mentioned above which support the argument that it is to the 
benefit of both North and South to protect IPRs, Deardorff (1992) and Helpman 
(1993) maintain the opposite view. Deardorff (1992) shows that when the protection 
is extended from the country where innovation takes place to the country where the 
innovated product is only consumed, the welfare of the inventing country rises while 
the welfare of the other country may fall leading to a decrease in the world welfare. 
Thus, he proposed that at least the very poor countries should be exempted from 
protecting the innovations of rich countries.H elpm an (1993) examines patent 
protection within a dynamic general equilibrium framework, and shows that the South 
does not benefit from strong patent protection. He further points out that even the 
North may have some incentives to relax IPRs if the imitation rates in the South are 
sufficiently low.
In this chapter we consider a model of IPRs protection within a North-South 
framework. We focus on the impacts of the regional and global patent length upon the 
technological lag between North and South. We assume that all innovations take place 
in the North. The newly developed technologies are patented for certain time periods 
in both regions, and during the life of the patent the right to produce the patented 
technologies is warranted only to the Northern innovator. However, after the patents 
expire, these technologies are produced competitively in both regions. Owing to the 
regional differences in economic development and income levels, the distribution of 
consumers in the South over the technology space is assumed to be a scaled and 
lagged version of that in the North.
We show that optimal monopoly markup is higher in the North than in the South. 
However, markups in both regions are decreasing in the patent duration. For newly 
developed products the technological lag between North and South increases as the
9 7
This proposition o f Deardorff is indeed in accordance with Part VI o f the TRIPs Agreement, namely, 
'Transitional Arrangements' which entitles least developed countries to a ten-year delay from the 
^niplementation o f TRIPs Agreement. The delay can be extended upon request.
9 8 This assumption presupposes that the distribution o f consumers over the possible preference 
Illations is identical in both regions.
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patent length is raised in South or reduced in North. It is striking that, even if North 
and South agree upon the same terms of protection, the change in the global patent 
length affects the technology lag between two regions. In particular, a reduction in the 
common patent duration gives rise to a shortening of the demand lag between North 
and South.
The organization of the chapter is as follows: Section 5.1 introduces the model, which 
partially borrows from Diwan and Rodrik (1991). Section 5.2 derives the optimal 
monopoly markups and analyzes the effects of a change in the regional patent 
duration and the regional economic development level on optimal markups and 
technology lag by assuming constant but not necessarily equal patent lengths in both 
regions.
5.1 Model
Consider a North-South (N-S) framework in which all innovations take place in the 
North.‘^‘^ We assume that the potential technologies (products) are characterized by an 
infinite spectrum, indexed by ^ e (-co,+oo). The range of available products are
restricted to a continuous interval , where 9 ' < 9 ’’. We assume that the set
{ 9 \ 9 * ) represents the products which were discovered in the past and are presently 
competitively produced. On the other hand, [9 \9 ' '  ] is the set of products which are 
currently (at time i = 0) developed and ready to be marketed in both regions by a 
Northern innovator. The Northern firm is allowed to patent each newly developed
product in the set [9* ,9^'~\ for a time period of T, in the region i = N , S .
We allow no infringement for patents in world markets. We assume that the products 
whose patents expired are competitively produced both in the North and in the South. 
The cost of production incurred by the Northern firm is given by
C^(9)  = c^9,  for all 9 e [ 9 \ 9 " ] . ( 1)
99- This assumption, also used by Diwan and Rodrik (1991), Deardorff (1992) and Helpman (1993), is 
not too restrictive, since by assumption, the North has stronger R&D background than the South.
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The price />, (^) of the product 0 in the region i is denoted by p. (0).  Products in
the interval [0' ,0*),  where no patent is effective, are competitively produced and 
priced at the marginal cost level in each region i, whereas products in the interval 
[0* ,0^'} are priced monopolistically by the Northern firm, due to the effective patent 
protection in the region i. For all patented products let m, {0) be the markup charged 
by the Northern firm in the region i = N , S , that is m, (0) = /?, {0) -  for all 0 
in [ 0 \ 0 " ] .
Distribution of consumers in region i is represented by a continuous (almost 
everywhere) and single-peaked function /¡(0) ,  defined over the interval (-oo,+oo):
f i  (^ )  = + cTjT , . z ((9) -  a ^ e .  ) , (2)
where <7 ,^ ,^(t „^(7 ·,· >0 are positive constants and z{0) is an indicator function given by
[ 0 otherwise.
(3)
Here, I . denotes the consumers' total in co m e 'an d  e, denotes the level of economic 
development in region i. We assume that North is economically more developed than 
the South owing to historical, cultural and geographical conditions so that ■
Moreover, /  is such that / . "  (.) < 0 and " (.) < 0 for all i = N, S and
0 € (0' ,0' ' ) .
Distributions and f^iO)  niay be interpreted as the total demand for the
technology level 0 in the North and the South respectively. A given distribution 
function over the technology space denotes the optimal choices of consumers given 
their income levels, the product prices, the patent duration and the economic 
development level of the home region. We assume that (.) and (.) have single
peaks, which lie over the region (-oo, 0*. ) , i.e.
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0] > argmax^; / ,  (^) i -  N,S.
That is, the most preferred technologies in the North and South are not protected. 
Figure 5.1 plots the distributions of consumers in the North and the South. Note that
(.) and fg (.) are discontinuous at points 9* and 6'' where the product price is 
discontinuous.
Figure 5.1. Consumers' distributions in the North and the South
From equation (2), it follows that a difference in distributions of Northern and 
Southern consumers may arise due to regional differences in (i) the prices of 
products, (ii) the patent length, (iii) the economic development level and (iv) 
consumers' income. It is clear from (2) that /y  (6·) is a scaled (by y)  and lagged 
(nonuniformly by L{0))  version of (.):
f s { 0 ) - y f A O  + L{e)) (4)
where
Y = and (5)
It is implicitly assumed that consumers in both regions have homothetic preferences. Thus the 
Engel curves associated with consumers' demand are linear.
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= o·,,, irns (^) -  (^))^(^) + (y,· (Ts -  )z{6) -  cr^  (e, - e^ ) . (6)
The parameter y measures the relative market share of the South with respect to the 
North, and from (2), it equals the ratio of aggregate income of Southern consumers to 
that of Northern consumers. The variable L{0) denotes the technological lag between 
the South and the North for the technology level 0.
5.2 Technological lag, monopoly markup and patent duration
We assume that for each newly developed technology there exists a unique Northern 
patentee (inventor), who runs the patents for the whole period in both regions. Total 
profits of the Northern inventor is then given by'“'
T,
(7)
i = N  , S  l = \
where
(8)
for all i.
The problem of the Northern innovator is to choose markups, in each region, over the 
interval {0* ,6 '^ ] so as to maximize her profits.
Proposition 1. Optimal monopoly markup m] {0) in region i = N ,S  is given by:
m* (0) = - MO) (9)
Proof; Differentiating (8) with respect to m, , i = N , S , we obtain
For simplicity, it is assumed that the intertemporal rate o f substitution (discount rate) is zero. Since 
the patent duration is not a choice variable, the annual fee o f maintaining patents in both regions is 
normalized to zero.
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dnj (9) 
drUj {9) = f , (6 )*  m , ( 6 ) c r , f ; m .
which vanishes at the optimal markup m]. The second order condition
= T, ¡2(T„,/; {9) + a im  I { 9 ) f l  (^)] < 0
dm. {9)
is satisfied at w,. = in' since /¡'{.) < 0 for all i = N , S , and moreover /¡{.) < 0 due 
to the assumption that 9 ' > argmax,^ /,. (9). So, markups given by (9) maximize 
the monopoly profits. Q.E.D.
Corollary 1. Optimal monopoly markup in the region i =  N ,S  is (i) decreasing in 
9, (ii) decreasing in T,., and (Hi) increasing in c,. if 9" > argmax^ /,· (^) holds ex­
post.
Proof. To show that (i) holds, we differentiate (9) to obtain
dm' 1 d[f, .{9)/ f;(9)]
d9 d9
1
i f >y
1
<y,„ 1 + ^ ,·
where / / .  = [ ( / , ') '  -  / / / ,  ]/(/,· We note that H¡ > 0, by the assumption that 
f l {.)<{). Therefore mj (9) < 0, i.e. optimal monopoly markups are decreasing in 
the technology level.
To show (ii), we calculate
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dm] {6) 1 d [ f , { e ) i f : { e ) ]
dT: a·.., dT:
1
i f i y -
<^T + cr,„
dm] {6 )^
dT,> y
o·,. 1 + « ,
Hence (ii) also holds.
Finally to show that (iii) is satisfied, we differentiate (9) with respect to e. to obtain:
dm-{0) 1
de, de.
1
i f iV-
-  cr„ + a..
dm] {9)
de,
H
a... 1 + H,
^  > 0 .
So (iii) also holds, and thus Corollary 1 is satisfied.
Q.E.D.
Part (ii) of the Corollary 1 shows that an inverse relationship exists between the 
optimal markup level and patent duration. If the patent duration in a region is 
increased, consumers' distribution there shifts to the left. Then the demand for all 
patented technologies in that region decreases, giving rise to a fall in the optimal 
monopoly prices of the patented products.'02
The inverse relationship between the monopoly markups and the patent duration was also 
demonstrated by Gilbert and Shapiro (1990). They show that, when providing rewards to innovators, 
there is a tradeoff between patent length (duration) and breadth which they define as the flow rate o f  
profit.
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Last part of Corollary 1 implies that the monopoly markups in a region increases as 
the region achieves economic development. The distribution of consumers in a region 
shifts to the right as the region develops, bringing about an increase in the demand for 
the protected technologies, and hence an increase in the optimal monopoly markups.
Corollary 2. Optimal monopoly markups are higher in the North than in the South, 
i.e., m^f^  {0) > ml(0),  for all 6 e [9’' ,0 '^ ].
Proof. Directly follows from part (iii) of Corollary 1 along with that the North is 
economically more developed than the South, that is, e^ > e^ . Q.E.D.
It is optimal for the Northern monopoly to follow price discrimination in world 
markets. Since the demand for the high-tech products under protection is lower in the 
South than in the North, it is optimal to charge a relatively lower markup for the 
patented products in the South. Figure 5.2 plots the optimal monopoly markups in 
both regions.
Corollary 3. Profits of Northern monopolists obtained from the sales in region i is 
increasing in the wealth level e·, if 9* > arg max^ /,· {0) holds ex-post.
Proof. Differentiating (8) with respect to e,·, in the range (6>* ,0 ' ') ,  we obtain
de. de. ClC;
= ( / ,  (S) + m· -m ] ( e ) a j ; ( 0 ) ,
de:
= -m ]{ 0 )a j ; {9 )> O,  i ^ N , S
for all /, since f  {0) + m*(0)a„,fi(9) = O by (9), and f[{9)<Q when 
<9 > arg max ^  / ,  (6>). So, is increasing in e,., and therefore profits obtained from
region / is increasing in e ,.
Q.E.D.
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We see that given the optimal monopoly markups, the technological lag given by (6) 
is not uniform over the product space. The lag between the demands by Southern and 
Northern consumers is constant for all nondeveloped and nonprotected developed 
technologies and proportional to the regional difference in the economic development 
level. However, the lag for patented technologies depends on the level of technology 
as well, since markups and patent length which are two of the determinants of the lag 
are not constant over the patented technologies.
Proposition 2. Assume Then, the technological lag L{0^ is nondecreasing
in 6 almost everywhere.
Proof. Inserting {6) and m^ (0) into (6) and differentiating L{0) with respect 
to 6 we obtain
dL{9)
dO
du
otherwise
or
dLje)  ^ i[i + / / , ( ^ ) ] ' ‘ - [i + / f (6»)]“' if 0 G 
dO 0 otherwise
where
(/; f , i = N,S.
Total differentiation of the last equality gives
d --------1  ^  ^ t / '   ^ i c r j m ]  {G) +  a,.dT. -  cr,de^).
l + / / , ( ^ )
Inserting
137
dm] (6») = -  — H¡ {(T,„dm] {0) + cr.,.dT. -  a j e . ) 
cr„,
into the above equation and dividing by de^  we obtain
‘‘ [l I . 7 . ( 0 ]  + / ,■ ( / , ') V r  .Q
de: 2 ( / ; ) ’ - / , / ; F
since i/i7i ’ (^ ) / i/e,. > 0 by (iii) of Corollary 1 . Similarly,
d  ^ 1  ^ -  2 / , / ;  ( / ; t - + ( / ;  /," + / ,  ( / ;  dm, {o)  ^ ^
dT; n  + / / , ( ^ ) / / ,  dT,
since i/m * (^) / dT- > 0 by (ii) of Corollary 1. Note that
1 1
\ + H , ( 0 )  l + H , ( 0 )
> 0 ,
since eg <e^  and Tg So, L { 6 ) > 0  for almost all 9&{ 0 , 0' ] .
Q.E.D.
As it is clear from Figure 5.3, technological lag is lower in the interval of patented 
technologies than in the interval of technologies whose patents expired or which are 
not developed yet. Moreover, the lag in the range of patented products is increasing 
in the technology level. It is interesting also to analyze the relationship between the 
patent duration and technological lag.
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Figure 5.2. Optimal monopoly prices Figure 5.3. Technology lag
Propositions. Technological lag L{0) is nondecreasing in and nonincreasing in
T■' N  ■
Proof. Differentiating (6) with respect to and we obtain
dLiO) ^ \ - G j m l { e ) i d T ^  if ^ e [o' , e ' \
dT^ [o otherwise
dL(0) _ (0) / dT  ^ if 0 g [0 ' , 0 ’’ ]
STy [0 otherwise
Along similar lines to those in the proof of Proposition 2 one obtains 
dL{0) _ f -  cr., [1 + (0)]-' if 0G [0 ' ,0" ]
0 otherwise
and
dL{0) _ \<T.,[\ + H s { 0 ) Y  if 0 & [ 0 \ 0 ‘ 
dT  ^ 10 otherwise
where
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1 ( / ; r
T ,  i = N,S.
It follows that dL{0)l dT,  ^ <0 and dL{6)l dT  ^ > 0 , since [l + / / .  ((9)]"' >0 for all 
i. Q.E.D.
The following proposition shows that if the patent duration is the same in both 
regions, then an increase in the patent duration raises the technological lag between 
the South and the North over all protected products.
Proposition 4. Assume -  T . Then technologieal lag L{6) is
nondecreasing in T almost everywhere.
Proof. Differentiating (6) with respect to T we obtain
dLiO)
dT
dT
0
ml-(0) -  ml, (0)] i f ^ € [ ^ ' , ^ " ]
otherwise
Mimicking the proof of Proposition 2, one obtains
dL(0) ^  jC7, ([l + N ,  (0)]-' -  [l + //;, (0)]- ' ) if 6» € ]
dT 0 otherwise
where
1 i f i Y
\ + H,{0) - f j ,
i = N,S.
Then, it follows that [l + (<9)] ' -  [l + H { 0 ) \  ' > 0 for all (9 e [-  oo,oo],
since e^ > . Thus dL{0)! dT > 0. Q.E.D.
We note that optimal monopoly markups decrease in both regions with an increase in 
the global patent duration. Moreover, the induced fall in markups is higher in the 
North than in the South which leads to a decrease in the absolute value of the regional 
differences in markups and hence an increase in technology lag.
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In this chapter we presented a simple model for the examination of the effect of patent 
length on technological lag between two regions. Among various findings, we have 
shown that technological lag is nondecreasing in global patent duration. This positive 
relationship implies relatively low levels of patent length if the international 
agreements on protection take into account the convergence of the consumption 
patterns, and hence of the welfares (utilities derived from consumption), among 
different parts of the globe.
One might worry that most of the results of this study depend upon the assumption 
that the distributions of consumers are single-peaked and that the lowest protected 
technology level is higher than the most demanded technology level in both regions, 
i.e., the demand of consumers of any region is decreasing in the technology level for 
the protected region. This assumption, which may seem to be restrictive, is 
nevertheless not too far away from reality as there is a delay between the rate of 
innovating new technologies and the absorption (adoption) of these technologies by 
the society.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
After studying the public good nature of knowledge within the general equilibrium 
theory, the thesis compares the patent protection system with alternative knowledge 
generating fostering systems, discusses the pros and cons of patent protection system, 
emphasizes the importance of knowledge for economic growth, and investigates the 
evolution of patent system over time to its ultimate version, the U.S. patent law. The 
thesis also evaluates the international trade dimension of intellectual property concept. In 
this context, importance of trade in intellectual property intensive commodities, 
diversification of patent stringency across countries and mutual patent grants in 
international knowledge flows are investigated. The findings indicate that, there is an 
increasing trend in trade of intellectual property intensive commodities, especially among 
the industrialized countries. Furthermore, it is reported that there exist large differences 
among the stringency of patent protection between developed and developing countries. 
Finally, findings indicate the existence of increasing number of international patent 
grants. Another contribution of the thesis is the analysis of patent protection within partial 
equilibrium, general equilibrium and North -  South patent protection models. In all these 
models, three alternative policy choices are evaluated, namely government subsidy, 
patent protection and no protection case. The fourth contribution of the thesis is the 
construction of a North -  South patent protection model, which deals with the possible 
effects of patent duration on technological differences between these poles. The model 
shows that for newly developed products, the technological lag between the North and 
the South increases as the patent duration is raised in the South or reduced in the North. 
The model also yields several results about optimum monopoly pricing conditions in the 
North and the South.
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Chapter 2 investigates the importance of knowledge in both resource allocation and 
economic growth. As shown by Solow (1956, 1957), knowledge plays an important role 
in economic growth. Solow attributed 87.5 percent of the growth in the U.S. gross output 
per man-hour over 1909-49 period to technical change, hence knowledge. In line with 
Solow, Abramowitz (1956), Kendrick (1956) and Denison (1985) all emphasized the 
importance of knowledge. These studies revealed that knowledge is a critical factor in 
detemiining economic growth and that it must be generated and allocated efficiently in 
order to achieve positive per capita growth in the economy.
The Arrow-Debreu model of resource allocation shows that resources will be allocated 
efficiently in the economy, provided that the assumptions of convexity, universality of 
markets and absence of uncertainty are satisfied. These assumptions, together with the 
assumptions on private ownership, largeness, and the assumption that each economic unit 
has perfect knowledge on prices, preferences, production and consumption sets, assure 
the feasibility and also the efficiency of the competitive mechanism (Debreu (1959)). But 
the Arrow - Debreu model of general equilibrium abstracts from explicit consideration of 
knowledge and its generation. It assumes that knowledge is freely available to all 
economic units. However, knowledge today is no longer freely available. It is considered 
as one of the most critical factors in determining the competitiveness of firms and 
countries. Marketability of knowledge is also problematic, because of the non-rivalry and 
non-excludability characteristics of knowledge. These characteristics make knowledge a 
public good. Knowledge also violates the assumptions of convexity and absence of 
uncertainty. The chapter concludes that, competitive market system cannot achieve 
optimum allocation of resources including the production and dissemination of 
knowledge. Artificial alternative structures such as government financed R&D, academic 
institutions and patent systems have been developed. The chapter compares the 
advantages and disadvantages of each of these systems. The main problems are the 
emergence of monopoly power in the patent case and administrative difficulties, market 
distortions and moral hazard problems in the subsidy case. The chapter proposes that 
diversity in knowledge generation and allocation mechanisms enables good match with 
variety in characteristics, scales and contributions of innovative activities.
In addition to consideration of efficient allocation of resources including knowledge, the 
thesis investigates the roots of the relationship between scientific studies and industrial
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evolution. It is shown that these roots have a rather short history. Before the last part of 
the 19‘'’ century, there were almost no links between science and industrial technology. 
As emphasized by Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986), a close relationship between science 
and industrial technology started to form at the end of the 19‘'’ century. According to the 
authors, decentralization of the selection mechanism in innovation projects, existence of 
market forces to innovate, and the diversity and autonomy of research agencies, enabled 
U.S. to set up a fruitful link between science and industry.
As mentioned above, the main scope of this thesis is the patent system. In this 
framework, history of patent system is studied in order to shed light on the current patent 
system. As it is well known, legal systems, like the patent protection system, evolve 
incrementally through time. Analysis of the history of the patent system indicates that 
initially the scope of the patent system was much narrower than its present scope. The 
thesis also evaluates the U.S. patent law, which is considered as one of the most advanced 
patent regimes. Historical investigation of the patent system revealed that the system was 
constituted to induce the transfer of knowledge from developed countries to 
underdeveloped countries in the medieval times. Patent system was also used to keep 
inventions within inventor’s country. Clearly, patent system did not aim to provide any 
private incentive for inventors to innovate. On the other hand, modem patent law is 
designed to foster inventive activités and information revealation within new inventions 
by providing exclusive rights to inventors. In this sense, it can be concluded that the 
patent system has changed continuously over time in order to fit the current needs.
Chapter 3 introduces the international trade dimension of intellectual property rights, 
especially that of the patent protection. The chapter defines the concept of intellectual 
property and presents its importance in international transactions. The analysis indicates 
that there is an increasing trend in the trade of intellectual property intensive commodities 
in total world trade. It is shown that major part of this trade is materialized within 
industrialized countries. The chapter also provides an economic overview of the TRIPs 
Agreement. This overview points that TRIPs Agreement, which specifies minimum 
standards, can be considered as the most advanced and effective international agreement 
in this field. TRIPs sets not only the standards of intellectual property rights protection 
but also its enforcement. Before the TRIPs Agreement, none of the previous international 
treaties or agreements could introduce any enforcement mechanism. The agreement
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imposes two important WTO principles in intellectual property protection framework, 
namely the most favoured nation and the national treatment principles. The first principle 
requires that member countries carmot discriminate between other member countries. The 
second principle establishes that each member country shall treat the nationals of other 
member countries, no less favorable than its treatment to its own nationals with respect to 
the protection of intellectual property. The chapter surveys the literature on TRIPs and 
concludes that intellectual property rights protection should be in harmony with 
competition rules in the country in order to minimize the possible adverse welfare effects 
of the TRIPs Agreement.
The economics of patent protection is analyzed using first the partial equilibrium and 
thereafter the general equilibrium framework in Chapter 4. Moreover a North -  South 
patent protection model is constructed in order to evaluate the possible costs of TRIPs 
agreement to the South. In all these models, three alternative policy choices are 
evaluated, namely government subsidy, patent protection and no protection case. Chapter 
4 also reveals that the South has a strong free riding incentive, whereas it is well known 
that northern high technology firms constantly invest on masking efforts to conceal 
knowledge within these new technologies. In this sense, a global consensus about 
intellectual property protection may be beneficial due to removal of these costly but not 
productive efforts.
The models in Chapter 4 give several important results about the patent protection for 
given parameters of the model. These parameters are degree of love for variety, market 
size (country size), demand pattern, extension of patent protection over differentiated 
goods market and patent duration. The main findings of this chapter can be summarized 
as follows:
• The degree of love for variety, which is represented by the elasticity of substitution in 
the model, is shown to be a critical parameter in the model. Both the monopoly profit 
and the welfare loss are sensitive to changes in degree of love for variety. Clearly, if 
degree of love for variety increases, which is equivalent to lower elasticity of 
substitution, then monopoly profit and welfare loss of society increase.
• Country size matters. Monopoly profits and welfare loss increase with increases in 
the country size. Thus larger markets create higher incentives to innovate.
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• If patent protection is extended to other substitutes of the patented technology, then 
profits increase and welfare loss decreases. Thus, wider patent protection, which can 
be interpreted as an extensive patent scope, creates higher monopoly profit and lower 
welfare loss in the original sector.
• The model indicates that, if patent duration gets longer, then both monopoly profit 
and welfare loss increase.
• Hence, degree of love for variety, country size, and demand pattern are all important 
parameters in the model. But these parameters cannot be controlled directly by the 
governments. On the other hand, patent duration and the scope of patents (extension 
of patent protection over product space) can be precisely adjusted by legal authority. 
It is to be noted that patent duration and scope can be interpreted as a proxy for patent 
stringency. This interpretation implies that stronger patent protection regime creates 
higher monopoly profits for innovators and larger welfare loss for the society. These 
findings also suggest that, two policy variables, namely duration and scope, can be 
used to obtain an optimum solution. Clearly if market size, degree of love of variety, 
demand pattern and cost of R&D are given parameters, then the model may propose 
an optimum patent duration for this economy, which minimizes welfare loss and just 
recover R&D cost of innovators.
• The chapter enables to study the e f f i c i e n c y o f  R&D laboratories. That is to say, 
the model implies that if R&D laboratory is more efficient in one country, then its 
innovators make higher profit per unit R&D cost, other things being equal. This result 
indicates that a country, which has more efficient R&D laboratories than its rival 
countries, makes more innovations than others, since more innovations are profitable 
to materialize in this country.
• The model also reveals that TRIPs agreement induces an income transfer from less 
developed countries to developed ones through stronger patent protection. Actually, 
this result sheds light on the resistance of developing countries in TRIPs negotiations.
1 0 3 R&D cost is assumed to reflect efficiency o f a laboratory.
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• All these findings suggest that patent protection system is the second best policy at 
hand, since it fosters innovative activities but also generates welfare loss for society 
due to monopoly pricing in product markets. Patent system must be carefully 
designed in order to keep the economy working and imiovating efficiently, while not 
creating too much monopoly distortions.
In the fifth chapter, a simple model is presented for the examination of the effect of 
patent length on technological lag between two regions. Among various findings, it is 
shown that technological lag is nondecreasing in global patent duration. This positive 
relationship implies relatively low levels of patent length, if the international agreements 
on patent protection take into account the convergence of the consumption patterns, and 
hence of the welfares (utilities derived from consumption), among different parts of the 
world. The main findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• Optimal monopoly markup in a country is decreasing both in the level of technology 
and patent duration, while it is increasing in economic development level of country. 
This result can be interpreted as higher monopoly prices in developed countries than 
developing countries; furthermore, prices of technologies, which lie at the edge of 
teclinology frontier, are higher than prices of other technologies whose patent have 
expired.
• Monopoly profit also increases by the increase of economic development level of a 
country. For example, a northern innovative firm could make higher profits in its 
local market than less developed foreign markets.
• It is also shown that, technological lag is a non-decreasing function of the technology 
level concerning patented products. That is to say, technological lag between 
developed and developing countries is larger in higher technologies than primitive 
ones in patented products.
• The chapter suggests that, technological lag is non-decreasing in patent duration of 
developing countries, whereas non-increasing in patent duration of developed 
countries.
• The model shows that, technological lag is non-decreasing in patent length given that 
all countries share the same patent duration. This finding implies that, if TRIPs
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agreement induces longer patent duration, then technological lag between developed 
and developing poles would not be reduced.
As Professor Scherer indicated at the AEA Conference in 1996, there is an increasing 
trend in the number of studies on intellectual property. Actually, the subject is rather 
old, and goes back to medieval times. The inclusion of intellectual property into 
multilateral trade negotiations fosters these studies. Moreover, increasing 
communication capabilities, globalization, and increasing volume of international 
trade raises the infringement risks of intellectual properties. Especially, developed 
countries insist on higher standards which provide a minimum required non- 
discriminatory intellectual property protection. Most of the studies indicate that 
patent protection is the second best policy, since it distorts commodity markets 
through monopoly creation, while promoting inventions. However, detrimental parts 
of patent protection can be abraded by effectively coordinated public policies, 
specifically through the control of anti-competitive practices. Finally, knowledge 
disseminations ignore international borders. Moreover, today’s technologies diffuse 
through digital environment without any limitation. All these increase the importance 
of efficient intellectual property protection regimes on a worldwide scale.
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